THE EARLY THEORY OF HUMAN CHOICE
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: SUÁREZ IN HISTORY

Francisco Suárez has been described as standing at the crossroads of scholasticism and modern philosophy.[1] He was born January 5, 1548, at the dawn of what was to be the modern era of thought in both philosophy and science. In the same year St. Ignatius of Loyola wrote his spiritual exercises; Giordano Bruno was born; Cervantes was one year old. The previous generation had given birth to both Montaigne and St. John of the Cross; the next was to flower in Shakespeare, Bacon, Galileo, and Kepler.[2] René Descartes graduated from the Jesuit school of La Flèche during Suárez' lifetime. The Protestant revolt had taken place, and philosophical and theological thought was in turmoil; men as a whole were looking forward in a rising humanistic spirit of individualism. At this time appeared Suárez--one of the great names in the history of philosophy. Yet, as Enrique Gómez Arboleya has pointed out, it is a name almost empty of content today. The quid nominis is recognized; the quid rei--the doctrine and reality of Suárez' thought--is not.[3] Why such an eclipse of a thinker whose books dominated most of the universities of northern Europe? To answer this question and understand the philosophical fate of Suárez, one must situate him carefully in the historical and philosophical currents of his time. No man philosophizes in a vaouum, for it is the man who philosophizes: the man who has been formed by his teachers, his surroundings, the books he has read and studied, his whole environment. And his teachings are not thrown out into the sterile air, but caught up into a world of other men's thoughts and strivings, there to be mixed and molded, to wield an influence great or small but always somehow perceptible.

When Suárez was born in 1548, the humanism of the Renaissance had dominated the world of reputable thought for some time. Since the fourteenth century and William of Ockham, no significant or truly original philosophy had appeared, while nominalism had degenerated into a dialectical survival of some of the worst precisions of scholasticism. Philosophy itself had become identified in the minds of most thinkers with useless hair-splitting and contradictory arguments, so that scepticism in speculative matters seemed to be the only sane position.[4] Humanists like Erasmus, who died only twelve years before Suárez was born, had made such a devastating and witty attack upon the philosophy of the schools that any profound intercommunication across the gap already widening between the scholastics and men of the modern age became nearly impossible.[5]

In spite of the unfavorable outlook toward philosophy, however, a noticeable vitality surged up in some scholastic circles, particularly on the Iberian peninsula. Here Suárez came into prominence, but not precisely in the same way that St. Thomas had. Comparisons between the two rarely succeed, for both were fully men of their times, and their times were inescapably different. St. Thomas wrote at the height of the thirteenth century, the golden age of scholasticism, when metaphysics was a philosopher's natural way of thinking. Suárez, on the other hand, wrote his philosophy at a time when metaphysics was regarded as untrustworthy at best, contradictory at worst. The entire medieval order and synthesis was breaking up to make way for the modern era in thought, science, and political society. Suárez had to present his philosophy in terms that would be understood by the more individualistic and practical men of his day, in a style that would be more acceptable to them than the dry and overworked commentaries on Aristotle or St. Thomas.[6] A teacher all his life, Suárez would have to strive to reach the minds of men where they were. *That* aspect of teaching can never change. His method therefore broke with the past and while he remained true to the basic positions of scholasticism, he still tried to stand firmly with his contemporaries--a "Janus figure," one author has felicitously called him.[7]

Such considerations emphasize the truth that a man cannot stand outside of history, and his thoughts cannot be fully understood without history to lend them perspective. The "counter-reformation" philosophers of Spain had been moved profoundly by the external events of revolt and schism. Deeply and personally convinced of the truths of faith, they sought with all the powers at their disposal to explain, in terms that would be understandable to all intellectual men of their times, the cosmological and human realities that form the underlying ground of faith and the science of theology.[8] Faced with a barrage of errors concerning man's freedom and God's necessary knowledge and efficacious will, these philosophers tended naturally to concentrate their efforts on the mysterious fact of man's liberty, and as Suárez himself states in the prologue to his Metaphysical Disputations,[9] a thorough foundation in metaphysics was recognized as necessary for anyone striving to reach a deep understanding of theology. Thus Suárez wrote an independent treatise in metaphysics--one of the first since Aristotle's. Through this monumental work the ideas of Suárez reached the universities of Germany and northern Europe, where a similar interest in metaphysics as a science independent of, but not foreign to, theology was developing.[10]

A brief look at some of the more outstanding thinkers prominent in the time of Suárez will help later to clarify his own positions.

Clavius, the famous Jesuit mathematician whose teachings were apparently to influence Descartes so greatly, sums up very well the prevalent attitude toward degrees of certitude in philosophy and mathematics. In the introduction to the 1611 edition of his Mathematical Works, he wrote:[11]

> To say nothing of the other philosophers, the many sects of the Peripatetics prove this point (of the doubts and uncertainties in philosophical knowledge). Although they

> are all sprung from Aristotle as branches from the same trunk, they disagree so completely with one another and with Aristotle who is their source that you would scarcely know what Aristotle was aiming at, whether he disputed about words or things. Hence it is that among his interpreters some follow the Latins, some the Arabs, others the Nominalists, or the so-called Realists. How far all this is removed from mathematical demonstrations is clear to everyone. The theorems of Euclid and of the other mathematicians are just as true today as they were in the schools centuries ago. Since therefore mathematical disciplines seek the truth so earnestly and love and cherish it so that nothing false or even merely probable is found in them, nothing that they do not prove by most certain demonstrations, there is no doubt but what the first place among the sciences should be conceded to them.[12]

In view of the uncertainties and even contradictions found in much of the philosophic thought of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, men naturally turned to disciplines in which at least some certitude could be found. Mathematical reason found its fruition in science with the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, and the other new scientists; many of the humanists, with their newly awakened interest in society and the state, turned to the opening field of politics and the techniques of managing men, as is clear from the tremendous influence of Macchiavelli's The Prince on the development of the modern state.[13]

Giordano Bruno, born in the same year as Suárez, faced an identical historical situation but with totally different results. Bruno's reaction to the new scientific developments was one of innovation in philosophy, and in him the discoveries of Copernicus found their first philosophical expression. The universe, infinite and beautiful, became identified with God for Bruno; in this conviction he found his senses open, his spirit fulfilled, his understanding expanded, man's only true beatitude achieved.[14] His doctrine of universal animation led him to a pantheistic outlook which he was able to reconcile with his faith only by leaning toward the doctrine of the "double truth" which the Latin Averroists had so nimbly expounded: "This is what would have been true in philosophy, except that God willed otherwise." Not so agile as Siger of Brabant, Bruno ended his life in the flames of the Inquisition, condemned to die as a heretic.[15]

The most outstanding Thomist in the sixteenth century was undoubtedly Thomas de Vio, Cajetan. In the Metaphysical Disputations Suárez cites him just under three hundred times.[16] Cajetan's commentaries on the Summa Theologiae were published over a span of fifteen years, with the first appearing in 1508, the last in 1523, only twenty-five years before the birth of Suárez. Cajetan became a cardinal in 1517, and was sent as papal legate to Germany in 1518, where he carried on conversations with Luther, who had defected the previous year. Although this sixteenth century summit meeting bore no tangible fruit, Cardinal Cajetan continued a life of great service, both in the practical and speculative spheres, to the Church. His commentaries on the Summa were so highly esteemed that, together with those of Silvester of Ferrara on the Summa Contra Gentiles, they have been incorporated into the Leonine edition of these works.[17] By the time Suárez began to study philosophy, these commentaries would have been in use for fifty years--obviously, therefore, both venerable and authentic Thomism. Whenever Suárez refers to "Thomists" he usually has in mind a particular group of commentators: Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara always, of course, and often mentioned by name. He also includes John Capreolus, "the Prince of the Thomists," who died in 1444, and Soncinas, whom Suárez apparently regards as the Thomistic authority on metaphysics. In the *Disputations* he is quoted more than any other Thomist except Cajetan. Occasionally Suárez expands his group to include Hervaeus Natalis and Dominic of Flanders, O.P., as well.[18]

Domingo Báñez,[19] another Dominican of tremendous historical importance, was a contemporary of Suárez and Molina. Born in 1528, he studied at Salamanca the generation before Suárez, and taught there as well. He had great personal influence over his students, but his strong pugnacious character, combined with an undeniable animosity to the Society of Jesus, turned an ideological difference into a long and bitter struggle.[20] The controversies on grace broke out in Salamanca in 1582, when Báñez had already been teaching the doctrine of physical predetermination for some time.[21] Báñez differed significantly from Vitoria in his basic approach to St. Thomas. Vitoria was a Thomist, but felt that any opinion of St. Thomas which proved to be false or unfounded should be replaced by a better one. This type of Thomism was espoused by the Jesuits. Báñez, on the other hand, would be disinclined even to admit such a possibility. For him, St. Thomas is the undisputed master in philosophy who ought to be followed in everything. Thanks to Báñez a very rigid Thomism developed among many Dominicans.[22] Báñez seems to have identified his cause with the cause of St. Thomas, of the Church, of God Himself. The zeal which flamed from his fierce Spanish nature thus knew no bounds, as was evident in his appeal to the pope in 1597, from whom Báñez begged a release from the three-year-old ban of silence concerning the controversies on grace--but only for the Dominicans! Among other arguments he cited the long warfare of centuries the Dominicans had waged against heresies and now, after bearing the heat and burden of the day, they had been forced to maintain a humiliating silence, just the same as the newest and most untried religious in the Church.[23] The following year the ban was lifted for everyone, but with the stipulation that discussions were to take place in universities and colleges only, not in pulpits.[24] Báñez' philosophical thought shaped and influenced strongly the positions of the men around him--to agreement or to controversy. Suárez cites him only four times in the Metaphysical Disputations,[25] but much of his material and even his method takes on a new depth because of the intellectual presence of Báñez.

As attention shifts from the Dominicans to the Jesuits now, Pedro de Fonseca stands out among the philosophers of the Spanish Renaissance. Born in 1528, he entered the Society on March 17 of the same year Suárez was born.[26] Fonseca's prominence both as a teacher at the intellectual center of Coimbra, Portugal, and in various religious offices of his order, intensified the influence of his teaching methods and his ideas on Suárez and other later Jesuit thinkers. His commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics showed a critical sense, a depth of commentary, and a genuine effort to understand the author on his own terms that clearly marked Fonseca as a man of the Renaissance. His work showed a marked respect for the text--a concern so lacking in medieval commentaries but so much a part of the modern mentality--and reflected as well the rising contemporary interest in reality itself: "things rather than words." His method also combined that of the commentary with that of the question,[27] as Suárez likewise would do later on, developing the technique even more fully. Perhaps, however, Fonseca most greatly affected the minds of men by his concept of the "scientia media" which would serve as one end of a bone of contention between Dominicans and Jesuits (and those studying them) for many years to come. In his Metaphysics Fonseca describes this rather special type of God's knowledge which turns out to be not absolutely absolute, but in a unique way conditioned. It is knowledge not precisely of what will happen, but of what would happen if God had willed to establish a different order among things and people (above all, their human wills) than the actual existing order He did create. This knowledge, therefore, is neither totally free nor totally necessitated. It cannot be lacking in God, for He is omniscient, so it is somehow necessary; but it is not so necessary that it could not be other than it is, provided the actual conditions or circumstances were to be different. And God was certainly free to make them different. This third type of knowledge is the famous "scientia media."[28]

Another Jesuit of considerable importance in Suárez' life was Gabriel Vázquez. One of the outstanding teachers at the University of Alcalá, Vázquez was replaced there by Suárez in 1585 when the latter returned from Rome, apparently for reasons of health, while Vázquez took over the vacated teaching position in Rome.[29] A personality clash between the two men came to its head when Vázquez returned from Rome after six years to teach at Alcalá with Suárez. Their differences were philosophical as well as personal, for in his Commentary and Disputation on the First Part of the Summa, Disputation 80, to take one instance, the ideas of Vázquez on the knowledge and liberty of God are somewhat controversial.[30] Vázquez writes there that liberty is not an intrinsic and real perfection of God, not even a relation of reason between God and the creature he freely creates. Rather, to safeguard the absolute immutability and simplicity of the divine being, liberty must be no more than an extrinsic relation with respect to God. At the same time Vázquez held that God does not know creatures mediately by contemplating his own essence; creatures are not of the same essence of God, hence cannot be known by means of it. God sees creatures, says Vázquez, directly in themselves as in an expressed species. Obviously certain problems arise from this position. Vázquez' views on nature and on the natural law stress the immutability and even inviolability of nature: a thing is bad or good by its very nature, and not at all by anyone's prohibition or external mandate, not even God's. Nature is its own law. These doctrines, and others, forced Suárez into frequent discussions and arguments with Vázquez[31]--their two years together at Alcalá must have been stimulating for their students as well as for their superiors.

Luis de Molina is probably the best known Jesuit, next to Suárez, in the sixteenth century. He was Báñez' principal opponent in the struggle to explain human liberty that would occupy the last twenty years ~~of~~ that century and make its reverberations felt around the world. Born about fifteen years earlier than Suárez, he entered the Society of Jesus in 1553 when Suárez was just five ~~years~~ old. Molina made his novitiate and studied at Coimbra in Portugal, where he later taught philosophy, while in 1568 he went to Evora to teach theology there for the next fifteen years. During this period he began to publish his commentaries and other theological works, winning fame in all parts of the Iberian peninsula. Molina left Evora in 1583, but continued to write, publish, and dispute until the end of his life in 1600.[32]

To sum up Molina's thought in a few paragraphs is plainly impossible, but a few comments on his doctrine and main themes throw considerable light on some of Suárez' positions. The two men never actually taught or studied together, but the last twenty years of Suárez' teaching life were spent at Coimbra, the most important university philosophically at that time in Spain and Portugal, where Molina had taught philosophy so long and so well. The leaven of Molina's thought was bound to be still at work. Perhaps the core doctrine of all Molina's writing is his insistence on the concept of human liberty, for his other positions seem to take their vital shape and form only in reference to that one. God has made man free: this is the central fact of man's human existence and struggle to attain his perfection; this is the doctrine denied by Luther and the other Protestant heretics that the Society of Jesus was founded in order to combat; from this reality flow the meaning of man, the very existence of responsibility and the moral order; here is a doctrine that must be saved at any cost.[33]

Although the name of "Molinism" was new, the Molinistic doctrine on grace had in essence been professed by the Jesuit order from the first. Suárez, in his treatise on the founding of the Society of Jesus, stresses the constant zeal of the order to solve the problem of the proper conciliation of grace and free will. He points out that St. Ignatius had been inspired by this zeal from the very start, passing it on in turn to his spiritual children, who had, Suárez affirms, received from the Holy Spirit Himself both the mission to combat heresies and the necessary guidance in doctrinal positions.[34] On both theological and philosophical grounds, Lutheranism had denied the existence of free choice in man; Catholics could no longer go on simply affirming the fact. The questions that Luther raised called for specific answers, explaining the how of compatibility between God as first cause and man as second. The problem took on a particular urgency, not only speculatively but also morally, and thus a natural dynamic reaction to Luther's extreme determinism and pessimism resulted in the opposite pole of Molinism, in which the highest possible value compatible with the divine causality was affirmed of the human will.[35] The obvious crusading spirit which animated both Molina and Báñez kept the fires of controversy blazing, so that the Jesuits proclaimed that anyone who disagreed with them on the question of grace was at heart a Calvinist or Lutheran, while the Dominicans led by Báñez were zealously insisting that their own position represented the one true doctrine of the Church and of St. Thomas.[36]

Apart from the rightness or wrongness of Molina's doctrine, the force of his arguments and boldness of expression have gained him a right to respect and studious consideration. True, many of the elements of his doctrine were not original, but the particular genius of organizing logically and with a certain profundity diverse philosophical and theological elements--previously considered to be incompatible--belonged to Molina.[37] If he did not solve the problem completely--and what finite being can really claim to do this? --he at least stated it in terms accurate and succinct enough to make discussion possible. This alone is a great service. Bonet put it well: "Molinism is one of the greatest forces that Catholic thought has produced in order to explain itself to itself."[38]

In addition to the influence of these sixteenth century thinkers, the principal systems of scholastic philosophy which were commonly taught at that time bear mentioning. Several were in vogue, often contradicting each other, at least to some extent. Such discrepancies failed to prevent their being taught at the same universities, however, and frequently by the same teacher. Ordinarily, in Suárez' time, chairs were established in the various universities for the teaching of St. Thomas, Scotus ("Ait Thomas, negat Scotus"), Durandus, and Gabriel Biel. Durandus, a thirteenth-century Dominican, was steadfastly opposed to Thomism, while Biel, "the last of the Scholastics," was an out-and-out nominalist who is credited, through his pupil Staupitz--Luther's superior and advisor--with having had considerable philosophical influence on that Protestant reformer.[39] In sum, then, and described all too sketchily, such were the chief philosophical currents and eddies into which Suárez embarked.

Francisco Suárez was born in Granada, Spain, on January 5, 1548.[40] His family was both ancient and noble, and seems also to have been quite religious, for out of eight brothers, six entered religion.[41] Suárez himself received the tonsure at the early age of ten. His extremely quiet boyhood lacked any significant events that have come down to us, save this one, which Suárez himself refers to later on in his treatise On the Virtue and State of Religion. Gómez Arboleya remarks that this calm and natural upbringing was a major factor in giving Suárez not only his characteristic equilibrium, but also a certain absence of relief.[42] In 1561, when Suárez was only thirteen, he and his brother set off to study at Salamanca, Francisco among the canonists, his brother Juan among the students of civil law. Juan left Salamanca after two years, but Francisco continued there, most providentially, for in the spring of 1564, one year after the close of the Council of Trent, Father Juan Ramírez preached what must have been an unusual series of Lenten sermons. The rector of the university recorded the truly remarkable fruits that appeared everywhere in the scholastic community: numerous confessions and communions, renewed application and ardor both in studies and in religious duties, and particularly a tremendous surge in vocations. Fifty candidates, among them Francisco Suárez, applied that year for entrance into the Society of Jesus.[43]

Of these fifty candidates, only one was rejected: Suárez himself. The board of examiners declared that although the young boy was plainly of excellent morals, neither his health nor his mental ability showed the necessary qualities for life in the Society. Suárez, however, began to show his habitual persistence for the cause of right confronted by opposition, and marched himself to Valladolid, where he appealed personally to the provincial superior of Castille, Father Juan Suárez. The provincial must have been somehow impressed by the boy, for he ordered another examination of the candidate. Once again Suárez was rejected. After much prayer, however, the superior decided to admit Suárez to the company in spite of the advice of his council, and gave the young boy the status of "indifferent," i.e., with permission to become a simple lay brother if he revealed no aptitudes for the priesthood. It was June of 1564. Suárez entered the Jesuit College less than two weeks later, made his novitiate during the summer, and by autumn had returned to Salamanca as a young Jesuit student to study philosophy under Father Andrés Martínez.[44]

Here the pessimistic predictions of both boards of examiners seemed to be fully realized. Only with great difficulty was Suárez able to follow the course of philosophy; he understood almost nothing and was unable to enter into any discussions. Discouraged, he went to his local superior and asked to be changed to more humble tasks, since it appeared that God was choosing this way to show him his unfitness for higher employments. His only aim on entering the company was to save his soul and to serve others; this only he begged to be allowed to do.[45] His superior, however, told him to go back and study harder, pray more fervently, and confide more deeply in God. The results were astounding, for Suárez began to improve and finally to excel, both in philosophy and in theology. After this, his path never wavered, and the remainder of his long life was spent in teaching and writing with the utmost success.[46]

During his six years of study at the University of Salamanca, the young Jesuit came in contact with some of the best minds of his day. The outstanding teacher at the university had been Francisco de Vitoria, who held the first chair in theology for the last twenty years of his life, from 1526 to 1546. One of his disciples, Mancio de Corpore Christi, was perhaps Suárez' most influential teacher.[47] Iturrioz speaks of Suárez as one link in the great chain initiated by Vitoria which also included Soto, Cano, Medina, Báñez, and Luis de León.[48] Suárez was formed here at Salamanca in a solidly based Christian humanism that rooted itself mainly in a realistic and objective view of reality. He displayed always a certain affection and pride in his own school, whenever, later on, he would refer to the great teachers of Salamanca. No slavish disciple, nevertheless, he knew well how to sift and weigh the evidence judiciously, accepting this and rejecting that, and the range of his citations and references reveals him to have been fully in contact with his contemporary world of thought, as well as fully in command of his own position confronting it.[49] In addition to formulating at this time the basic attitudes he would take toward reality and that explanation of it which is named metaphysics, Suárez developed at Salamanca the scholarly habit of thought which would lead him to examine for himself every opinion or problem he encountered in philosophy. He made a practice of studying beforehand the texts of St. Thomas and Scotus that would be taken in class, stating the problem for himself and drawing up a provisional solution, prior to any explanation on the part of the professor. The philosopher Suárez thus came into being, and by the end of his studies in 1570, he was quite ready to begin his teaching career.[50]

Suárez was still too young to be ordained a priest. He remained at Salamanca for the rest of the year, conducting a sort of review in theology for those students like himself who could not yet be ordained but had finished their regular studies. At this time, too, he began real work on what would be published nearly thirty years later as his Metaphysical Disputations.[51] Sent to Segovia in 1571, Suárez began his philosophy teaching in earnest, and was ordained there in January of the following year. In 1575 he began to teach theology in Segovia, then successively in Ávila, Valladolid, Rome, Alcalá and Salamanca. He initiated his publishing career in 1590 while at Alcalá. At the request of Philip II, Suárez went to Coimbra, Portugal, in 1597 to take the first chair in theology, and taught there until two years before his death on September 25, 1617, in Lisbon.[52] His last words were: "I did not believe it was so sweet to die."[53]

What does one write of the life of a teacher? On the surface, surely, the facts appear drab enough with little that is outstanding. Here is just another life of teaching class after class, interspersed now and then with the publication of one or another book. A few incidents come down to us, nevertheless, that reveal the man behind these everyday facts: a man of dedication to truth and in possession of quiet strength. First of all, even in Suárez' very first teaching assignment, rumbles of protest were heard against his teaching methods. Suárez replied always that he was prepared to give up his professorships, if so desired by his superiors, but that if he were to teach, it could only be as he was then teaching. Marías remarks the unusual tenacity and determination that Suárez continually showed in this matter, in spite of his habitual self-discipline and spirit of obedience.[54] What was there about him to provoke such opposition and suspicion? The answer, it seems to me, lies in the dedication and well-thought-out procedure of the real teacher, as appears plain from Suárez' own explanation of the matter in a letter to his superior, Mercuriano, in 1579. After affirming that he had always mainly adhered to the doctrine of St. Thomas,[55] Suárez goes on to explain that what is really causing the astonishment and questioning is his manner of conducting class. The prevailing custom almost everywhere had been to "read from notebooks" ["leer por cartapacios"], i.e., simply to repeat various opinions and principles with very little examination of their actual content--some were professed as false, others maintained by a sort of blind faith as absolute maxims of philosophy. These were regarded as near "deities of reason"; even to question their truth seemed somehow irreverent.[56] Suárez, opposing this tradition-bound parroting of a sort of frozen scholastic party line with very little apparent connection with reality, insisted rather on a close, honest look at the roots of things, an effort to see them exactly as they presented themselves: being, but limited being. His sources and guides would always be sacred authority, human authority, and reason, each in its proper place.[57]

This is the proper philosophical spirit. In line with it, Suárez acquainted himself with as much of the history of philosophy as possible, so that he could bring to bear the wisdom of the past on the perennial problems he studied and taught. As a teacher, Suárez had to understand the secular tradition in which the "cartapacios" had been formulated, but so as to interpret and explain to his students the realities with which it dealt. His entire philosophical task, therefore, consisted of a constant *rethinking* of all that had gone before, in confrontation with the new ideas and positions of his contemporaries.[58]

All this demanded a new method. Instead of producing numerous commentaries on the text of this author or that, or minute questions broken down into parts and subparts, Suárez perfected the form of the disputation--an extended treatise to clarify and explain some particular philosophical problem. His purpose was always to teach. He was not by profession a philosopher making known to the public the fruits of his intellectual research; rather, he was a professor of theology who saw his writing and publication as no more than a service bound up intimately with his role as a teacher. Suárez began to publish only in 1590, at the insistence of his superiors, when he had already been teaching twenty years.[59] Certain points needed to be clarified in order to be taught more easily; this clarification he accomplished to an astounding degree, as the tremendous volume of his published writings attests: the earliest edition of his collected works, that of

Sebastian Colleti in Venice from 1740 to 1751, took up twenty-three large folio volumes.[60] In beginning to write his theology, however, Suárez discovered that he must first establish clearly and fully the fundamental science of metaphysics. Human and natural knowledge was a necessary basis for the supernatural. And thus, Suárez wrote his metaphysical treatises primarily for a theological reason--they were a needed preparation and foundation for any serious study of theology which wished to do more than skim the surface.[61] The searcher after truth in its deepest dimension, therefore, stands revealed by a careful examination of Suárez and his teaching method.

A rather significant glimpse of the personality of Suárez can be obtained by a closer look at his teaching years in Alcalá. He had gone there from Rome in 1585, changing places with the renowned Gabriel Vázquez.[62] His reception was somewhat cool, unfortunately, for Vázquez had been a figure of immense popularity at Alcalá. Both men were undoubtedly fine theologians, but the strong personality differences between them gave each a unique impact upon his students. Vázquez was the scintillating, dynamic teacher, whose classes seemed to pulse with vitality. He was open to all, friendly and expansive, and in need of personal contact with his students in the interchange and stimulation of thought. Quick and somewhat nervous, Vázquez thrived on debate, which served to sharpen his already incisive wit. This man, with his Augustinian fervor and devoted followers, was replaced by the quiet, reserved Suárez. The change was not welcome to the university circles of Alcalá. If Vázquez was Augustinian in temperament, Suárez may be called Thomistic. He showed none of Vázquez' sporadic but brilliant bursts of genius; rather, he was methodical and precise. Suárez moved slowly and in an aura of certitude. His externally cold manner repulsed those used to Vázquez' warmth, and his introverted aloofness, while making a strong intellectual impression on a few, typified to most observers the scholar one admires greatly but hardly ever loves.[63]

When Vázquez returned to Alcalá from Rome, the situation grew immediately worse. The rivals were to teach together for two years, but nearly the whole population of the university threw its vociferous support to Vázquez; a disgruntled toleration of Suárez as a temporary--and far from satisfactory--substitute now burst into open animosity which soon grew quite intolerable for the reserved and silent Suárez. Finally, at his own request, he left Alcalá in 1593 and went instead to Salamanca. More opposition met him here, but in spite of it all, Suárez kept both the approbation of his superiors and his core of interior calm. His fame over the entire peninsula was growing as his publications increased, so that Philip II was even then asking the Jesuit superiors to send Suárez to Coimbra to take the first chair in theology.[64]

None of this turmoil shows in the writing of Suárez, yet turmoil it must surely have been to a man so peace-loving, so opposed to polemic, so dedicated to his vocation. If the personality of Suárez is visible no place else, he cannot fail here to win our compassion and admiration. The man is evident.

The works are also a testimony. Jesús Iturrioz, in his introduction to the excellent Suarezian bibliography in *Razón y Fe*'s special memorial edition in 1948,[65] points out that as far as Suárez' own workmanship and authorship is concerned, his published works can be divided into three parts. The first section includes all those edited and published by Suárez himself, from his first work, *De Incarnatione Verbi* in 1590, to the last published during his lifetime: his *Defensio Fidei*, at Coimbra in 1613.[66] The second group of his writings, although published posthumously, was prepared for the press by Suárez himself before his death. The remainder were edited and finished, to a greater or lesser degree, by various editors, among whom stands out Baltasar Alvarez. His liberal ministrations call for a careful study of the text of these latter works in comparison with the originals, where possible, or with the earlier works of Suárez, so that the authentic Suarezian thought may be neither obscured nor lost.[67]

The first editions of the works of Suárez himself are as follows:

De Incarnatione Verbi	Alcalá, 1590
De Incarnatione Verbi (expanded edition)	Salamanca, 1595
De Mysteriis Vitae Christi	Alcalá, 1592
De Sacramentis, I	Alcalá, 1592
Disputationes Metaphysicae, I and II . .	Salamanca, 1597
Opuscula theologica (*De concursu*, etc.).	Madrid, 1599
De Sacramentis, II.	Coimbra, 1602
De Censuris	Coimbra, 1603
De Deo Uno et Trino	Coimbra, 1606

De Virtute et Statu Religionis, I	Coimbra, 1608
De Virtute et Statu Religionis, II	Coimbra, 1609
De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore	Coimbra, 1612
Defensio Fidei	Coimbra, 1613.

All of these volumes were published during the lifetime of Suárez, and can therefore be considered completely genuine.

These works alone would have represented a remarkable volume of publication, but Suárez left many thousands of pages unedited. The chief posthumous publications are these:

De Gratia, I and III	Coimbra, 1619
De Angelis	Lyon, 1620
De opere sex dierum and *De Anima*	Lyon, 1621
De Fide, Spe et Charitate	Lyon and Coimbra, 1621
De Virtute et Statu Religionis, III	Lyon, 1624
De Virtute et Statu Religionis, IV (*De Instituto Soc. Jes.*)	Lyon, 1625
De ultimo fine, de voluntario, etc.	Lyon, 1628
De Gratia, II (De Auxiliis)	Lyon, 1651
De vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis.	Lyon, 1655
Opuscula sex inedita	Brussels-Paris, 1859
Francisco Suárez, Doctor Eximius: Conselhos e pareceres	Coimbra, 1948.[68]

Two *Opera Omnia* have been published--Sebastian Colleti's in Venice from 1740 to 1751, and that of Luis Vives, in Paris from 1856 to 1861. Both collections are lacking in various short works and monographs, in spite of their titles, but even now a fully complete body of works is not available. Many of Suárez' treatises and commentaries still remain in manuscript form, e.g., several chapters of *De vera intelligentia*'s first draft in the author's own hand, with numerous corrections by him, in the Barberini collection in the Vatican.[69] The original text *De Anima*, taught by Suárez in Segovia around 1571, is catalogued in the University of Salamanca, MS #583, as "Commentaria una cum Quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de Anima."[70] How many more manuscripts may be lying hidden in this or that library in Spain or Portugal is an intriguing question, and one not likely to find a ready answer. The task continues.

Some recognition must be given to the tremendous influence the works of Suárez exercised all over Europe during the two centuries after his death.[71] In the first forty years after the publication of the Metaphysical Disputations more than sixteen editions were printed. Rábade Romeo points out that the basically essentialist orientation of this work reflected accurately the developing rationalism of the time. Recalling the uncertainties and resultant scepticism dominant in most of the philosophical world of the sixteenth century, one understands the appeal of a world of essences and pure possibles where predictions are absolutely safe, concepts are neat and well-defined, and untidy existential contingencies are--as far as can be managed--swept swiftly under the rug if they are ill-mannered enough to appear.[72]

Whatever the ultimate reason for the widespread influence of the disputations, the facts are plain. Germany especially seemed to have found a kindred philosophical spirit, for the book was immediately put into use in all the major German universities, several editions appeared in Germany alone before 1620, and the very name of Suárez meant metaphysician.[73] Even the Protestant centers and universities considered him their absolute guide, as is clear from the fact that the most prominent Protestant writer on metaphysics, Christoph Scheibler, was called "the Protestant Suárez" soon after his Opus Metaphysicum appeared in 1617, the same year Suárez died.[74] The universities of the Low Countries, after a long period of domination by antimetaphysical and Calvinistic attitudes, took a renewed interest in philosophy and metaphysics at the beginning of the seventeenth century, introducing the works of Pedro de Fonseca as well as those of Suárez. The Disputations became the common text, resumés were made of it, and manuals of metaphysics were fashioned by the professors after its pattern. Even after Cartesian thought became prominent, the influence of Suarezian metaphysics traced a broad path at these universities even up to the middle of the eighteenth century.[75] The familiarity of such great philosophers as Descartes, Leibniz, and Schopenhauer with the works of Suárez is well-known,[76] and Julian Marías points out that the influence of Suárez on modern philosophy as a whole is much greater than is usually recognized. His metaphysics was not carried on as such into modern thought, but it was without a doubt the testing ground where the great new philosophers learned their first metaphysics and came into contact with the most important ideas and concepts of the Scholastic past, before turning a new face to the future and forging a new method in metaphysics. The influence might be denied; it could not, however, be erased.[77] Marías writes in another place that the modern world learned metaphysics from Suárez, but it did not learn the metaphysics of Suárez. The new discoveries in science and the philosophy of Descartes took the world by storm very shortly after the death of Suárez, and the vast intellectual excitement generated a strong impulse into the future and a rejection of much of the past. Even the literary forms changed, becoming more compact and less verbose, so that today the "near-library" that any one of Suárez' works resembles gains no ready audience.[78]

Today few universities profess the philosophy of Suárez as a whole. The Jesuits in Spain remain almost totally faithful, however, as even a cursory look at the periodical literature coming from there reveals most clearly. Some outstanding Jesuit philosophers in Germany and a few other isolated areas--Mexico, for instance--still are Suarezians, but for the most part Thomism has become once again the dominant philosophy of the schools. This fact, nevertheless, does not diminish the historical importance of Suárez, nor his right to be studied seriously and profoundly as one of the foremost thinkers in the dawning of modern philosophy.[79]

To judge the accomplishment of Suárez is part of this study, and not the easiest part. The simplest object appears very different when viewed from various perspectives, and when, Picasso-like, we try to portray all its angles at once, the result itself demands interpretation. We are not accustomed to seeing the whole of an object at once; thus we either declare that the picture is distorted or we mistake our own limited view for the whole, forgetting the possibility of other vantage points. Something of the same process happens in judging a philosopher or a philosophical system, so that almost anyone can find an opinion on Suárez to suit him. Some thinkers, particularly in Spain, see Suárez as the positive cure for every philosophical error, and spread their gospel most fervently.[80] Others denigrate him nearly as fervently. Mullaney, in his *Suarez on Human Freedom*, maintains that a denial, albeit unconscious, of the principle of noncontradiction underlies the whole metaphysical system of Suárez.[81] Still others view him as little more than a collector of other men's opinions--a ~~sort~~ of self-appointed arbitrator with little ability or originality of his own.[82] But the only sure way, although a slow and difficult one, demands a careful examination of the writings of Suárez himself, in which Suárez is both summarized and judged on his own terms and with his own mentality. Complete objectivity is neither attainable nor--in my judgment--totally desirable, but the subjectivity which gives depth and reality to any human endeavor must here be that of Suárez himself, as far as possible. The achievement of a balanced view of Suárez can only be, therefore, a joint task engaged in by many scholars, limited as each one is. It is my hope that this dissertation may contribute some small part to this body of truth.

The particular problem studied in this dissertation is that of the type of causality exercised by the intellect and the will in the natural act of human free choice. I am prescinding from the controversies *De Auxiliis* as such, in order to try to determine what Suárez saw as their philosophical basis. The position that Suárez held on the respective roles of the intellect and the will in the act of free choice (liberum arbitrium) has been widely disputed, since a shift in his doctrine seems to appear in his final works, especially the De Legibus, which was taught during the years of 1601 to 1603, and published in 1612, Suárez' next to last publication date during his lifetime. My concern here will be only with Suárez' early position on this problem as it is manifested in the De Anima, which was taught in the early 1570's but published posthumously in 1621, and in the Metaphysical Disputations, which were published by Suárez himself in 1597, though formulated as early as 1570.[83]

To date, there has been no consistent treatise on this point, which is certainly one of the perennial problems of philosophy. Recent works in English, such as Vernon Bourke's Will in Western Thought[84] and Armand Maurer's Medieval Philosophy,[85] either quote exclusively from the De Legibus, or combine quotations from Suárez' early and late works without much awareness of any existing problem. Father Davitt's The Nature of Law[86] clearly points up the issue but, as would be expected, emphasizes Suárez' late position. Contemporary Spanish philosophers writing on this point, such as Jesús Muñoz, S.J., in his "Esencia del Libre Albedrío y proceso del acto libre según F. Romeo, O.P., Santo Tomás y Francisco Suárez, S.J.,"[87] see very little difference between the positions of St. Thomas and Suárez on this point, simply granting to Suárez a fuller and more precise treatment of doctrine basically Thomistic. Muñoz ignores completely the De Legibus and Suárez' later position on the will. Some authors, such as Dumont, in his Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez,[88] and Marcial Solana, in Historia de la Filosofía española, t. III,[89] insist that Suárez rejects the "Thomistic" position of reciprocal causality and places full efficacy on the will, while others--P. M. Abellán, for example, in his "Posición de Suárez ante el conflicto entre la libertad y la obligación probable"[90]--state or imply that the will must choose the object presented to it by the intellect as best for one reason or another. Thomas Mullaney's book[91] totally denies this view and states that Suárez is a convinced though perhaps unconscious voluntarist who never understood the Thomistic teaching of the interdependence of intellect and will and ends in a contradictory position where he is forced to deny any real or basic distinction between act and potency.

Evidently, then, Suárez' position on the precise relation between intellect and will is not yet clear. Some critics speak of a shift in his doctrine on the causality of the will, distinguishing rather vaguely an early and late position. These questions then occur to me as needing an answer: Exactly what is the early thought of Suárez on this point? Are any progressive indications of a shift to be found in his early treatises, from 1570 to approximately 1595? Can these positions and their development be clarified from his own work, on his own terms, without an overemphasis on criticism from another position, Thomistic or otherwise? To find the answers to these questions, simply with regard to Suárez' early position, is the goal of this dissertation. To attain it, the early texts of Suárez himself will be studied and analyzed. Only after the presentation of this original material will the secondary sources be summarized and evaluated on their view of this problem in Suárez. Finally, then, my own evaluation and judgment on free choice in Suárez will be presented. The problem of human liberty is important both doctrinally and historically; surely one of Europe's greatest metaphysicians has something to say to us still. I hope to help him say it.

CHAPTER I--NOTES

[1] This description has been developed at length by most authors situating Suárez historically. Among the best are Enrique Gómez Arboleya, *Francisco Suárez, S.I.* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1946), especially chap. i, pp. 5-63; Julian Marías Aguilera, in his *Historia de la Filosofía* (10th ed.; Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1958); and his article, "Suárez en la perspectiva de la razón histórica" in *Ensayos de Teoría* ([*Obras*, IV], Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1959), pp. 440-54; and Marcial Solana, *Historia de la Filosofía española--época del Renacimiento*, t. III (Madrid, 1941), pp. 511-13.

[2] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 440.

[3] Gómez Arboleya, Prologue, p. xiii.

[4] Cf. on this point especially James Collins, *History of Modern European Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1954; 1959 printing with on-going bibliography), chap. ii: "The Renaissance Background," pp. 13-50. Also Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 441.

[5] Collins, pp. 15-17.

[6] Cyril Vollert, S.J., in the introduction to his translation of *Francis Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distinctions* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947), p. 2.

[7] Clare C. Riedl, "Suarez and the Organization of Learning," in *Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance*, ed. Gerard Smith, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1939), p. 12.

[8] Cf. José Ferrater Mora's excellent study, "Suárez and Modern Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (1953), 528-47; on this point, pp. 528-31.

[9] Francisco Suárez, Prologue to *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, I, 17-18, and also pp. 203-04. I am using the six-volume Spanish translation edited by Sergio Rábade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez, and Antonio Puigcerver Zanón (Madrid: Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosofía [24], Editorial Gredos, 1960-1964). This edition contains a critical

edition of the Latin text as well as the Spanish translation.

[10] Ferrater Mora, p. 531. On this point the article by Herman J. de Vleeschauwer, "Un paralelo protestante a la obra de Suárez," Revista de Filosofía, VIII (1949), 363-400, is worth consulting.

[11] I am indebted to Clare C. Riedl's article, cited above, for this quotation.

[12] Riedl, pp. 9-10, quoting Christophori Clavii, S.J., Operum Mathematicarum (Moguntiae, 1611), t. 1, prolegomena, p. 5, recorded by Étienne Gilson, Descartes: Discours de la méthode (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), p. 128.

[13] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 441.

[14] Ibid., p. 442. The parallels here with Spinoza are striking.

[15] Collins, p. 35. One of the best--and most readable --accounts of the Latin Averroist position and its origin in the Arabian philosophers is found in Étienne Gilson's Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), pp. 37-66, especially pp. 53-66.

[16] Jesús Iturrioz, "Fuentes de la metafísica de Suárez," Pensamiento, IV (1948), num. extra., 37*.

[17] Gómez Arboleya, pp. 33-34.

[18] Iturrioz, Estudios sobre la Metafísica de Francisco Suárez, S.I. (Madrid: Estudios Onienses [Serie II, Vol. I], 1949), pp. 137-47, also p. 66. Cajetan is cited 299 times, Soncinas 192, Ferrara 124, and Capreolus 115 times.

[19] Báñez' name appears in several variant forms, even as he signed it himself. When he was professed in the Order of Preachers he signed "Vañes," while on some other documents and on books published during his life it appears "Bañes." Since "Báñez," however, is the most widely used and also the accepted modern Spanish spelling, I concur with Marcial Solana in preferring it. See Solana, p. 174. Biographical data on Báñez (1528-1604) may be found in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1941), t. II, part 1, cols. 140-41. The article is by P. Mandonnet. An excellent and unbiased summary appears in Alain Guy, Esquisse des progrès de la spéculation philosophique et théologique à Salamanque au cours du XVI^{e} siècle (Limoges: A. Bontemps, 1943), pp. 34-36. This little book gives a clear picture of the Spanish renaissance at Salamanca.

[20] Alberto Bonet, La Filosofía de la libertad en las controversias teológicas del siglo XVI y primera mitad del XVII (Barcelona: Imprenta Subirana, 1932), p. 118.

[21] Ibid., p. 133.

[22] Ibid., p. 100.

[23] Ibid., pp. 118-19. Báñez' position reminds me of a much-discussed recent political statement: "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice." The havoc Báñez raised and perpetrated--in the name of zeal, doubtless--could teach all readers of history and leaders of government a significant lesson.

[24] Ibid., p. 134.

[25] Iturrioz, Estudios ... , p. 157.

[26] Solana, p. 339.

[27] Gómez Arboleya, pp. 56-57.

[28] Solana, p. 363, quoting a Salamanca manuscript of Pedro de Fonseca: Metafísica, lib. VI, cap. II, quaest. IV, sectio VIII, pp. 120-21.

[29] P. Monnot, "Life and Works of Suárez," in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, t. XIV, part 2, col. 2639. See also Gómez Arboleya, pp. 76-77.

[30] Gómez Arboleya, p. 55.

[31] Ibid., pp. 55-56. Two articles in Razón y Fe, Vol. CXXXVIII (1948), both by Eleuterio Elorduy, are very informative on the Suárez-Vázquez relations. Noteworthy are "El humanismo suareciano," pp. 60-64, and "Fama de santidad de Suárez," pp. 72-78, where the objections Vázquez raised against Suárez in a letter to the superior general, Claudio Aquaviva (April, 1593), are discussed.

[32] Anton C. Pegis, "Molina and Human Liberty," in Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance, ed. Gerard Smith, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1939), p. 81.

[33] On the whole importance of the doctrine of human liberty, above all at this time in history, see Bonet's excellent study, particularly pp. 95-117 on the origins of Molinism.

[34] Ibid., p. 106, quoting Suárez, De Institutione Societatis Iesu, lib. IX, c. 5, n. 43.

[35] Bonet, pp. 95-96.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 102. Bonet here describes how Bellarmine commented, in the last hearing *De Auxiliis* in the presence of Pope Paul V, that the Dominicans, in professing physical predetermination, held the same position as the heretics. They ought to be excused, however (he adds), since they hadn't actually read the works of Calvin or Luther.

[37] Solana, p. 423.

[38] Bonet, p. 103.

[39] Riedl, pp. 10-11. The reference to Luther and Staupitz comes from Léon Mahieu, *François Suarez, sa philosophie et les rapports qu'elle a avec sa théologie* (Paris: Desclée, 1921), p. 10. Those holding the various chairs in philosophy presumably taught the corresponding systems. One wonders how Báñez, a superardent Thomist, managed while holding the chair of the anti-Thomistic Durandus at Salamanca for three years.

[40] The best biography of Suárez available in English is Joseph H. Fichter, S.J.'s *Man of Spain: Francis Suarez* (New York: Macmillan, 1940). Adequate but brief treatments will be found in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 1913) and other short articles, such as Clare C. Riedl's in *Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance*. The *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* gives an excellent summary of Suárez' life, and Raoul de Scorraille in *François Suarez*, 2 vols. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1911) is the French work most easily available, though somewhat laudatory. One advantage of this work is its frequent quoting from B. Sartolo, one of Suárez' earliest biographers, who expounded in the typical hagiographical style. His book, *El Doctor Eximio y venerable Padre Francisco Suárez, de la Compañía de Jesús, en la imagen fiel de sus heroicas virtudes* (Salamanca, 1693) is now difficult to locate. Karl Werner, *Franz Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten Jahrhunderte* (2nd ed.; Ratisbonne, 1889), seems to be the definitive work in German on Suárez. Spanish works abound; I have made most use of Gómez Arboleya's excellent study, published in 1946. Julian Marías also gives a fine treatment in both the works I have been using. The various histories of Spanish philosophy do full justice to Suárez, of course, such as Marcial Solana's, Ceferino González' (Madrid, 1858), Tomás and Joaquín Carreras y Artau's (Madrid: Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales, 1939). The special publications of various magazines in 1948, fourth centenary of the birth of Suárez, were also extremely helpful: *Razón y Fe* most of all in the biographical area. Further information on these memorial publications will be found in the Bibliography under "General

Studies and Aids."

[41] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 442.

[42] Gómez Arboleya, p. 66.

[43] Ibid., pp. 66-67. Suárez was now sixteen years old. Gómez Arboleya, in a burst of enthusiasm, declares that this moment in which the young Suárez recognized his vocation was probably--next to the very founding of the Society of Jesus--the most decisive moment in the entire Spanish counter-reformation.

[44] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

[45] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 443.

[46] Ibid. Also Gómez Arboleya, pp. 69-70. Various theories are advanced as to the sudden change in Suárez. They range from the near-miraculous to the ordinary "late bloomer." The truth probably lies somewhere between--a spot difficult to discern in poring over accounts by laudatory admirers four centuries after the event occurred. Gómez Arboleya describes Suárez' slow and reflexive disposition which would quite naturally be delayed in giving fruit. His extreme youth might also have been joined to a feeling of inferiority that made him reluctant to give his ideas and "show his talent." Marías, on the other hand, seems to think--rather sanely--that Suárez may not have been so stupid as his biographers make him out to be. Lack of philosophical keenness at the age of sixteen is hardly alarming. Perhaps the case was rather that the other boys grasped easily and quickly the surface facts and the dialectical tricks of argument. Thus they may have bounded swiftly along on the fragile surface of truth, while Suárez, perhaps, was taken up with the thing itself and its meaning in depth. It could be that, seeing the real extent of the problem under discussion, Suárez knew better than to rush into the facile arguing game. A happy judgment, but facts seem to me to contradict it, for if such had been the case, would Suárez have been discouraged to the extent of appealing to his superior for a permanent change? I think not.

[47] Gómez Arboleya, p. 70.

[48] Iturrioz, Estudios ... , p. 19.

[49] Ibid., p. 157. Suárez' citations in the Metaphysical Disputations of various teachers with whom he had come in contact is of some interest to both professors and students. Vitoria, though not actually his teacher, is quoted three times, in spite of the lack of availability of his philosophical works at the time Suárez wrote. Soto is cited

seventy-five times, Báñez and Medina four times each, Melchor Cano once, and Toledo sixteen times. Suárez' teachers at Coimbra are cited by him thirteen times. Ibid., pp. 157-58.

[50] Gómez Arboleya, pp. 70-72.

[51] Riedl, pp. 6-7.

[52] Gómez Arboleya, p. 94. The date of October 2 given by Sergio Rábade Romeo, Introduction to Disputaciones Metafísicas, Vol. I (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1960), p. 7, is a printer's error meant to be corrected in the final volume. (Personal communication from Rábade Romeo.)

[53] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 445.

[54] Ibid., p. 443.

[55] The expression Suárez uses, arrimarse a, can mean "lean against," "join to," or "shelter under"--indications of the type of discipleship Suárez professed of himself toward St. Thomas. The letter itself is quoted in many places. I have used here Gómez Arboleya, p. 74, quoting Sartolo, p. 84. Gómez Arboleya notes that a photostat of the complete letter may be found in Scorraille's biography of Suárez, between pages 160 and 161. Julian Marías' comments, pp. 443-44, are also excellent.

[56] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 443.

[57] Gómez Arboleya, p. 74.

[58] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 444. Marías points out that while Bruno's attitude toward the tradition of the past was to reject it totally, Suárez chose instead to rethink it, thus profiting from the wisdom of others. Two possible paths in modern philosophy are here exemplified.

[59] Ibid., pp. 446-47.

[60] Rábade Romeo, p. 7.

[61] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 447. On page 451 Marías develops carefully the actual historical perspective implied by Suárez' teaching method. The philosophical past is actual and simultaneous to Suárez, who seeks the truth wherever it is to be found, making use from time to time of historical interpretation to help him discover it.

[62] P. Monnot, in his article on Suárez in the Dict. de Théol. Cath., col. 2639.

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[63] Gómez Arboleya, pp. 76-77, sums up the situation. He writes on p. 77 that the value placed on the two men has altered greatly over the years. Contemporaries judged by their heart and preferred Vázquez; posterity has judged by intelligence and chosen Suárez. The fact that Suárez began publishing during these years at Alcalá is worth noting. Could the coolness of his reception have caused him to turn increasingly to study and composition? His personal sufferings during these years must have been considerable, yet he chose this precise time to write his treatise on the Incarnation of the Word. Surely the humanness of Suárez is to some extent laid bare here at Alcalá.

[64] *Ibid*., pp. 77-78. The date of Suárez' departure from Alcalá is variously given as 1592 and 1593. I concur with the latter, given by the *Dict. de Théol. Cath.*, col. 2639. Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," p. 444, gives the date of the first request of Philip II to the Jesuit superiors as 1593. Suárez did not accept, however, until 1597, the same year the *Metaphysical Disputations* were published.

[65] Jesús Iturrioz, "Bibliografía suareciana," *Razón y Fe*, CXXXVIII (1948), 479-97. These comments, p. 481.

[66] Lists of Suárez' publications are available in many places. See, for example, Scorraille, "Les écrits inédits ... ," pp. 151-55; Gómez Arboleya, pp. 94-95; the various bibliographies such as that in *Razón y Fe*. John O. Riedl's helpful little book, *A Catalogue of Renaissance Philosophers (1350-1650)* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1940), pp. 96-97, gives pertinent details of Suárez' life and mentions the main points of his philosophical doctrine as well as his outstanding works.

[67] The beginnings of such a critical examination are available for the *De Anima*, a text Suárez had been in the process of revising just before his death, and which Alvarez completed. See Joaquín Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto del tratado *De Anima* de Francisco Suárez," *Pensamiento*, XV (1959), 293-307.

[68] Gómez Arboleya, pp. 94-95. Scorraille, "Les écrits inédits ... ," pp. 151-55. The last item listed, *Conselhos e pareceres*, is from later bibliographies.

[69] MS Barb. lat. 1036, as cited by Michel Batllori, "Les fonds manuscrits de Suárez dans les bibliothèques et les archives de Rome," *Actas* III, Congreso Internacional de Filosofía [Barcelona, October, 1948] (Madrid: Instituto Luis Vives de Filosofía, 1949), p. 332.

[70] See the article by Carreras y Artau, cited above in n. 67, especially p. 296. This particular manuscript will be studied as a part of this dissertation.

[71] Although Suárez' political works and the *Defensio Fidei* had their own somewhat independent and influential histories, my main interest here is, quite naturally, the *Metaphysical Disputations*.

[72] Rábade Romeo, p. 15. The "essentialist orientation" will be either vigorously denied or explained by Suárez patriots, but the fact seems evident enough. See on this Étienne Gilson's superb summary of Suárez and his chief disciples in *Being and Some Philosophers* (2nd ed., corrected and enlarged, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), pp. 97-119; but especially p. 105, where Gilson summarizes Suárez' own position. Rábade Romeo's answer to Gilson and others is both clear and well-balanced. See "La metafísica suareciana y la acusación de esencialismo," *Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez* (Universidad de Granada), III (1963), 73-86.

[73] Clare C. Riedl, pp. 2-6, gives an excellent and accurate summary of the German influence of Suarezian metaphysics, in which she quotes Eschweiler, Grabmann, etc., and the standard German sources. See also Joaquín de Iriarte, "La Proyección sobre Europa de una gran metafísica," *Razón y Fe*, CXXXVIII (1948), 229-63.

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 4, quoting Karl Eschweiler, "Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts," *Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft*, First Series, Vol. I (Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1928), p. 294.

[75] F. L. R. Sassen, "La influencia de Suárez en las universidades protestantes de los Paises Bajos en los siglos XVII y XVIII," *Actas* III, Congreso Internacional de Filosofía (Barcelona, 1948), p. 471.

[76] Clare C. Riedl again summarizes these sources succinctly on pp. 5-6. See Iriarte, pp. 240-49.

[77] Marías, *Historia de la Filosofía*, pp. 203-04.

[78] Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," pp. 452-54. The conclusion of this article is one of the most balanced and accurate summaries of Suárez' historical position that I was able to find.

[79] Rábade Romeo, p. 16.

[80] Rábade Romeo, pleading for a balanced view on p.11 of his introduction to the Metaphysical Disputations, cites José Hellín as an example of this extreme group. Hellín's chief work on Suárez, La analogía del ser y el conocimiento de Dios (Madrid: Editorial Nacional, 1947), makes this position abundantly clear. His prolific articles in defense and explanation of Suárez underline it, e.g., "De la analogía del ser, según Suárez," Pensamiento, II (1946), 267-94; and "Existencialismo escolástico suareciano," Pensamiento, XII (1956), 157-78. Eustaquio Guerrero's writings are largely in defense either of Suárez or of his defenders. See, for example, his very laudatory review of Hellín's book in Razón y Fe, CXXXVI (1947), 365-69; and his blistering comments on Mahieu's "El 'François Suarez' de Léon Mahieu," Razón y Fe, CXXXVIII (1948), 313-51. Guerrero is well-named.

[81] Thomas U. Mullaney, O.P., "The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching of Human Freedom," The Thomist, XI (1948), 1-17; 330-69; 448-502; XII (1949), 1-94, 155-206. Published separately as Suarez on Human Freedom (Baltimore: The Carroll Press, 1950). The introduction to the Thomist article (Vol. XI), especially pp. 15-16, is most outspoken on this point.

[82] This rather widespread opinion has been frequently encountered in conversation. The users, I suspect, are basing their views on those of someone like Mahieu, rather than on first-hand examination of the texts of Suárez himself. Cf. Léon Mahieu, "L'éclecticisme suarézien," Revue Thomiste, VIII (1925), 250-85. The articles and books in praise or blame of Suárez are too numerous to be cited here. Those I encountered are listed in my Bibliography. Marcial Solana's, pp. 509-12, gives an affirmative but largely balanced opinion on the doctrine of Suárez, as does Gómez Arboleya, prologue, pp. xii-xiii, and pp. 3-4 of chap. i, stressing chiefly his historical position. On the other hand, Juan Francisco Yela Utrilla, "Modo y Límite en Suárez," Actas III, Congreso Internacional de Filosofía (Barcelona, 1948), pp. 545-46, speaks of Descartes' whole endeavor as a step backward rather than an advance in philosophy, and calls unashamedly on all for whom "philosophy is something more than pure and mere philosophizing" to heed "the eternal message of Suárez," which continues, both "now and forever," to be metaphysically fruitful.

[83] Suárez' De Voluntario et involuntario in genere deque actibus voluntatis in speciali is not extensively studied in this dissertation, as it was published only posthumously in 1628, though compiled from notes taken from Suárez' teaching about 1580. Internal references in the published text to works of Suárez of later date than 1580, however, indicate rather extensive interpolations by the editor (see Monnot, Dict. de Théo. Cath., t. xiv, col. 2645), and since no early manuscript version was available to me, I decided to limit myself chiefly to the De Anima for this study. References to the De Voluntario will be made, however, where this seems pertinent or helpful.

[84] Vernon Bourke, Will in Western Thought (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964). See especially pp. 176-79.

[85] Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962). See especially pp. 367-71.

[86] T. E. Davitt, S.J., The Nature of Law (St. Louis: Herder, 1951). See especially pp. 86-108.

[87] Jesús Muñoz, S.J., "Esencia del Libre Albedrío y proceso del acto libre según F. Romeo, O.P., Santo Tomás y Francisco Suárez, S.J.," Miscelánea Comillas, IX (1948), 347-504.

[88] Paul Dumont, Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez (Paris: Beauchesne, 1936).

[89] Solana's book is the same I have been using throughout this chapter. See note 1 above.

[90] Pedro María Abellán, "Posición de Suárez ante el conflicto entre la libertad y la obligación probable," Actas III, Congreso Internacional de Filosofía (Barcelona, 1948), pp. 33-57.

[91] See note 81 above.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY DOCTRINE OF SUÁREZ ON FREE CHOICE

Francisco Suárez had formulated his position on the act of human free choice as early as 1571, when he began teaching his first course in philosophy at Segovia at the age of twenty-three, the year before being ordained to the priesthood. Suárez taught philosophy there until 1575, when he moved up to the theology faculty at the same college, and authorities agree that his commentaries on Aristotle's _De Anima_ were taught during those first four years.[1] The primitive manuscript of Suárez' treatise _De Anima_, therefore, is the earliest example available of his professed philosophical positions.

Some textual and historical problems arise, however, concerning the _De Anima_, for the published treatise bearing that name did not appear until 1621, four years after Suárez' death. Many of the Suarezian works were yet unedited in 1617, and the General of the Society of Jesus delegated a Portuguese Jesuit, Father Baltasar Alvarez, to collect, edit, and prepare for publication the numerous papers and works the great theologian had left behind him. One of these was the _De Anima_, which Suárez himself had been preparing for publication. By 1617, the year of his death, he had had time to finish only the first twelve chapters of the first book, as Alvarez himself tells us in his preface and comments to the readers of the published text.[2] To complete the work, therefore, Alvarez filled in the remaining two chapters of Book I and the other five complete books of the *De Anima* with the manuscript *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de anima*, which Suárez had taught as a young man in Segovia, most probably in 1572-73.[3] The edited text, always published together with the *De opere sex dierum*, appeared first in Lyon in 1621; it was included in the *Opera Omnia* of Sebastian Colleti in Venice in 1740, and likewise in the Luis Vives re-edition in 1856.[4] The authenticity of the edited *De Anima* was vouched for by Alvarez, who had been assisting Suárez during the last months of his life[5] and was thus presumably most familiar with the master's aims and methods. His statements indicate that the *De Anima* as published was integrally Suarezian, even though the first twelve chapters of Book I represented the master's final philosophical thoughts, while the remainder of the work--more than five complete books--was written by a Francisco Suárez of forty-five years earlier. Alvarez repeats more than once that this "juvenile" Suárez had a mind already mature in philosophical reasoning, whose thought was more than worthy to be published without major revisions.[6]

The very fact that nearly forty-five years of productive and intense teaching and writing intervened between the two sections of this published treatise cannot help but raise a persistent interest in the development of doctrine and presentation that would be bound to occur. Instead of the young cleric, teaching his first course in philosophy, one discovers the advanced and famous teacher, the "Doctor Eximius" known all over Europe as a metaphysician and theologian. A confrontation of the published text and the primitive manuscript is clearly demanded for anyone hoping to attain a real understanding of the genesis and development of Suárez' philosophical thought. One can only wish that Suárez himself had been able to complete the revision, so that a full revelation of this development might be available to us. In fact, of course, it is not, but sufficient trends and inclinations are evident in the first twelve chapters to make a study of the manuscript significant.

The existence of the early manuscript of the Suarezian commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima is no longer in doubt. In the library of the University of Salamanca, manuscript 583 is titled Francisci Suarez Societatis Jesu Commentaria una cum Quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de Anima, and--according to a notation on the first page of the document--is a duplicate of the original proceeding from the College of the Society of Jesus in Salamanca. Scholars have determined its authenticity both by paleographic study and internal evidence, which reveal a close similarity to other extant original Suarezian manuscripts and fix the date of composition as sometime during the last quarter of the sixteenth century.[7]

This manuscript, however, is a typical product of the

University of Salamanca, since it is quite clearly a text taken down from class dictation, as was the custom at that time. Aside from the fact that several scribes have shared the labor of copying it, the document itself must therefore be viewed with some reserve. Most of the Spanish manuscripts originated in this way, and show varying degrees of fidelity to the exact words of the master, even as the notes of students differ in any lecture class. Frequently the professor dictated or taught simply the kernel or essence of some philosophical doctrine, as in the time of Vitoria, but in other instances he merely dictated philosophical axioms and positions which were ~~to~~ be literally copied and memorized by the student, as became more prevalent later on.[8] The latter method was the famous "reading from notebooks" that Suárez disliked and rejected. Suárez himself followed neither of these methods slavishly, preferring to explain and discuss a problem by means of disputations and pertinent questions, but he would probably have leaned somewhat towards the former method--that of presenting the essentials of the doctrine--at this early date in his career. The complaints about the novelty of his teaching methods, however, began to be heard almost as soon as his teaching itself. Who can definitively say into which category this particular manuscript falls?

With respect to the student, of course, a further textual problem presents itself. Is this manuscript a faithful transcription of what the master actually taught in class? Are there omissions? Additions? Have any items been misunderstood, misinterpreted? Is this really what Suárez thought, or rather what some student thought he thought? All of these difficulties combine to make absolute accuracy of these sixteenth century Spanish manuscripts impossible to accept.

At the same time, however, the fact becomes reasonably clear from an examination of the primitive manuscript and the published text, the results of which will be shown later, that here indeed is the manuscript from which Suárez and Alvarez worked to prepare the revision of the De Anima. Throughout the manuscript glosses and outline headings have been carefully added which reveal a definite striving for clarity and precision. Surely the document itself must be extremely close to Suárez' actual positions if he felt it accurate enough to serve as the basic text for his published De Anima.

Father Alvarez declared bluntly that the only innovation he made in the early text was to continue the rearrangement into books and chapters, begun by Suárez himself, instead of the original form of disputations and questions. Unity of the treatise would in this way be assured.[9] Thus, for Book I Suárez himself combined disputations one and two of the original treatise. Alvarez continued the same process, usually combining two or three disputations for each book, but at times using only one when the subject warranted it, as in the case of disputation fourteen (Book VI) on the separated soul.

But these are not the only changes in the manuscript. Alvarez, having assisted the master in his revision of the first book, evidently determined to continue in the same manner, omitting this or that, adding one comment or another--faithful no doubt to the basic intention of Suárez and the purpose of the treatise, but at the same time using a somewhat free hand in his ministrations. Very little of this does he mention in his comments, however; the text itself witnesses to the fact. Is this beyond a doubt the text from which Alvarez worked? One cannot be positive, of course, but the identity of titles and chapter headings, the numerous passages which are reproduced exactly, the coincidence of subject matter throughout the entire treatise, argue strongly that this manuscript is the very one Alvarez used as a basis for his editing and revision. True, he might also have had at hand another somewhat varied manuscript not yet unearthed in any library, or he might have made use of penciled notes or comments left by Suárez himself that would account for some of the more significant changes. Without such evidence, however, one can only eye the present text De Anima with some wariness.[10]

The excellent article by Joaquín Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto del tratado 'De Anima' de Francisco Suárez,"[11] gives a most illuminating study of the general changes in the manuscript De Anima. Dr. Carreras y Artau points out differences which are immediately obvious on even a brief examination of the two texts--some paragraphs or comments either omitted or added, new authorities cited or references rectified, others omitted completely or combined into a general citation. Variations in style, vocabulary, and word order are omnipresent, but frequently without doing significant harm to the meaning of the text. Dr. Carreras y Artau, however, takes these many slight variations as indications of more serious changes which appear with intensified study. He selects quite at random three passages for such study--from Books II, IV, and VI of the published text. Without going into the confrontations exhaustively, he yet manages to establish with reasonable certitude his position that the edited text be not regarded with too much confidence. He pleads at the same time for a detailed and critical study of the original Suarezian manuscript that would present to the philosophical world an authentically Suarezian text from that early stage of the author's thought when he was, as Carreras y Artau puts it, "fully a humanist."[12]

With respect to Book V of the De Anima, which is studied in this dissertation, the changes from manuscript to published text follow the same general pattern that Carreras y Artau holds to be manifest throughout the treatise. Some of the more significant doctrinal points will be examined carefully farther on in this study, but at present a few examples of the main variations that exist in this section of the De Anima will simply be indicated. They can be classified in five ways: (1) changes in style and vocabulary, (2) omissions from the text, (3) additions to the text,

(4) substitutions, and (5) changes in tone or attitude.

Typical passages showing the close correlation between manuscript and text generally prevalent throughout most of the De Anima might be the following:

MS	EDITION
Averroes vero loquitur de motione metaphorica, et de eadem debet interpretari D. Thomas ubicumque de eo loquitur et quando finem vocat principium actionis loquitur moraliter non physice. Et eodem modo appetitus dicitur potentia pasiva metaphorice sicut motio finis metaphorica est et hoc de principio actus appetitus.[13]	Averroes vero agit de motione metaphorica, de qua etiam interpretandus erit D. Thomas ubicumque de eo tractat, quando autem finem vocat principium actionis, intelligit moraliter, non physice: similiter appetitus potentia passiva dicitur, metaphorice, sicut motio finis metaphorica est, et haec de principio actus appetitus.[14]

The changes here are obviously those of style or vocabulary; the basic meaning is unchanged. Enough correspondence of this type exists in Book V to make reasonably sure the identification of manuscript 583 as the basis of the published text.

Several passages or comments appearing in the primitive manuscript have been omitted in the edition prepared by Alvarez. The most notable of these omissions in Book V is a glaring one: the whole of question two of disputation twelve. Alvarez himself mentions this omission in the two short paragraphs he has substituted for chapter eight of Book V, where he explains that since the matter covered in this question deals with establishing the fact of freedom of the will in its own actions, and Suárez has treated this subject very widely in other places, he as editor will simply refrain from repeating the same doctrine. Instead he refers the reader to the other works of Suárez, specifically the Metaphysical Disputations XIX, especially section two, and extended treatments in the volume De Gratia (Prolegomenon I), and the opusculum on the freedom of the divine will.[15] Alvarez alters the title of this deleted chapter somewhat, for while Suárez queried whether the will were free in its own acts, Alvarez inserts the qualification "in all its own acts" [italics mine]. He also adds a second paragraph, in which he mentions two questions still remaining to be investigated. Neither of these points appears in the omitted question, and they do not belong under the subject of this chapter. Their addition here by Alvarez is purely gratuitous. The first question is not discussed at all by Suárez in Book V; the second does receive mention at the beginning of the twelfth disputation (chapter seven of the edition), but not as a doubt to be settled. Instead a solution is given and indeed taken as a doctrinal supposition for the study of the will.[16] Alvarez wonders first whether man's rational appetite is in fact the lowest type of will, or whether will should rather be distinguished specifically in men and angels. He asks, in the second place, if the rational appetite is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, as most philosophers distinguish the sensitive appetite. Alvarez does not attempt to solve these controverted questions in this place, but he does refer the reader to other authors and sources, including Suárez'

Book III De Angelis.[17] The omitted question two of disputation twelve will be studied later on in this dissertation; it proves to be a sizable piece of philosophical writing by the young Suárez, comprising folio pages 260r through 264v.

Other briefer omissions Alvarez does not explain. An example of one rather significant change is the failure to follow the manuscript in citing the indifference of the intellect as one of the root causes of liberty:

MS	EDITION
Id probatur ex propria ratione voluntatis quae libera est, et eius libertas, ut dictum est, oritur ex indiferentia et perfectione intelectus.[18]	Antecedens autem suadetur . . . tum ex propria ratione voluntatis, cujus libertas, ut diximus, ex perfectione intellectus nascitur.[19]

In other sections of Book V, as throughout the entire De Anima, Alvarez has added comments or references, at times with a very generous hand. Such, for example, is the passage in chapter seven, paragraph five, where Suárez points out that the acts of the vegetative powers of man--such as the motion of the heart--are not commanded acts, since they do not fall under the power of the will directly. After this statement, retained in the edition, Alvarez explains parenthetically that such actions can be remotely subject in a certain way to the will, as when we deprive ourselves of food or take our own lives by force.[20]

In the following paragraph a more noteworthy doctrinal addition occurs, for while the manuscript declares that the intellect does not concur elicitive in the placing of the will act, the edition states that neither the intellect nor the object concur so as to elicit the act. Both texts then go on to discuss whether or not the intellect can concur imperatively--"alia quaestio est."[21] On the same page Alvarez adds the influence of the angels to a list of possible agents outside our will causing acts within our intellects; they are not mentioned in the manuscript.[22] In other instances, as paragraph seven of chapter six, Alvarez inserts several lines of doctrine concerning the way in which the sense appetite can be affected by the knowledge and love of supernatural goods existing in the intellect and will.[23]

Additions are perhaps the most frequent type of important alterations introduced by Alvarez, but occasionally a startling substitution of one term for another takes place. Some of these are certainly scribal errors, e.g., the edition's use of the word "intellect" in a context where "will" is expected and actually does occur in the manuscript.[24] On the other hand a change in chapter three gives more pause for thought. In the manuscript Suárez writes that if the appetible object were to exert efficiency, then one could not distinguish the concursus of the final cause from the efficient cause.[25] In the edition, however, Alvarez points out instead that in this case one could not distinguish the concursus of the formal from that of the efficient cause.[26] In several other places he **"rectifies"** a quotation in the manuscript, sometimes correcting the text, sometimes citing the source more fully. Alvarez frequently adds remarks such as "according to Cajetan," "and this was the position of Scotus," etc.[27]

In several places a change of tone is evident from the rather calm exposition of the young Suárez. Alvarez is more dogmatic, showing at times a touch of belligerence, particularly when discussing the views of opponents, which he often prefers to "wipe out" rather than refute,[28] and label impossible rather than improbable.[29]

Some of these changes are no doubt allowable and can be reasonably left to the discretion of a prudent editor, but it seems that Alvarez has certainly gone beyond this limit. Although perhaps the text as he has edited it cannot quite be classified as a commentary on Suárez rather than a transcription of his manuscript, still as it stands it cannot be called integrally Suárez. Until other manuscripts or notations are found which would alter this judgment, the published text De Anima should not be considered as authentic as it pretends to be, and should be used, I believe, only in conjunction with the primitive manuscript. This is, therefore, the procedure which will be followed here in studying the De Anima V.

Doctrine of the De Anima V

The material covered in the entire treatise De Anima includes the study of the substance of the soul in itself, an investigation of the powers of the soul--both in general and in particular--and finally a discussion of the condition of the human soul separated from the body. Book V of the *De Anima*, which is our concern here, begins with a general treatment of all the appetitive powers of the soul, follows this with a special study of both the sensitive and rational appetites, and concludes with a section on what Suárez calls the *potentia motiva secundum locum*,[30] a power which he sees closely allied with the appetites of man.

A preliminary statement of the points of doctrine affecting the relation between intellect and will in this early work of Francisco Suárez will subsequently help to direct a more intensive study of the key concepts at work in his thought. In explaining the appetitive powers in general, the difference between a natural and elicited appetite must first be recognized, for while every being has a natural appetite by which it seeks after the demands of its own nature, only knowing beings have elicited or vital appetites, which follow the new forms acquired through knowledge and cause a man to execute his operations. Vital appetites act for the good of the whole man, not just for the good of one or another part. Two kinds of knowledge in man, sensitive and intellectual, naturally give rise to two kinds of appetite, and sense appetite serves rational appetite, the will, much in the same way that sense knowledge aids intellectual knowledge.[31] The adequate object of the appetite is certainly the good, or something apprehended under the aspect of good, and thus appetite may be described as a certain inclination tending towards a proper perfection.[32]

De Anima V, in discussing the act of appetition itself, deals chiefly with the manner in which it is produced, its principle and term, the respective roles played by the object, the apprehension of it, and the end or "product" resulting from the act. The act of loving is a vital or immanent act, which ought necessarily to be produced by the same power in which it is received, but which is--as is any act--a quality distinct from that power. The role of the object may be viewed in many different ways, but it must be said that the appetitive power definitely elicits its own act without any efficiency of the known appetible. The object does not concur efficiently in any way, especially when the act is free, and apprehension--though necessary for the act of the appetite--does not effect this act, and is required not as an efficient cause, but simply as the condition for the application of the object. All moving causes should be reduced to the efficient cause, rather than to the appetible object, as Aristotle taught. Action by the appetitive power postulates only the prior union of its own object with another knowing power of the same soul.

The end is rightly called a principle of action, but understood morally, not physically. Motion "caused" by the end is motion only in a metaphorical sense. The total end or product produced by the appetite is simply the act itself--that act by which it loves and which is a sort of weight or leaning toward the thing loved.[33]

Is man's sensitive appetite subject in any way to reason or will? The intellect is able to exert some control by demonstrating to the sense appetite a greater proportion of good or evil in objects, so that the cogitative power itself will then apprehend the object in another manner, and hence judge differently. Since the mere apprehension of the object on a sense level moves the sense appetite, the intellect can incline it in one way or another by emphasizing one or the other sensible aspect of the object. In this way the appetite is subject to reason.[34]

The will, man's "noblest potency," is presupposed to be a power of the rational soul as such, which follows the intellect and lacks an organ. Its irascible and concupiscible aspects are distinct only in reason. The object of the will is the good in general, and since this power is rational appetite, the exact extent of whatever the intellect apprehends marks the precise scope of the will's object. The will's acts can be directed either towards means or ends, since both share in the aspect of the good. The intention of the end is most properly the will act, but the will can also consider means as means; it then exercises election and use.

The first act of the will with regard to means is to accept one among them as a real means to the willed end--this is to consent or to choose. Consent, which follows from the previous consultation of the intellect, properly signifies that application of the will to some means presented by reason. If the will's acceptance is efficacious--by separating one means from the others and preferring that one--the act is called choice. Because such a chosen means is certainly selected for the sake of execution, the will then exercises *use*, by which it applies other powers to the operations necessary to bring this particular means into fruition.

The relations between intellect and will present a special problem which reveals itself in properly human acts. Elicited acts are performed by the will itself, while commanded acts occur in any other human power subject to the use and motion of the will. The operations of the intellect itself are commanded by the will, because they are performed voluntarily. Although all agree that the will "follows" the intellect, only those operations are considered properly human and worthy of reward or punishment which proceed from the will. Which act, therefore--that of the will or that of the intellect--is simply prior? Speaking simply and absolutely, the intellect can only move the will *finaliter*, while the will indeed moves the intellect *effective*, by way of efficient causality. Efficiency exercised by the will does not mean that the will impresses something on the other powers, or somehow concurs immediately to elicit their acts; its motion is instead what Suárez calls a *moral motion*. In natural philosophy, moral motion is considered as only accidentally efficient, but in moral philosophy it is judged to have *per se* efficiency, since it arises only from the consensus of powers which are rooted in one and the same soul and have a natural ordering to each other.[35]

Does the will act freely? How is it influenced by the intellect, a power really distinct from it, in the act of free choice? A power free for acting is one that, even when it is perfectly poised for action, and possesses all the requisites needed for operation, can operate or not at its own volition. The emphasis of this often repeated definition lies in freedom of exercise. Violence is thus unalterably opposed to liberty, for the very act of exerting force on an agent necessitates it by removing the dominion which must be present in a free power acting freely. Is the will free in this precise sense? If so, in what acts and to what extent?

Several preliminary arguments in favor of liberty may be adduced from faith, Sacred Scripture, and various authorities. Scripture itself contains many precepts and persuasions of one kind and another which would be futile unless man were free to follow them. Experience and reason, however, are able to show that man is free. Experience tells us that what we wish to do we operate; we can likewise cease from operating, should we wish that. On this point man evidently differs from brutes, and the wise from the insane. We also see from experience that human operations are truly worthy of praise or blame. Man is of his very nature capable of taking counsel about some action to be performed, and certainly if he were not free all counsels and laws would be superfluous. Observation and experience also make it clear that man often sins and does wrong. Now if he is not free, but rather is necessitated by his nature in all that he does, then what a man does is certainly not to be imputed to him but to the author of his nature, to God. To impute evil to God, however, is absurd; hence man must be free.

Other facets of experience and points of proof may be cited, but a culminating argument, which Suárez calls *a priori*, is that liberty consists formally and radically in the fact that man is rational--i.e., precisely *because* of his rationality liberty is found in man. The fact that neither reason nor liberty exist in any other animal proves that it is properly *by reason* man surpasses other animals. A man knows this himself through his own experience, for he only realizes freedom in himself to the extent that he uses reason. Liberty must therefore belong to some part of the soul which properly and specifically belongs to man as man. Nearly all scholastic philosophers have agreed that *liberum arbitrium* (or "free choice" as I will translate it) is a faculty of will and reason. In its strict and proper meaning free choice is an act, but long usage has modified the term to designate the principle of the act, therefore a faculty. If a faculty, it must be natural to the soul, hence a natural power. The power of free choice, however, is considered as something more than the will and the reason, for liberty truly involves both of these--it is in reason as in its root; it is in the will as in a subject formally free. Man is free *because* he can choose this or that, but since it belongs to the will to choose its own actions and to make use of the other powers, liberty clearly belongs formally to the will.

An operation carried out by a man is considered free to the extent that it is subject to that man's will. Yet liberty of the will evidently arises in some way from reason, for appetite always rises out of knowledge, and therefore the type of appetite which issues from a man's will rises out of the mode and properties of the knowledge possessed by that man.

But exactly how does liberty in the will rise out of reason, if it is the will, not the intellect, which is formally free? The Thomists' ordinary explanation declares that the liberty of the will rises out of the indifference of the intellect.[36] They say that the will can love a thing and not love it, because the intellect itself is not necessitated. The object presented to the will by the intellect contains some aspects of good and some of bad; the will can love it or hate it. Brutes lack liberty, the Thomists point out, for the precise reason that they cannot make judgments of reason concerning the variety of aspects to be found in an object; man can make these judgments and is therefore free. Liberty of the will consists then in this: that the good object being proposed, the will can love it and not love it. This act is free, since the will can love the object on account of the good aspects present in it, or not love it on account of the bad aspects there. Liberty consists, therefore, in the fact that the will can take either of these attitudes in the face of the same object. The Thomists state further that if the intellect would encounter some good in which no aspect of evil at all could be found, the will could not not-love it.

The implication follows that the will ought always to choose whatever the intellect judges to be better or more suitable, for the will cannot reject anything unless it sees in it some aspect of evil.

Although Suárez agrees with a large part of this position of the Thomists, he sees implications which present a major difficulty, for this way of explaining liberty makes the will no more free than the intellect. In this view, just as the intellect necessarily assents to the true the will must love the good to which no evil is attached. Likewise, in the same way that the will can choose not to love a good because it finds in it some aspect of evil, so the intellect can refuse its assent whenever the truth of a thing does not appear certain, or may perhaps be mixed with some degree of falsity. Absolutely speaking, therefore, it would result from this position that the will is not free, for it always follows the judgment of the intellect and certainly ought always to choose whatever the intellect judges better. But the intellect in fact is not free, hence neither is the will. This opinion certainly seems to agree--at least implicitly--with the often rejected opinion of Durandus that liberty is formally in the intellect rather than in the will, for since liberty in the will rises out of the indifference and liberty of judgment of the intellect, liberty must reside first and more perfectly in the intellect.

A better way of explaining the manner in which freedom rises from the intellect, however, is to show that it rises not from its indifference, but rather from its perfection and universality. This is the opinion of Suárez. The intellect surpasses the sensitive powers precisely in that it knows not merely in a confused way that a certain thing is suitable, but it can perceive distinctly the aspect of suitability, separating it from all the other aspects present at the same time. The intellect can consider a thing simply insofar as it is desirable. From this very perfection of knowledge arises a similar perfection in the will, the appetite answering intellectual knowledge.

Just as the intellect perceives in each thing the degree of its goodness or badness, the will loves it to the extent that goodness solicits love. For this reason those things which appear good, but not so good that they are judged to lead necessarily to beatitude, men do not love necessarily but freely. No particular thing or object occurs in this life which is ever apprehended as absolutely necessary, even when it actually does lead to beatitude, because it is not judged here and now as necessary. Therefore liberty of the will arises, and the will can love any good proposed to it on account of the goodness which it does possess; it can not-love the same good because that good is judged not to be necessary, at least not here and now.

It is one thing, however, to not-love an object, and quite another actually to hate it. Non amare signifies liberty with respect to exercise [quoad exercitium], and for this a simple judgment that the object is not a necessary good suffices; one need not find in it an aspect of evil. For hatred to exist, however, one must truly discover an aspect of evil in the object. This fact has given rise to the above Thomistic opinion, which Suárez does not entirely repudiate but rather seeks to explain.

The Suarezian position could be summarized thus: free choice follows from intellect and reason, the discursive and rational power. The intellect apprehends the aspects of good and of evil present in the thing, and judges in what particular way each thing is eligible and good. The appetite consequent upon such knowledge will be able to love each known good only under that aspect and in that manner in which the intellect has judged it to be desirable. This love of the appetite is free, since--as has already been shown--no good is here apprehended as absolutely necessary. The knowing power existing on man's highest level demands a corresponding appetitive power which is moreover free. In this sense primarily appetite is said to follow knowledge; the intellect holds the highest rank among man's cognitive powers, while the will takes this place among his appetitive powers.

In what precisely does this position differ from the foregoing statement of the Thomistic view? Apparently Suárez is extremely wary of making the freedom of the will so dependent upon the indifference of the judgment of the intellect. In his eyes the Thomistic position comes very close to situating freedom in the intellect, not in the will; to this Suárez will never agree. If the will is to be actively in dominion of its own acts, as Suárez believes is absolutely required both by faith and reason, then to make its indifference depend only on the indifference of the intellect is ultimately to deprive the will of any real freedom. The intellect is passively at the mercy of the object, so to speak; the will is never at its mercy, at least in this life. The will must be essentially and formally free, which for Suárez seems to mean free from any outside efficiency whatever. The will must be able to reject any or all of the particular objects proposed to it by the intellect, able to act or not act. True, the judgment of the intellect is a necessary condition for liberty, but it is one of those prerequisites for action without which the will cannot act, but with which it is still able to refrain from acting. The will, not the intellect, is man's free faculty.

Thomists maintain this too, of course, but Suárez fears that the implications of their solution outweigh the words. To Suárez it is not sufficient that the will reject a thing simply because of the bad aspects there which the intellect points out. He declares that the main factor in the will's choice between loving and not-loving is not the fact that the intellect sees both good and bad aspects in the thing (though it does), but rather the fact that only a qualified amount of goodness is present in the object. Because no particular good presented to the will is seen to be absolutely good, absolutely perfect, the will is free to accept it or reject it. Thus, although it is true that the intellect must necessarily adhere to any truth it sees as such, the will--even though only good aspects of an object are presented to it--still need not choose or desire that object, for it is not perfectly good or seen to be absolutely necessary here and now for beatitude.

The contrasts and comparisons between the two positions might be summed up briefly in this fashion:

For the Thomists,

1. The will loves something because of the good aspects present in it.
2. The will does not love something because of the bad aspects there.
3. The human will, meeting God, must love him because no bad aspects are to be found in him.

For Suárez,

1. The will loves something because of the good aspects present in it.
2. For him, however, the will chooses not to love something because the good presented there is not necessary for beatitude.
3. The human will, on meeting God, must love him because it encounters in him at last the perfect and necessary good.
4. The apprehension of some evil aspects in an object is required actually to hate that object; not, however, for the simple choice of the will not to love it.

For Suárez, to say that the will must follow the judgments of the intellect, choosing what it says is good, rejecting what it declares as bad, is to concede far too much to the intellect's judgment, making it a determinant of the will act and in the end depriving the will of its essential freedom and active dominion. This difference with the Thomists is largely a matter of emphasis, but a most important emphasis to Suárez, and one that he maintains throughout the De Anima. The stress on this point sets the direction and the tone of his basic doctrine on the independence and freedom of the will, and reveals at the same time the need for a careful study of the meaning of efficient causality in the mind of Suárez.

Will and free choice are actually the same power, being distinguished only by reason, much in the same way that intellect is distinct from reason. For intellect is called *intellect* insofar as it understands or simply grasps a thing, while it is called *reason* insofar as it reasons discursively about something. Will, likewise, is called *will* inasmuch as it tends in one way towards the end, or simply wills something, but it is called *liberum arbitrium* inasmuch as by free choice it is directed towards means.

To interpret any discussion of freedom at the time of such ferment over the problem, the traditional distinction between liberty of exercise [*quoad exercitium*] and liberty of specification [*quoad specificationem*] must be understood. When one is free as to the exercise of an act, he may do it or not, as he wills, and may also cease from it. Liberty of specification means that one can have contrary acts, either love or hate, towards the same object, or--to put it another way--one may love either this thing or its opposite. In the thought of Suárez, (1) the will is determined as to specification to the good in common, or to beatitude, but (2) in this life it is never determined as to exercise. Since no aspect of evil appears in beatitude or in the good in general, the first point is proved; no reason for hatred can be found. The second point holds because in this life man never sees such beatitude or "good in general" to be simply or absolutely necessary; hence the will is here never necessitated as to exercise. Furthermore, the will is at no time necessitated or determined in this life to any particular good, for the complete and necessary aspect of good which would demand love never is clearly manifest. Thus, since no good here presents itself except as mixed with evil and difficulties, the will is determined neither as to exercise nor as to specification in respect to any particular good met with in this life.

In this aspect will differs from intellect, for the intellect is not in itself free as to exercise, but depends upon the motion of freedom. With respect to specification, the intellect must necessarily assent to an object if that object appears evidently true. The will, on the other hand, is not necessitated to loving, even if the object appears evidently good. Why this difference in the two powers? The meaning of truth and goodness in the different objects of these powers must be considered. Truth has but one integral aspect, so that if a thing is really true, by that very fact all falsity is excluded. But the meaning of goodness is manifold--a thing may be good under several different aspects, while simultaneously other evil aspects may present themselves. In this life no particular good exists which is not a mixture of good and bad aspects. In heaven, of course, if a man attains the vision of God, he will be necessitated to love God both as to exercise and specification, since in God no aspect of evil will be found, but only the highest and necessarily perfect ratio boni. In every other one of its acts, however, the human will is free, both in the intention of the end and in the act of choice. Its manner of acting does certainly differ in each of these cases, for when it regards means the will acts not only freely but also with deliberation and counsel, while regarding the end as such no deliberation is involved.

Several important points made in this section of De Anima V bear on the causality involved in the act of human choice. A superior potency may operate freely with respect to some objects, but at the same time naturally and necessarily with respect to others, since it has the power to operate according to exigency. In this way God loves himself necessarily and creatures freely. When God concurs with our will, therefore, either in natural or in supernatural acts, he does not destroy its liberty because he acts in harmony with the nature of the will itself, which is free. God, in his infinite wisdom and omnipotence, is able to accommodate his power to the particular way in which each potency operates according to the demands of its own nature. So when the human will acts, God does not necessitate it to choose this alternative or that; rather he aids the will in its own natural act of determining itself to whatever alternative it wishes; to this God lends his help. Recall the meaning of liberty: the will itself can issue into second act or not, all the requisites in first act being given. God's acting with the human will means that he is ready to concur with the will in whatever act the will itself wishes to effect; thus it is in my power as a free agent whether God concur with me or not, and to what act he concur. The concurrence of God, therefore, in the act of human choice imposes only a conditional necessity which does not impair the essential freedom of the human will.

The will, whether it chooses to operate or not to operate, is free, for in the very instant in which it operates, it is--so far as depends on itself--also free not to operate. The will in the act of choosing must be considered in that instant in which it elicits the act, since the will itself is prior in nature to the act it elicits, freely determining itself to this act: either to operate or not. With the act once chosen, of course, a certain necessity can then be understood, but only because the composition of the act is completed. Such necessity is not consequent necessity, but simply the necessity of the consequence, with which liberty is perfectly consonant.

My future free acts are known to God simply because they are in some way present to his eternity; his knowledge of them imposes no more than conditional necessity.

The human powers of intellect and will, which are spiritual and of a higher order than other powers of man, escape the direct influence of the "heavens" which were thought in Suárez' day to be so powerful. The ideas of Suárez on this point help to underline his insistence on the intrinsic nature and independence of man's highest powers, for even though he believed the heavens to have an influence over the body of man, he limited this power to all those bodily factors which intrinsically depend upon corporeal dispositions. Because the intellect and will have no such intrinsic dependence, being elevated above the body in some of their operations, they are not directly under the sway of the heavens, although they may be influenced indirectly to the extent that reason follows after sense, and the will goes along with the sensitive appetite. Even here, however, the will is not determined or necessitated, but merely inclined in a certain direction; it can by its liberty resist and dominate the influences of the heavens.

Luther felt that concupiscence in the sensitive appetite and its resultant inordination always necessitated the will, forcing it, as it were, to sin. But because sense appetite and will are two really distinct powers consequent on diverse knowledges in man, they are by nature inclined to different objects. One appetite may draw the other after it by inclining it in some way, but not by necessitating it. No reason exists to prevent diverse powers in the same soul from being inclined to distinct or contrary objects.

God can, in his omnipotence, necessitate the will, even though the will is by nature free. Liberty, since it is an intrinsic perfection by which an agent has dominion over its own acts, can never be extrinsically attributed to something. Necessity, however, can be so imposed, even on a free faculty, and in this way God can necessitate the human will. Even God, however, cannot impose violence on the will, for violence is by definition absolutely opposed to will and inclination. The will cannot will something against its will, for the very act of willing expresses and confirms its own will and inclination. Force in the will itself is an obvious contradiction. God's necessitating of the will, therefore, is never to be identified with forcing it or imposing violence. He does not force the will to act against its own inclination; he simply inclines it so strongly in one direction as to necessitate it.[37]

In spite of the careful defense of the will's freedom and relative independence in the act of choice, the De Anima firmly maintains the position that the intellect, a more perfect power than the will, holds primacy over it. Several arguments for the primacy of the will are first advanced, however, of which perhaps the most telling declares that since freedom is the greatest perfection of man, and it is the will that is free, then the will must be the highest power in man. This stand is confirmed, the argument goes on, because the will rules the intellect and all the other powers of man, so that they are all moved at the command of the will.

Clearly, then, the will has primacy among man's powers. This position, nevertheless, will be refuted by a whole series of proofs. At least on this point of primacy of powers, the De Anima is unhesitatingly clear in designating the intellect as first.

Six principal arguments are put forth to prove the greater perfection of the intellect: (1) the nobility of a power is taken from the nobility of the object, in which point the intellect excels; (2) the intellect proceeds directly from the essence of the soul, while the will proceeds merely through the intellect; (3) man is designated as rational principally because of intellect, since will is rational only through a participation of intellect and is in fact a blind power having its roots in the intellect itself and able to operate only when led by reason; (4) the intellect is the rule of all the will's operations, since they are good or bad inasmuch as they are conformed to right reason; (5) the difference in species of intellectual supposits depends upon the manner of operation of their intellects, not their wills; (6) the knowing power is more perfect in its own class than the appetitive, for the intellect rises above its own genus and increases proportionately in species while the appetite simply seeks the good and does not explain its own perfection, as does the intellect.

In general, therefore, the intellect is seen to operate in a more perfect way than the will, although in certain acts--or secundum quid, as St. Thomas holds--the will manifests a higher act. For example, while man is in via, on the way to heaven, the act of love produced by the will towards God is higher than the intellect's knowledge of God, because the intellect knows God only imperfectly in this life, that is, as he exists in the human intellect itself, but the will is drawn to things considered as they are in themselves. In heaven, however, in patria, the act of the intellect towards God surpasses the act of the will.

The mutual dependence of the intellect and the will is acknowledged and even insisted upon. The will certainly loves nothing but the thing known by the intellect, and although the application of a man's powers to operating comes from the will, the rectitude of the operation comes from the intellect. However much the will surpasses the intellect in liberty, still the intellect excels the will in reason and discourse. To be a rational power by essence, however, is a much greater perfection than to be free, for the perfection of freedom rises out of the perfection of rationality. Clearly these powers assist each other, but the will apparently receives more assistance from the intellect than the intellect does from the will; the intellect therefore has primacy and is of a higher perfection.

For further confirmation one should note that although the moral goodness of man truly is consummated in the will, this power possesses such moral goodness only to the extent that it is conformed to its own rule, which is right reason.

Actually, therefore, moral goodness comes in the first place and more perfectly from the intellect. In intellectual natures, moreover, contemplation is certainly a better way of attaining the universal and highest good than merely taking pleasure in it. The operation of the appetite itself, which is ordained to the operation of the intellect, emphasizes this point. Therefore the intellect is man's most perfect power.[38]

The final chapter of De Anima V concerns progressive motion, or motion according to place, and its connection with man's appetitive powers. The focus here is not really on the will, but some telling points are discussed concerning the various roles the will can play in respect to the sensitive appetite in man. The sensitive appetite is capable in itself of moving man to local motion provided that the will does not contradict it. Thus, will can be considered in four ways. First, when it is impeded from operating perfectly, as with the insane, or with children before the use of reason. Here will neither impedes nor aids the sensitive appetite; therefore the sensitive appetite alone may effect motion, as experience shows. Secondly, although the will can be unimpeded, and able either to reject or consent to a movement of the sensitive appetite, it can remain indifferent and simply not issue into act. Here also sensitive appetite could move without the will, for if the will fails to consent explicitly, at any rate it does not reject the inclination and is felt to consent at least virtually. Thirdly, the will can be regarded as moving positively either to aid or impede the movement of the sense appetite. Finally, of course, the will itself can move without the sense appetite, even in contradiction to this appetite, since the will is free and the principle of all other motion in a man.[39]

A close study of the meaning of the principal concepts used by Suárez would seem to be a necessary step to any deep understanding of his positions. In *De Anima V* certain terms appear frequently and in preference to somewhat more literary alternatives.[40] The precise meaning of these recurrent terms is certainly primary to the thought of the young Suárez, who was composing these pages around 1572, while he was still in his early twenties.

Suárez repeatedly refers to the intellect and its practical judgment as the *root* of liberty, but he never names it a cause, nor attributes to it any efficiency.[41] Just what does Suárez mean by *radix*? In no place does he actually explain its meaning; one must discover it by study of the word in context. *Radix* first occurs in *De Anima V* as a synonym for "origin," in a passage where Suárez describes the correspondence between appetite and knowledge.

> Truly, if knowledge is the root and origin of this appetite, from a diverse kind of knowledge follows a diverse kind of appetite.[42]

Radix here seems to mean not only a thing that must be first before something else can take place--a principle from which something else follows, but which need not be the efficient cause of that something else--but also a factor in some way responsible for the specification of the consequent. At the same time, however, Suárez is everywhere insistent that neither the object nor the apprehension of it exercise any efficiency with regard to man's appetitive powers.

What kind of root or origin is this? A passage just before the above quotation throws some light on the question, for here Suárez introduces for the first time in De Anima V the term oritur which he frequently uses in conjunction with radix. Describing the manner in which knowing things can move themselves through their own knowledge, Suárez states that from this knowledge--a new quality in the being--a certain leaning or weight [pondus] develops or arises [oritur] in the knower. This inclination is named appetite, and knowers are moved by means of it to act. Alvarez adds in the edition that such knowing things are thus moved on their own accord to perfections not possessed in themselves--a qualification not stated in the early Suarezian manuscript, but certainly implied.[43]

This first use of orior in De Anima V sets into place the relation that Suárez sees between one thing and another developing from it. It is from a root that something arises or comes forth. (Nascor is used in the edition equivalently with orior, though not so frequently; Alvarez sometimes substitutes it for the particular form of orior occurring in the manuscript. Suárez himself uses it not at all in De Anima V.) The two words, then, radix and orior, "root" and "to arise from," must be considered jointly to discover their true meaning to Suárez. This meaning seems to be complementary.

Significantly, radix is first used as a synonym for origo. The root or origin of something is, of course, absolutely necessary if the consequent is to take place, but does this fact in itself demand an inevitably necessary connection between the root and its fulfillment? To put it more graphically, if there is a flower, there must be a root from which it springs; but does the existence of a root of necessity demand a flower? Let us make the metaphor clearer. If the root is the intellect, reason, man's universal knowledge, then the plant or stem rising naturally--hence necessarily--out of it is rational appetite, the will, man's free faculty. So far there exists a natural emanation due to man as an intellectual being. There is no contingency about man's having a rational appetite; this is necessary to his nature. This power itself, however, is named free. What does this mean? Not that the power may or may not be there, but that the acts it performs--the flowers, in this metaphor--may or may not take place. This special plant, the will, has dominion over the number and kind of flowers--free acts--which may blossom from it.

In the natural course of events, then, yes, there will be a plant which can produce its flowers, if all the other requisites and conditions of growth are fulfilled, but there is not such an inexorable connection evident between root, plant, and flower as exists, for example, in a determined series of cause and effect, which would leave no room for any escape into freedom. For this reason, I believe, Suárez invariably chooses the softer word radix rather than causa to describe the manner in which liberty is grounded in the intellect. He is safeguarding the autonomy of man's free faculty.

Must it not be said, however, that given the root and the natural sequence of events, the subsequent flowering would also have to be a natural, and hence determined, emanation from the root, inhibited only by the lack of some requisite condition? If freedom springs from the intellect with only this negative kind of contingency, then apparently man is only "free" so long as no exterior or opposing forces prevent this action of his from taking place. Rather, the act itself is contingent, because it might not have occurred. This state of affairs would amount to the "divided sense" of freedom which Suárez rejects, for he insists over and over that if man is truly free he must be able to act or not to act, even when all the requisites for his action are present. Otherwise "freedom" would be no freedom at all. And can one say, furthermore, that the emanation or development (root into plant) is itself natural and determined, but that the fruit of this development is itself a free power? Man's free faculty necessarily rises out of the power he has to make universal judgments: it is therefore natural that man be free. Does this statement of the situation deprive man of his essential liberty? Does he still have dominion of his free acts--able to perform them or not, as he wishes? How can what is free arise from what is necessary, and arise necessarily? To find the way out of this seeming dilemma calls for further exploration of the basic Suarezian texts.

A close look at the meanings in context of radix, even when it occurs in doctrine apparently unrelated to the central issue here, gradually reveals its fundamental meaning to Suárez: that of a source, an originating point, but without necessary causal implications. For example, powers that are rooted in the same soul possess, because of this, a certain bond of unity.[44] Suárez regrets the impossibility of searching out the doctrine of the will to its very roots--a project which, since it would involve the whole of moral philosophy, is beyond the scope of the De Anima.[45] Radix, then, designates basically simply a starting point: something is rooted in something else; it originates there, but it need not be caused efficiently by that thing. Picture a highway going from New York to Philadelphia--it originates in New York, it has its source there, but it is not New York that produces the highway, at least not simply on the score of its beginning there. The agency of its coming-to-be is another question.

Radix takes on a further meaning in Suárez' mind, however, for he speaks of it also as something more than a mere beginning point; a root in addition plays some part in determining what grows from it. One of the earliest uses of this sense of the term in De Anima V occurs in the fifth chapter of the edition, where Suárez, speaking of the concupiscible acts of the sensitive appetite, writes that love is certainly the first of these acts, and also the root of all the others.[46] What does this mean, if not that love is somehow the basis of all the other concupiscible acts, which in turn derive their meaning in relation to it? Earlier in the same chapter Suárez explains the manner in which love gives rise to desire:

> And thus from this love a certain motion rises in the appetite towards the beloved thing, by which it desires to be united to that thing, and [this motion] is called desire.[47]

Again oritur is used to describe the manner in which the new appetitive act rises out of the root appetite, love. The acts discussed here are both appetites, of course, so do not present precisely the same problem as an intellect, root of the will. The term radix, nevertheless, is consistently used. We may now say that this deeper meaning of root includes an influence which helps to define the thing developing from it in relation to its point of origin. Some formal causality is at work here, though Suárez does not yet refer to it as such.

In dealing specifically with the problem of freedom and its manner of development from the intellect, Suárez takes for granted the basic meaning of root that he has already established. In question two of disputation twelve, which is devoted to an examination of the freedom of the will, an argument is introduced to show in what liberty consists "formaliter et radicaliter."[48] Most importantly, liberty is found in man because of the fact that he is rational, since the perfection of liberty is found in no other animal. Liberty manifestly must belong to man, then, precisely on account of that perfection by which he surpasses other animals: namely, reason. Experience confirms this position, for a man discovers freedom in himself to that exact degree he makes use of his reason.[49]

What is the status here of *radicaliter*? At first glance, it apparently signifies little more than a pinpointing of the source of freedom, but the close connection of reason and liberty is certainly implied, not only in the fact that both of these special powers of men have their foundation and origin in the most specifically human part of man, but also in the paralleling of the degree of rationality and freedom.

A few lines farther on in the same question Suárez explains the meaning of the well known formula that *liberum arbitrium* is a faculty both of reason and of will. How can this be? Liberty, he writes, "depends partly on reason, partly on will. In depends on reason as on a root; on the will as a subject formally free."[50] This statement is his most succinct summary in *De Anima V* of the relationship involved here. Assumed is the background of his meaning of root: not a cause in any necessitating sense, but a necessary source of *being* for the will (the faculty which is formally free), and moreover a source of *defining* the will. The will in essence is simply the appetite following on universal knowledge, and its object can only be that which is presented to it by the intellect, *as* it is presented. This is not to say that the will *must choose* such an object; the will is not determined by the intellect in this narrow sense, but *if* the will chooses (exercises a free act), it must be an object presented to it by the intellect, hence delineated and made definite by man's reasoning power. In this sense alone does the *root*, the intellect, exert a determining force on the will--the intellect sets up, outlines, makes definite its presentation of the object to the will, which is then able to adhere to it or not, since it is the will which is formally free among man's powers.[51]

Radix is used again with the same meaning in the next chapter of *De Anima V*, where one of the proofs to show that the intellect is more perfect than the will advances as argument the fact that the intellect itself is the root of the will, for whenever we say that man is rational, we at the same time assert virtually and radically [*radice*] that he has volition and free choice.[52] Although the meaning of *root* here does ~~not~~ change essentially, it is now recognized as being of greater perfection than that which develops from it, since some formal causal influence and priority is clearly present as a governing and regulating principle. This meaning carries over to the role of the intellect or reason in providing a rule for the particular acts of the will, which acts are morally good, Suárez agrees, only to the extent they conform with right reason.[53]

A final use of *radix* in *De Anima V* occurs in the last chapter of this book, where the proper subject is no longer the will as such, but instead the general motive power possessed by man. This passage proves significant, however, for in comparing the manuscript and edition versions, the very close relationship of the terms now being studied becomes most evident. Suárez is here pointing out that the general motive power in man must be located together with the sensitive power in the brain, because an injury to the sense also does away with the motion of the involved members.

MS 583	EDITION
Ergo signum est quod motus in eodem fonte radicatur in quo sensus, quo leso utraque periit.	. . . quod indicio est, motum quoque ex ea radice nasci ex qua sensus oritur, qua vitiata uterque perit.[54]

What proves useful in this text for the purpose of this study is the close equivalence found among the key concepts "root" and "source," "to be rooted in," "to rise out of," "to originate from." Although the manuscript uses only two of these, the ease with which Alvarez substitutes "ex ea radice nasci ex qua sensus oritur" for the simpler phrase of the manuscript, "in eodem fonte radicatur in quo sensus," gives manifest proof that he judged these terms to be closely parallel in the mind of Suárez.

A root, then, has something developing or rising out of it as from an originating source, which unites and makes definite but does not necessitate. Suárez makes use of the complementary term orior even more often than radix, especially whenever he deals directly with the relations between intellect and will. The prepositions ex or ab used with both orior and nascor vary the meaning of the verbs to some extent. When either of these two verbs is used without a preposition, but simply with the ablative of separation, the reference is to an immediate source; when either verb is used with ex or ab plus the ablative, the source is at once designated as remote. Suárez invariably uses either one of these propositions with orior (as does Alvarez with nascor, when he substitutes it; Suárez himself does not use this term in De Anima V) whenever he refers to the manner in which the will or appetite rises out of knowledge. He thus indicates a remote source, safeguarding once again the positive freedom of the will. Suárez does not want to make this connection too immediate or too strong, I believe, for too close a bond might raise a plethora of questions concerning determinism and necessitating causality. Suárez is bound to avoid this situation at all costs.

A look at some of the uses of orior will illuminate the point. One of the first points in need of clarification, it seems to me, is the problem of what exactly, in this process of emanation from a root, rises out of what. Does power come from power, or act from act? Can one say that the will rises out of the intellect in the same manner that a free act of the will rises out of some actual knowledge of the intellect or reason? Or is it rather that freedom in the will rises out of indifference in the universal knowledge of the intellect? Each of these ways of describing the situation seems to find some support in the texts. Let us have a look at them.

The passages in which orior refers particularly to the relation between intellect and will are most helpful here, and the majority of them stress the act or perfection of knowledge possessed by the intellect as the root of: (1) an act of the will or appetite, (2) the quality or mode of this new act, namely, that it is free. Once again the root is playing its specifying role. As an illustration of this, the first text using orior (discussed above, page 76) defines an appetite as a certain inclination or weight rising out of the knowledge possessed by a being. This new leaning of a knower is in addition to the inclinations he has innately on account of his natural being, for the knowledge is new to him, and so is the appetite rising out of that knowledge. Here, then, a new act or quality in the intellect or knowing power is the source of a new act in the appetite or will.[55]

A text in chapter three insists that an elicited appetite, as differing from a natural one, rises out of knowledge [ex cognitione]; for this reason it is called elicited and vital.

> I admit, therefore, that apprehension is required, not as an efficient cause, but as the application of the object, for certainly it is good which moves the appetite; this good ought, nevertheless, to be applied to it through knowledge.[56]

Apprehension here signifies an act whose precise function is to present the object to the will--no more, no less. Apprehension is an act (in the knowing power) by means of which is born another act (in the appetitive power). The object of both acts is the good presented.

Chapter five has a passage dealing with the acts of the sensitive appetite, and gives us the same picture of act rising out of act. There anger is described as rising out of the apprehension of an evil which is at once present and unavoidable; the appetite is a strong one bent on conquering the evil, and "this act is anger."[57] Much the same picture of act begetting act appears in the next chapter, where it is explained how, from a consideration of supernatural things, a _sensible_ delight can arise in the appetite, "even to tears," adds Alvarez.[58]

Another text in chapter six, which explains why the sense appetite is _not_ free, lists some significant qualities required in the knowing power in order that freedom may result. The sensitive appetite cannot be free, for the simple reason that it follows from sense knowledge, in which is found no _discursus_, no reasoning process, no inquiry concerning means, no universality in knowledge. Liberty can arise only out of some indifference in knowledge, which is not at all present in the apprehension of a sense object.[59] While Suárez here speaks of an indifference of _reason_, Alvarez emends the word to an indifference of _knowledge_. The manuscript term, _rationis_, would specifically exclude sense knowledge from this category, and might also imply an indifference in the _faculty_ as well as in the type of knowledge possessed by it. Is it this inference that Alvarez wishes to avoid?

In sum, however, this text stresses the point that the quality freedom rises out of certain prior qualities which are to be found only in intellectual knowledge. This still amounts to a rising of act from act, although, surely, a different type of act--a modifying quality.

In a later text in the omitted chapter eight, Suárez justifies this type of inference. Clearly, he writes, liberty in the will rises out of reason because appetite rises out of knowledge, and therefore the mode of the appetite and will must also rise out of the mode and properties of knowledge.[60] This text seems to me extremely important, for it reveals the profound formal dependence of will or appetite on reason or knowledge. Not only does the being of the appetite result from knowledge, but also its specification and properties must agree with and be limited by the knowledge that brings it forth. This position will be most significant in determining the exact role formal causality and intellectual knowledge do actually play in the act of human choice. Precisely what is left for efficient causality, the role traditionally given to the will, in this description of the situation? These questions cannot be properly answered here; but their very roots are making themselves felt and must eventually be laid bare. The real meaning of the theory of human choice advanced by Suárez will not be understood until then. My purpose here is simply to indicate the specific points at which I think these questions begin to grow, and to trace as clearly as possible the path of their development.

As the De Anima continues its study of the will and its freedom, more stress is laid upon the property of indifference as a main root of liberty. Immediately after asserting that the properties of the appetite must agree with and rise out of the mode and properties of knowledge, Suárez states that the Thomistic school of philosophy commonly attributes the source of liberty in the will to indifference of the intellect.[61] This position will be not so much refuted as qualified. Suárez, as was stated earlier in this chapter, sees some danger in the implications of this Thomistic position. He judges that it can easily slip over into the error of Durandus, who placed liberty formally in the intellect, since its indifference and liberty of judgment seemed to him prior to and more perfect than the liberty of the will. For Durandus, then, the will would possess only a derived sort of freedom. Suárez abhors this extreme position, and to avoid its pitfalls, vehemently insists that freedom in the will rises primarily from the perfection and universality of the intellect, not from its quality of indifference. Behold one more example of the correspondence existing between the intellect and the will--the power that is perfect in the order of cognition calls for an equally perfect power in the appetitive order. So the perfection of one power rises out of the perfection of the other.[62] That indifference is present in the knowledge of the intellect is, of course, not denied, but emphasis is placed instead on the universality of the object of both powers. The object of the intellect is whatever is true, the will whatever is good--but this good must always be presented to it by way of the intellect. In this way the will rises out of the intellect: one perfection corresponds in degree and scope to the other.

But how does Suárez think of indifference in the intellect? It is a characteristic of the way in which the various goods met with in this life are apprehended. None of them is judged to be necessary for man's beatitude because none of them is seen as the all perfect and highest good, capable of calling forth a necessary act of love. Because the intellect judges or estimates these particular things in this way, "ergo oritur libertas voluntatis."[63] Indifference, understood in this fashion, then, can be the root of liberty in the will. Indifference signifies no positive freedom in the intellect, but only its manner of judging or valuing objects in comparison with a universal standard, then correspondingly presenting the objects to the will, that it may desire or choose among them. No one of them is this universal good itself--not in this life; hence the will is free. It can choose the object for the good which it does possess; it can reject the object because it is neither supremely good nor judged to be presently necessary for the attainment of beatitude.[64]

The remaining usages of orior in De Anima V stress a perfection rising out of a corresponding perfection. The earlier texts brought out the relation between an act of knowledge and an act of appetite, but now the emphasis is on the quality or perfection of those acts. Again formal causality seems to be at the basis of these positions.

Chapter nine offers an interesting variation in the usage of these terms. Throughout the manuscript version of De Anima V, Suárez (especially in the question on the freedom of the will as such) has been stressing more the perfection of the intellect as a root of freedom rather than its indifference, while the edition, up to this point, usually prefers to emphasize indifference. Yet the edition, in the second paragraph of this chapter, states plainly that the liberty of the will comes from [nascitur] the perfection of the intellect, while it omits the additional factor of indifference, which the manuscript, on the other hand, here makes a point of including: "the liberty of the will, as has been said, rises out of [oritur] the indifference and perfection of the intellect."[65] Suárez evidently considers his explanation of indifference to have made its meaning sufficiently clear as itself an example of the perfection of the intellect, but this would not explain why Alvarez omits it here, when he ordinarily would emphasize it. Perhaps, since the context in which this passage occurs is an argument to prove the greater perfection of the intellect, this is explanation enough. Or is this an indirect concession to the fervor of Suárez' argument in the omitted chapter eight for "perfection" rather than "indifference" as the root of freedom? It is impossible, of course, to decide for either one of these alternatives with any real certitude.

In the same chapter, which deals with the problem of whether the intellect or the will is the more perfect power, Suarez seems to combine the two notions of power and perfection in discussing intellect and will, for he declares that it is a higher perfection to be a rational power by essence, than to possess liberty, since the perfection of freedom rises out of the rational power, and is therefore the lesser.[66] Is this a description of power rising out of power, or of act rising from act? Actually, it is both, for the intellect and the will are not just passive potencies in man; they are his most perfect powers. Simply to possess the potency which is an intellect is a perfection higher than any other natural quality of which man or animal can boast. Because of the possession of this uniquely perfect power to know, man also possesses another power which is essentially active and free, but has its roots in the power of knowing. These powers are themselves perfections, though certainly not fully actualized, and therefore must be regarded as forces in man by which he acts, knows, and loves. Nothing in man is pure act, that is true, but neither is it pure potency; whatever exists must possess some act, and to this exact extent it can have an influence on something else. What is more natural than that man's highest powers should also be the source of his highest acts, able to exert the most influence on his life and on his aspirations?

Thus, the intellect is even the ultimate root of moral goodness in man. True, moral goodness reaches its completion in the will, but any human act possesses this quality of moral goodness only to the extent it is conformed to its rule, which is right reason itself. And what is this? Simply reason, judging rightly about things to be done. The will has an obligation to heed this regulation of the intellect (though it can choose not to do so), and therefore, even in the realm of morality in which the will is generally granted preëminence, the intellect is actually more perfect, since moral goodness arises out of it prius et perfectius.[67] The word "conformity" gives a clue here to the type of perfection involved. The will has goodness if it conforms, shares the same form with, the rule presented to it by the judgment of the intellect. Once again the same insistence on like perfection begetting like perfection appears. Certainly, this perfection of moral goodness is one which the will can choose to give itself or not--but the root of this perfection, as well as its extent, lies in the judgment or act of the intellect. The freedom of the will does rise out of its root, the intellect, and finds its perfection insofar as it corresponds to the perfection of reason itself.

Although the term orior does occur in other sections of De Anima V, particularly in the question on the acts of the sensitive appetite, only one other usage proves of much value to clarify its meaning. In a paragraph about the causes of laughter the distinction in meaning between a root and a cause is hinted at. Everyone agrees that laughter rises out of [oritur] delight and joy, but whether joy is a sufficient and adequate cause of laughter remains doubtful. After a few explanatory comments, Suárez concludes that laughter rises out of surprise and joy simultaneously.[68] What is implied here? Chiefly, it seems, that the root of something, that out of which it rises, does not necessarily constitute an adequate cause of the thing. A root, that is, is not up to doing the job all by itself. As such, it is not a sufficient cause; in itself it does not possess the necessary efficiency to bring about the desired result. A root is a source, but not the only source. It is an origin which does not fully account for the perfection developing from it. It does stand firm, however, as a necessary condition and delineating factor; it does exercise a very needed formal causality; it does make the perfection rising out of it be--not in an absolute way, but in a specifying to-be-of-this-kind way. And this is one of the essential principles of being.

The meaning of free choice itself [liberum arbitrium] must now be examined. Rather strangely, this term occurs only once in the edited version of De Anima V, though it is used often in the chapter on the freedom of the will omitted by Alvarez. This one use is not even extremely significant, for it simply mentions free choice as one of the results of having rationality. This text has already been cited in our study of radix,[69] but the casual way in which liberi arbitrii is appended, especially in the Alvarez text which has given it no recognition at all, is a source of surprise.

The omitted question two of disputation twelve, however, devotes considerable time and space to this unique power that man has of making choices that are free, of exercising dominion over his own acts. Liberum arbitrium is mentioned in the early part of this question simply as a fact which needs to be reconciled with other facts, as, for example, the influence of God's providence and his preventing grace.[70] This particular question, however, is relegated to theology where it properly belongs. Among various errors concerning man's freedom, one of the most widespread was Luther's claim that original sin had obliterated free choice in man, so that now he finds himself obliged to sin.[71] No controversy or explanation is found in either of these contexts concerning the meaning of the term "free choice"--it is assumed that everyone knows what is under discussion here. This assumption would be a natural one, considering the flaming contemporary controversies raging over freedom. Everyone was at least familiar with the existence of the question, as well as the usual language in which it was phrased. Faith insists that man does possess the power of making free choices, and Suárez quotes Scripture and other authorities to show this. He gives several proofs that man is free and goes to great lengths to define freedom and explain what is meant by man's power of free choice, or liberum arbitrium. He never questions this phrase as such, however, but simply accepts it from a long tradition of scholasticism. Apparently he expects his readers to do likewise.[72]

These first uses of the term in question two seem to equate it quite closely with liberty or freedom, taken as a quality of the human will. The word "freedom" could just as easily be substituted for liberum arbitrium in the examples cited above. A progression in thought seems to appear, however, on folio 261r, where the manuscript insists that liberty as such is opposed to violence and force, for whatever undergoes violence is at the same time necessitated. Some sort of distinction in terms seems to be implied in what follows, for Suárez immediately states that the first step in an investigation of the perfection of liberty is to seek out the meaning of liberum arbitrium. The term, he remarks, is taken from the word "libet," "it is pleasing," as if whatever is called free [liber] can operate of itself whatever it pleases. But then, instead of tracking down the term "arbitrium," Suárez initiates a long discussion of the meaning of liberty itself, stating the familiar definition of liberty--the power of a potency by which it can issue into act or not, even when all the requisites for acting are given. The text goes on to explain why the words "omnibus requisitis" are included, since if an agent ceases to act merely because of some defect in the object or some other lack, this cannot be called liberty but only indigence![73] Arguments for liberty, both from faith and reason, follow in the text of the manuscript, and liberum arbitrium is not again mentioned as such until two folio pages later, in the midst of an argument for freedom, where Suárez declares that whoever takes away liberum arbitrium from man is making him equal to brute animals, thereby destroying the order of God and the basis of religion.[74] This section stresses the capacity of man to take counsel and exercise dominion over his actions, to bring about either good or evil, so that the meaning of _liberum arbitrium_ certainly at this point indicates a power which is at work, more than just a quality possessed by the will. Suárez seems to be implying here that simply to have the quality _freedom_ is insufficient; for man truly to be free, he must be able to exercise this liberty, to put it into practice. Unless, through his power of freely exercising dominion, he is able to act or not to act, as he wishes, freedom is an empty word, and the power of free choice is no power at all.

After showing how liberty is rooted in the rational part of man, the part that is specifically human, question two begins to examine the nature of the _liberum arbitrium_. Just what is it? This power too must reside in man's most specific part, since it is proper only to man among all beings of the material world. _Liberum arbitrium_ is commonly described as a faculty of the will and of reason.[75] Suárez briefly traces the use of the term "faculty." Properly speaking, free choice is of course an act, but it has been taken over and used also to mean the _principle_ of the act of free choice. A principle of an act in man is a potency or power, and thus a natural faculty, for these _are_ the specific powers of man. Reason and will are both named in this basic description of free choice, because it partakes of both of these, depending on reason as on a root, and on the will as a formally free subject.[76] The text first investigates the meaning of a "formally free subject." This phrase refers to that subject to which freedom belongs by its very nature. The quality of freedom itself makes this faculty to be *what* it is; freedom designates it *formally*. What is this power? Liberty is found formally in the will, since it consists formally in the indifference of choice. A man is free, experience shows us, because he can choose either this or that, and is able to exercise dominion over his own operations. But the power which can choose and also make use of the other powers of man is the will, and thus it is evident that liberty belongs formally to the will; freedom makes this power be what it is. This view is strengthened by the fact that all of man's actions are designated as free to the exact degree that they are subject to his will.[77] Because of the presence of the *will*, then, man is free; it is in this faculty of man that the power of free choice properly and formally resides.

Question two then explains the part of the statement that describes the liberty of the will itself as rising out of reason.[78] Since will is rational appetite, it has its source in reason in the same way any other appetite originates in knowledge. And this appetite must correspond to the knowledge from which it is born, as was made clear in the first few pages of *De Anima V*.[79] The formal influence of the *root* was previously developed at length, and Suárez at this point seems to be taking for granted its specifying role. He next investigates the *manner* in which liberty, which is a quality residing in one vital power, can arise out of reason, a really different and distinct faculty in man.[80] The meaning of *liberum arbitrium* is now taken to mean man's special faculty, partaking both of reason and of will, by which he is enabled to make free choices and exercise dominion both over himself and over other things. The *fact* that free choice shares in both these powers is now considered proved; the point remains simply to explain *how* in a manner that will safeguard the essential freedom of the will, by which man is able to act or not to act, even when *all* the requisites for his action are present.

The Thomists maintain, according to this manuscript, that man has *liberum arbitrium* because he is able to make judgments of reason, as brutes are unable to do, and hence lack free choice.[81] They continue that the liberty of the will consists in the fact that once the good object is proposed, the will can love it or not. Suárez dislikes this manner of stating the solution, as he feels it does not lay enough emphasis upon the *active* indifference or dominion exercised by the will. Furthermore, if the will can reject something only because of some evil which is judged to be present in it--a view Suárez attributes to the Thomists--then what if two limited goods are presented neither of which is really evil? Must the will always choose the one presented by the intellect as the greater good? Suárez feels that the Thomists would have to answer yes to this question, and he refuses to admit this. The will must be able to choose any one of the objects presented to it by the intellect, and it actually possesses this range of choice as long as the object is neither totally bad nor completely and necessarily good. As far as limited and particular goods in this life are concerned, the will is absolutely free to choose any of them presented to it by the intellect. Why? Because they all contain some good, hence need not be rejected, but none is perfectly good, hence need not be chosen. The emphasis here on the positive aspect of good, even in the reason for rejecting one of the proposed goods, is a noteworthy contribution to this doctrine. Suárez does agree that some evil aspect must be apprehended in the object in order that the will may hate this object, but for simple choice or rejection, the mere fact that the good is limited suffices.[82]

Two other important references to liberum arbitrium occur in this same question. Summing up the way in which the will follows [sequitur] man's rational power, Suárez states again that it is because of this that the will is free [ergo est libera]. He argues for the truth of this conclusion because free choice follows from [sequitur ex] the intellect and reason, which apprehends precisely the good and evil present in each thing, and judges under what aspect and manner it can be considered eligible and good. The appetite which follows such knowledge, therefore, is able to love any known good in the same way in which it is seen as lovable or desirable. This act of the will takes place freely, for the appetite which is the will follows man's highest level of knowledge, which is universal in scope, and thus the power in the appetitive order will enjoy the same universality and perfection.[83] Once again Suárez rests his principal argument for the freedom of the will on the very perfection and universality of the intellect, which clearly serves as the formal determinant here in presenting to the will the objects it may love.

While Suárez made it emphatic that the intellect and will are really distinct powers of the soul, he insists here that the will and liberum arbitrium are not actually distinct, but are distinguished merely by reason, analogous to the way that intellect and reason are distinct in meaning. Will and free choice are really one and the same faculty, but this free power in man is called will when it simply wills or tends toward an end, while it is named free choice [liberum arbitrium] when it is considered as exercising its liberty of choosing among means.[84] This identification may perhaps explain why the edition makes no effort to introduce or discuss the term liberum arbitrium, and why the qualities of liberty and perfection that Suárez describes in the will are equally attributable to the power of free choice. Liberum arbitrium, for Suárez, equals the will making its free choices about means to be taken. Thus, as Suárez himself has said, this quality and perfection found in the will [freedom, or liberum arbitrium] has its roots and source in the intellect and man's rational power, just as does the appetitive power itself.

Has Suárez really explained the freedom of the will? How does this power escape into freedom from the intellect's determining influence, which is certainly necessary and unavoidable? Suárez would answer this, I am certain, by pointing out more accurately the kind of knowledge and "determining influence" that the intellect does possess. This intellectual knowledge is universal in scope, able to present *any* one of the millions of goods in this world as an object to the will. Granted, the will must choose what the intellect presents to it--that is, if it chooses, it must choose *here*. Such is its function as rational appetite. But simply because of the perfection and range of the objects of the intellect, which are in a certain sense infinite, the will itself partakes in this same universality and modest kind of infinity. The will is free.

But how does the will exercise this freedom; how does it act? What type of causality is exercised by the will, if all the determinants on the formal side are contributed by the intellect? Precisely how does the will go about this act of choice? What does it *add*, if anything, to make *this* object, not *that* one, be the chosen one? Where does it get the power to love, if the question may be phrased in this way? How would Suárez answer these questions?

In fact, his approach to these points in *De Anima V* strikes me as oblique rather than direct. Is it fair to ask these questions of him in this fashion? Are these problems peculiarly modern and lacking in relevance to the doctrine

Suárez sought to present? I think not. I believe that the solution of these questions will reveal much about the adequacy of Suárez' total doctrine of freedom in human choice. It seems to me that he leaves some very crucial points largely untouched. Most of them concern causality, and as such will be studied intensively in the third chapter of this dissertation. Before leaving De Anima V, however, a few of the texts in which efficiency is attributed to the will and denied to any other human factor in the act of choice should be examined.

The section in this treatise which deals with the various acts of the will would appear to be the logical place to look first for Suárez' explanation of what the will does, precisely, in the act of choice.[85] The discussion, however, approaches the problem from a totally different angle. The first part of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the object of the will, the good. A text in paragraph three seems promising, at first, of giving some insight into the manner in which the will acts, but actually it merely proves that being-as-good is the true object of the will. It is not sufficient, for action on the part of the will, that the thing be presented to the will simply as a known thing--it must also be known as a good. Without this essential factor in the intellect's knowledge and presentation of the thing, the will simply does not desire it.[86] Again, a formal determinant is being pointed out here; no hint is given of the real source of the will's efficiency.

The text follows this passage immediately with an enumeration of the various acts of the will, dividing them basically into those concerning ends, and those concerning means. The explanation is solidly traditional,[87] but in the discussion of means Suárez points out that here the acts of the will can properly come into play. These acts are two: election and use. The act of choice is broken down in the usual fashion--the will intends the end, then the intellect, after taking counsel, presents to the will a number of means by which the proposed end can be attained. When the will accepts these means as valid, it consents or chooses. To consent [consentire] is for the will to say yes to the means, and the term properly signifies this acceptance, though it is also frequently used in a general way to describe any act of the will, whether it concerns the end or the means. If the will, after consenting, then goes on to separate out one of these proposed means, preferring it to the others, this act is choice [electio]. Immediately, then, Suárez proceeds to explain how the will exercises its next act, use [usus], by which it puts the chosen means into execution through applying any necessary powers to their proper operations.[88] In this place, however, no more is said of the way in which the will is enabled to perform these acts; only a simple description of them is given, without any real investigation of the principles involved.

Later on the same chapter takes up the problem of which act is simply prior, the intellect or the will. Here occurs a very pregnant statement of the respective roles of the two powers. Suárez refers to St. Thomas as the source of the doctrine:

> The intellect moves the will through the manner of a final cause by applying the object, while the will moves the intellect effectively, namely by applying it to operate.[89]

No further explanation, however, is given of this text. The question goes on at once to discuss whether or not the intellect can, at times, truly command the will through an imperium to put a chosen act into execution, but Suárez insists that the intellect does not of itself possess any efficacy whatever, and the only efficiency it can command in such a situation proceeds from the previous choice of the will. For in fact, if the will does not persist in its choice, this imperium cannot be efficacious. The earlier statement of final causality on the part of the intellect and effective causality on the part of the will is reiterated and considered proved.[90]

The next paragraph provides a statement concerning how the efficiency of the will should not be understood, but the reference is to the effectiveness of the will in moving the other powers of man, not its efficiency in eliciting its own act. The will does not move these other powers as if it placed something in these potencies, or concurred immediately to elicit their acts. Rather, the will's efficiency in respect to other powers is called moral. Suárez notes that moral causality is usually considered to act per accidens in natural philosophy or physics, but that in moral matters it is truly a per se causality, since the powers concerned are all rooted in the same soul and have a natural subordination, one to the other.[91] The notion of this moral efficiency will be considered more fully in chapter three of this dissertation, which will be concerned with the meaning of the various kinds of causality as they appear in these early works of Suárez.

The section in chapter three of the earlier part of De Anima V, where Suárez is systematically excluding from the act of the appetite any efficiency except that produced by the appetite itself, should be a fruitful source of explanation of this efficiency in the will, but it proves, at least at first glance, to be similarly disappointing.[92] One text does speak emphatically of the apprehension of the object as being only a required condition for the application of the object to the appetitive potency, but its role is clearly one specification, not of efficiency.[93] Suárez admits that this apprehension of the object is truly necessary for the act of the appetite to take place. It remains a cause per accidens, however, in the physical sense of the term, and serves simply to specify and delineate the object so that the appetite may move itself into act.[94] Why does Suárez insist that the causality here is accidental, though necessary in order that the act take place? Because, it seems to me, if he were to call the application of the object by means of apprehension a per se cause of the act of the appetite, efficiency--either on the part of the object or of man's knowing powers--would immediately be introduced. And this he will not admit.

The real role of efficiency in the appetite is still not evident. One final text, in the chapter dealing with the relative perfection of intellect and will toward the end of De Anima V, gives a curious picture of the will's reason for choosing. The context of this statement is an argument to prove that the intellect is actually more perfect than the will, even though the will is free. The text argues that the intellect is able to consider its object in a more perfect way, abstracting it from existence and considering simply the naked quiddity of the thing. The will, on the other hand, is only drawn to a thing insofar as it has an order to actual existence, for nothing can be desired unless it exists in act or will exist. The power of the intellect is greater, therefore, for it can separate the essence itself from existence and seek after the proper ratio of each thing, "but the will is drawn in a simple way to its object by desiring its existence, which certainly is a less precise way of operating, and less immaterial."[95] The will is less perfect than the intellect, therefore, because it desires the whole thing, precisely as it exists. In fact, it desires the very existence of that thing. The intellect, however, has the power to concentrate on the pure intelligible essence in itself and is thus greater in power and perfection than the will. Suárez describes this argument as the most precise, and the one that best demonstrates the greater perfection of the intellect--

even though, as he comments, Scotus was fond of making fun of it.[96]

This text, I feel, may provide the best clue De Anima V offers to what Suárez means by efficiency in the will: it desires the existence of the object proposed to it by the intellect, or it chooses that one object, rather than another, should be made to exist. The implications of these remarks will be left for further investigation later, but a brief look at the texts available in De Anima V has indicated that the exact meaning of efficient causality in the will must be sought out by indirection and examination of texts which may ostensibly be on other topics. The question remains: just how does the will choose? De Anima V, on the surface, does not answer it.

Before taking up an investigation of the positions of Suárez on human choice in the nineteenth disputation of the Metaphysical Disputations, a more careful presentation of some of the chief doctrinal differences between the early manuscript and the Alvarez edition of the De Anima should be made. The changes introduced by Alvarez have been classified above (pages 46-53), where some typical examples were given, but now that a study of the texts has been completed, a more balanced judgment on the extent and importance of these changes can be reached.

Certainly the most important and significant change introduced by Alvarez was the omission of chapter eight from the edition. To leave out what certainly must be considered one of the most crucial sections of this treatise on the will, in a time when freedom and liberum arbitrium were still so much a question of debate, seems to be simply incomprehensible. The reason Alvarez gives for the omission is merely that Suárez had covered this doctrine in several other places, and his thought on the subject was well known. Why, really, did he omit this section? Could the reason be that, with the publication of De Legibus in 1612, some significant changes had taken place in the doctrine of Suárez concerning the primacy of the will with respect to the intellect in the realm of law and command? This shift in doctrine has been noted or hinted at by more than one scholar.[97] It is not my task in this dissertation to ferret out the late position of Suárez on the relations of intellect and will, but simply to set out as clearly as I can the facts of his early position, and to discover if the views given in the Metaphysical Disputations, edited by Suárez himself fifteen years before the De Legibus, show any significant changes or developments. Nevertheless, if such a remarkable shift had taken place in the thought of Suárez and appeared in the immensely popular De Legibus, nearly ten years before the time at which Alvarez writes, would it not be feasible for Alvarez to drop out a chapter from the De Anima which stressed the very freedom of the will as based necessarily in the intellect itself? A chapter which says over and over again, in various ways, that the will is formally dependent on the intellect, and must correspond to it and be guided by it? There is always the possibility, of course, that Suárez himself instructed Alvarez to omit this chapter, but if this were the case, I feel sure that Alvarez would have mentioned the fact in his brief explanation of the omission. A likely guess, then, would be that for Alvarez, rather than stress with the young Suárez in the omitted chapter a dependence on the intellect that had at least been considerably qualified in later years, or make the drastic changes that might be necessary to bring this work into conformity with Suárez' later position, he simply left it out. On the other hand, if this surmise is at all true, why would he not also omit chapter nine, in which Suárez emphatically insists on the primacy of the intellect over the will, even making the moral goodness of the will dependent on the right judgments of reason? The problem must really remain without an answer, but the fact persists that the very omission of such a sizable and important question is sufficient of itself to diminish significantly the worth and authenticity of the De Anima as edited by Alvarez.

Earlier in this chapter, mention was made of the various types of changes introduced by Alvarez in the primitive manuscript: omissions, additions, substitutions, and the like. The numerous changes in style certainly affect the doctrine very little, although they do raise a question of the basic attitude of Alvarez towards the manuscript and work of Suárez. It seems to me, after a close study of the text of De Anima V, that Alvarez, doubtless in good will, is attempting to clarify and perhaps make more teachable by these emendations the manuscript text of *De Anima*. He makes it his business to correct references, omit certain authors, add others. He frequently inserts explanatory comments or examples which are certainly true to the thought of Suárez, and most often are not just gratuitous additions to the doctrine found in the complete treatise, though the particular phrase may not occur at that precise spot in the manuscript. As I indicated above (page 90), the fact that Alvarez omits the term "indifference" from the passage in chapter nine where the manuscript states that liberty rises out of the indifference and perfection of the intellect could easily be an attempt to stress at least to some degree the argument on which Suárez spent much time and labor in the chapter Alvarez chose to omit. No special explanation is given of this term, however, in the edition.[98]

In the same section, however, a change occurs in the phrasing Alvarez gives to the description of the intellect as root of the will. The manuscript writes plainly that the intellect *is* the root of the will, but the edition softens this statement considerably by stating that "the root of the will *is thought to be* the intellect itself" [italics mine].[99] Why does Alvarez make this summary of position somewhat ambiguous? Is this just a literary device, or is he possibly adjusting the doctrine to prepare for a shift in position?

Leaving aside some of the more lengthy interpolations with which Alvarez has endowed the edition, but which do not directly bear on the way in which the will operates,[100] I will limit my study to a few of the alterations which I think most likely to indicate some doctrinal modification by Alvarez. Admittedly, some of these may be rather slight, but they should at least be exposed to the light.

In chapter seven, which studies the object and acts of the will (question one of disputation twelve of the manuscript), Alvarez qualifies a statement of Suárez concerning the manner in which the intellect concurs with the act of the will.[101] The point under discussion is whether the intellect can at any time command the will effectively to perform some work, and Suárez makes the remark, more to introduce the argument than anything else, that this question is very different from the one treated earlier, where it was defined that the intellect could not concur in bringing about the act of the will even in an elicitive way.[102] Alvarez adds to this that neither does the object concur elicitively.[103] To elicit means to bring forth, or to make something be, and its meaning as used by Suárez clearly resembles "to cause effectively" or "to exercise efficiency." Alvarez here is really adding nothing at all foreign to the doctrine of Suárez as it was presented in chapter three of De Anima V, which showed at length--concerning appetites in general--that the object contributed absolutely nothing in the order of efficiency to the act of the appetite; the appetite itself is the only efficient cause.[104] Why add "object" at this point? It is true to the thought of Suárez, and plainly seems to reinforce the position being advanced here--in spite of the fact that the intellect can in certain circumstances command the will to put the powers subject to it into use in order to carry out a chosen task, still this efficacy in the intellect comes only from a previous act of the will. Alvarez wants to remind us again that only the will possesses true efficient power in the series of acts that make up human choice.

A noteworthy change occurs in the text of the same chapter three with respect to the same problem. Suárez states that the appetible object simply cannot effect anything, for "if it were to effect something, then the concursus of the final cause could not be distinguished from that of the efficient cause."[105] Alvarez writes instead: "if it were to effect something, then the concursus of the formal cause [italics mine] could not be distinguished from the efficient."[106] Finality is spoken of very sparsely in De Anima V, and then nearly always in a problematic sense. It is possible that Alvarez, realizing this fact and knowing the emphasis that Suárez places--implicitly or explicitly--on the formal role of specification and determination played by the intellect and the object it presents to the will, simply substitutes here the term he thinks Suárez meant. The problems involved in finality and formal causality as viewed by Suárez will be studied more thoroughly in chapter three of this dissertation; at present, in my estimation, this text of Alvarez, if it is not just a scribal error, gives a fair indication that he realized a problem did exist for Suárez in this area.

Earlier still, in chapter two of Book V, Suárez makes the statement, in dealing with the nature of the object which attracts the appetite, that the will can reject some good only if it finds in that good some aspect of evil.[107] Alvarez, besides putting this into more highly literary form, adds the adverb "positively"--the will cannot turn away *positively* except on account of some aspect of evil which appears in the object.[108] What does it mean for the will to turn away positively? I believe that Alvarez is inferring here that the will's conscious act of choice is a fully deliberate act of rejection of this object. Thus once more he makes explicit--where the manuscript here only implies--that the will is able to act efficaciously, actively. Its operation is not merely a passive *reaction* to an object which is presented to it.

In still another passage in chapter nine, Alvarez omits an important phrase which appears in the manuscript. Suárez is approaching the answer to the question of the relative perfection of intellect and will by a consideration of the objects of these two powers, and he writes that if the objects of the intellect and will are considered *in ratione rei*, then it must be said that they are nearly of equal perfection, since "each of these powers is most universal, and whatever one understands, the other can love."[109] Alvarez stops after "most universal," omitting the concluding clause. Perhaps he feels that it implies too much dependence of the will on the intellect, but the argument in which the passage occurs sets out precisely to show that the intellect is a more perfect power than the will.[110] Is Alvarez simply tempering this solution as much as he can? It is truly not possible to answer these questions definitively, as so many of the changes that have been made by Alvarez seem somewhat arbitrary, but it seems to me that there is evident a general drift in the direction of emphasizing the efficacious role played by the will. Alvarez seems even more determined than Suárez that the will is free; he goes even farther than the young philosopher did to safeguard its autonomy. The only reason that occurs to me for this is the one I have suggested above--Alvarez knew the positions to which the early thought of Suárez would lead, and he emends the text from time to time to make the pathway a little clearer. This is a conjecture on my part, as it must be, but the fact of the modifications, omissions, and additions is clear enough in the text for all to see.

The text of the edited De Anima V, therefore, does share the same dubious regard as the rest of the edition, so far as being a faithful transcription of the authentic philosophical voice of the young Francisco Suárez. Although I think the De Anima can certainly be described as Suarezian in tone and inspiration, calling the edition pure Suárez would be perhaps somewhat analogous to reading a selection of Etienne Gilson's and calling it a text of St. Thomas. A considerable amount of interpretation and original insight has been contributed here, and while the edition is faithful to Suarezian doctrine in its principal points, the increased emphasis in some areas and complete omission or disregard of others make the Alvarez edition of the De Anima a work to be used with the utmost caution and--for the sake of accuracy--only in conjunction with the original manuscript.

In sum, then, this early work De Anima, which contains the first professed Suarezian doctrines available to scholarship, sets down some very definite and detailed positions concerning the causality in the act of human choice. The role that the intellect plays in the act of choice is, I feel, delineated with more precision and exactitude than that of the will. The whole purpose of Suárez with respect to this problem in De Anima V seems to be to prove beyond a doubt that the only efficiency exercised in the act of human choice, at least so far as man's natural powers are concerned, is strictly and formally the possession of the will. Much of the treatise is thus devoted to proving that the object of the appetite exerts no efficiency on the appetite, and that the contribution of the intellect itself is limited to one of specifying and supplying to the will the knowledge of the object necessary that the will may freely choose.

At the same time, however, that he stresses the autonomy and freedom of the will, Suárez is equally insistent in De Anima V that this very independence and freedom are rooted strongly in the perfection of the intellect itself, for it is precisely because the knowledge of the intellect is universal in its scope that the possibilities of choice for the will are equally varied. Appetite follows knowledge, and therefore the appetite which is the will rises out of the knowledge of the intellect and the new forms which the knowing being thus acquires, enabling it--by means of the appetite--to go out of itself toward all that is good in the world. The superior ability possessed by the intellect of judging how various things conform to the truth, or how different objects approach the necessary and supreme good, is the fundamental perfection which enables the will, as a result, to accept or reject any good which is presented to it as less than all-perfect, less than all-good. And even though freedom is truly present in the will, not in the intellect, and is certainly one of man's most precious possessions, still Suárez insists repeatedly that the intellect is a higher power. It is a greater perfection to be a rational power by essence than to be free--which is a perfection derived from rationality--and even that moral goodness itself, though certainly it is consummated in the will, itself has its roots in the intellect, which is the rule and measure of the goodness or badness of human acts.

A look at the total picture presented in De Anima V, therefore, seems to me to reveal a tendency in the mind of Suárez to regard formal and essential perfections as higher and more perfect than what is mixed with existence, so to speak. Although no extrinsic efficiency can impose itself on the will and still result in a free act, so that all the efficiency exercised by the will must come from something in the power itself, this very fact reveals a curious quality in efficient causality. Apparently, in Suárez' mind, all efficient causality necessitates its effect--why, otherwise, would he be so insistent upon excluding it from any factors contributing to the voluntary acts of the will? How, then, does the will itself exercise efficiency? This problem I feel Suárez does not really answer in De Anima V; he seems to be penetrating a series of concentric circles around the will, excluding any efficiency from each ring as he advances inward. This process leaves the will, possessing all the efficiency needed to produce its own acts of choice--but here he stops. The ground and inner point of the circle are left nebulous. Here is efficiency in the will--but what is it? In spite of the tremendous emphasis placed on efficient causality in Suárez, then, and its seeming glorification as the special prerogative of the will in human actions, I feel that Suárez really does not find himself at home with efficient causality --at least at this early point in his career--and is actually placing higher perfection and more confidence in formal causality. One very fine scholar has remarked that in Suárez efficient causality is king, being indeed the central point of his whole system;[111] I do not agree with this, at least as his early position appears in the De Anima. Despite the apparent honor paid to efficiency, what does it really do except say "yes" to what has already been totally determined in the formal order? Is it really anything more than the final formality? This problem remains to be investigated in chapter three of this dissertation, which will deal specifically with the meaning of causality to Suárez. Before taking it up, however, an examination of the Suarezian positions in the Metaphysical Disputations is in order, that the total picture of the first teaching years of Suárez' life may be as complete as possible. Although the main features of the Metaphysics were already formulated in the mind of Suárez as early as 1570, the monumental work was not published until 1597, when it was prepared and edited by Suárez himself. This was still twenty years before his death, and would represent his mature thought on the doctrine of freedom and causality in the will. Surely, too, what he had written in other intermediate treatises, such as the De Voluntario, would be amended and included in the Metaphysics at least as an influencing factor. Thus it seems to me that these two works, the De Anima and the Metaphysical Disputations, give together a well rounded view of the beginnings and the culmination of the early period of Suarezian thought.

Doctrine of Metaphysical Disputations XIX

Much of the historical influence of Suárez as a philosopher has resulted from his Metaphysical Disputations, which saw numerous editions even during his lifetime and became the common metaphysics textbook in use all over Europe during the first part of the seventeenth century. Among the Germans Suárez even went by the name of "the Metaphysician," just as Aristotle had been called "the Philosopher," and Averroes "the Commentator."[112]

The Metaphysical Disputations were published in Salamanca by Suárez himself in 1597. The work consists of fifty-four disputations or treatises on first philosophy, and in the preface Suárez gives his reason for turning away briefly from theological works to a strictly philosophical theme. He had discovered, while teaching his courses in theology, that a thorough and profound grasp of metaphysical principles was necessary for a student to be capable of approaching any real understanding of theology. To explain the fundamental philosophy in class disrupted the ordinary procedure of the course, but to omit an investigation of the main points was equally disastrous for theology. Suárez determined to examine and bring up to date the points on metaphysics which he had organized and used many years earlier, when just beginning his teaching career.[113]

Although Suárez himself gives no definite date of this primary formulation of his metaphysical views, authorities seem in general to agree that it probably occurred during the year he spent at Salamanca after completing his own theological studies in 1570. Still too young to be ordained, Suárez spent this entire year in teaching review classes to other students in the same situation. Knowing that in the following year, 1571, he would be sent out to teach philosophy, Suárez would almost certainly spend a major portion of his time--in addition to the theology reviews he was conducting--in preparing the philosophy he would so soon begin to teach. Suárez himself states that very little needed to be changed in this work he had drawn up at such an early age--insights had deepened and become more precise, certainly, but his basic positions were fundamentally the same.[114]

The Metaphysical Disputations can be considered the fruit and culmination of the teaching of Suárez up to their publication in 1597. The twenty-five years of teaching they represent win for them a unique position in the thought of Suárez. In one sense they are part of his early thought, since most of the positions were already formulated and taught at a very youthful age, but they can also be considered the zenith of his mature philosophical thought, for more than two decades of teaching had enriched them both in doctrine and in style. Jesús Iturrioz, S.J., in a valuable study on the first published work of Suárez, De incarnatione verbi (1590), points out that internal references in this work continually deal with all problems concerning essence, existence, and subsistence, by alluding to a small work that would be an appendix to that same treatise, and would develop metaphysical points which, although not belonging intrinsically in a properly theological treatise, were yet necessary for an accurate understanding of the concepts involved. Beginning with disputation eight of this same treatise on the Incarnation, the references indicated that the opusculum had already been completed. Iturrioz emphasizes, however, that no such appendix ever appeared with this published treatise. In 1595 Suárez published an expanded edition of the same theological work, and Iturrioz found, on checking the points in the text which previously had referred to this metaphysical opusculum--already written, but never located--that the reader was now referred instead to an entire book on metaphysics soon to be published--the Metaphysical Disputations themselves, which actually appeared two years later. The doctrine which was cited as having been treated in this separate little treatise appears in the thirty-first and thirty-fourth disputations, according to careful analysis by Iturrioz.[115]

Apparently, then, at least this important section of the disputations dealing with essence, existence, and subsistence was written about 1590. The Metaphysical Disputations as a whole, nevertheless, provide substantially a transcription of the philosophy that Suárez had been teaching for more than twenty years. Together with the De Anima, which dates from 1572, they will, I believe, give as complete a picture as possible of the development of Suarezian thought for the first twenty-five years of his professorship. Since the Disputations are undoubtedly authentic, having been completely edited and prepared for the press by Suárez himself, the positions presented there on the causalities involved in free will must be his considered and proven thought. Twenty more years of fruitful teaching remained to him, during which he published--among other works chiefly theological in nature --the philosophical work on law which brings into question the possible shift in the Suarezian doctrine of intellect and will. For this reason, I place the Metaphysical Disputations in the category of his youthful writing, even though it would certainly be the crown and culmination of his early thought. The positions contained in it do not differ violently from those previously professed in the De Anima, but a study of the texts and doctrine found in the nineteenth disputation (on causes which operate freely) does reveal a certain amount of development and shift of emphasis from intellect--at least as expressed in the De Anima V--to the preëminence of will.

The doctrine of the Metaphysical Disputations taken as a whole will simply be mentioned here as a background against which to study intensively the nineteenth disputation. This work, truly monumental in the history of philosophy, was the first complete and independent treatise on metaphysics which broke away from the tradition of simple commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. This traditional treatment was deliberately rejected by Suárez in order to avoid useless problems and repetitious sections which were of little contemporary value. Although Suárez mentions more than once that his motive for writing the Disputations was precisely to aid the teaching and understanding of theology, he yet has written a strictly philosophical work, both coherent and systematic, which would be outstanding in the history of thought for this reason alone.[116] A brief survey of the material treated in the fifty-four disputations would include, first, the object of the science of metaphysics taken as a whole (disputation one), then the notion of being itself (disputation two), its common properties or attributes (disputations three to eleven), followed by the doctrine of causes (disputations twelve to twenty-seven). The divisions of being into infinite and finite are then treated in turn (disputation twenty-eight), the existence and essence of uncreated being (disputations twenty-nine and thirty), of finite being (disputation thirty-one) and its distinction into substance and accident (disputation thirty-two). The doctrine of substance and its various kinds is next studied (disputations thirty-three to thirty-six), followed by an analysis of the various types of accidents and their relations to substance (disputations thirty-seven to fifty-three). The final disputation treats of beings of reason, which--although they do not properly belong to the real being which is the object of metaphysics--still prove to be a useful study for one in the pursuit of first philosophy.

Suárez followed a generally uniform method or outline in his works. In each section or chapter he first proposes the question to be investigated, often in the form of a doubt. Then the various opinions on the subject under discussion are presented, with lengthy arguments in favor of each one. After an ample development of the divergent views, Suárez chooses the one which seems to him most probable, gives numerous proofs of it, and finally answers the objections which had been presented earlier, either by himself or by the opposing camps. Because of this generous multitude of positions, proofs, and refutations, it is an extremely difficult task to read Suárez casually. One is too apt to mistake an opinion which will later be refuted for the view held by Suárez. True, he almost always signifies his own position quite clearly--saying, for example, that he holds this opinion to be the more probable. In the course of studying the complete section one easily recognizes his position, but the danger lies in reading one of the other arguments out of context or hastily, and then deciding that it represents the authentic Suarezian doctrine on this or that subject. There is no shortcut to be found in studying the original treatises of Francisco Suárez.

The nineteenth disputation is concerned with the operation of efficient causes, particularly with those which operate freely or contingently.[117] It contains twelve sections in all; the first examines causes which work through necessity, the next eight study intensively causes which operate freely, and the last three study contingent causes with an emphasis on fate, fortune and chance.

The first section rather quickly disposes of causes which work through necessity by an appeal to experience. Many such causes obviously do exist and demand certain conditions for their operation. Suárez names eight of these conditions, such as sufficient active power, disposed matter, lack of an equal opposing power, etc. Should any of these requisites for acting be absent, the cause cannot act. Such acting-or-not-acting, however, does not achieve freedom, and is merely the result of some deficiency either in the cause or one of the conditions acting with it. No true indifference exists in such causes, for--although they sometimes appear to be acting so as to prefer one effect rather than another--they are specified not by any self-dominion, but instead by some extrinsic factor, such as opposing forces, lack of disposed matter, or something similar. Causes which can act only through necessity are so limited precisely because they lack reason and the resultant true dominion over their own actions. Even as the presence of rationality is the root of liberty, so the lack of it is equally the root of necessity. The lack of one perfection means the lack of the other.[118]

Section two begins the study of free causes, and first discusses the arguments against the existence of freedom in man. Various opinions are explained, but the point is maintained that man does operate freely very frequently and therefore must possess some free faculty. The terms "necessity" and "freedom" are clarified, and the section concludes by stressing the fact that the free faculty in man must be active and able to determine itself to one particular act rather than another. Neither can it be habitually impeded by any extrinsic cause.[119]

Section three asks if a truly free action demands freedom in all the causes cooperating in its production, or whether only one such free cause is sufficient. The main problem, of course, concerns the results on man if the first cause were to operate necessarily rather than freely. Suárez holds that if God acted absolutely without any freedom, no creature whatever would be able to participate in true freedom, for God's unrestrained omnipotence would at all times overpower it. Even if man had a naturally free faculty, he would be unable to make use of it--a condition which would result in no liberty, for in the practical order a faculty which is unable to be used is no faculty at all. If God acted through necessity, however, but simply granted the same degree of cooperation and concursus to man's free power as He does at present, man's liberty would be intact, for an effect is free whenever one of the causes contributing to it is truly free and indifferent, even though others--even God--are acting through natural necessity. Very important for the purposes of this thesis is the example Suárez mentions here of a necessary cause and a free one acting together: the knowledge of the object (or the "known object") which concurs efficiently in the act of the will in a natural and necessitated way, but which does not take away the liberty of the act because of the true intrinsic indifference of the will. As long as the will is free, the act it produces is free, no matter how many other necessary causes contribute to the effect.[120] This position, even though advanced here simply as a "probable opinion," is significantly different from the Suarezian doctrine in De Anima V, where he was so careful to deny any efficiency whatever to any other power but the will itself.

Section four defines the free cause, and attempts also to solve the problem of harmonizing the free action of a second cause with the concurrence of God. Much of the difficulty in deciding how the concursus of God can still leave man free results from a mistaken understanding of the meaning of freedom and its root, the indifference of the judgment. The judgment of the intellect is indifferent only *objectively*, that is, because of the object, which never possesses so much goodness that it attracts the will necessarily. Precisely because the object itself is indifferent in this sense, the will is formally free and can move towards it or not, provided that no extrinsic force presents its own proper movement. On the other hand, indifference of the object *alone* is not sufficient for liberty, but rather the faculty acting *in accord with* this judgment, for otherwise one could call any act free if the object were judged to be indifferent, even though some extrinsic agent might be forcing the faculty to act. Suárez insists repeatedly that it is not sufficient for freedom that the faculty itself be free; the act or use of the faculty must also be free. Any explanations of liberty which inhibit this in any way are totally rejected. The free faculty is that which, with *all* the requisites for action present, can still act or not act. Two points clarifying this definition should be demonstrated and maintained at all costs: (1) that man's free faculty must be an *active* power which of its own internal capacity can exercise or suspend its activity, and (2) that this capability to act or not act, even with all the prerequisites for action given, must be present even when the act is in the process of realization. The will possesses indifference of its own through *liberty of exercise*--freedom to possess an act or to lack it--and *liberty of specification*, which at least to some degree is always present with liberty of exercise, for it signifies the will's power to choose a contrary act, one different in kind or species, from the one proposed to it. That the use of liberty is what is most important to man's freedom seems most evident to Suárez, for--as he points out quite astutely--it is in the use and exercise of liberty that all its difficulty as well as all its utility is to be found. With this emphasis in mind, Suárez shows that the concurrence of God as first cause is actually a part of the action itself, concomitant with the will in second act; it is not one of the already discussed prerequisites for action with which the will can act or not act. Simultaneous or consequent necessity, however, does not deprive the will of liberty, since it is one of the necessary conditions of action itself.[121]

Section five asks in what faculty the liberty of the created cause properly or formally resides. Only a rational agent, precisely as such, is capable of a truly free action. This rationality and consequent liberty, moreover, have their basis in the spiritual and immaterial soul of man, which cannot be directly acted upon by matter. Thus, the spiritual substance itself is the radical principle of the free act, for what is material is by that very reason deprived of rationality and intelligence and can act only in a determined, natural way. If man is free, then, the roots of this freedom in him must be in that part of him which is immaterial: his soul, and furthermore in a faculty of that soul precisely as intellectual--for from this order arises any dominion a man has over his actions. Liberum arbitrium, or free choice in man, is not simply an act, for man possesses it even when he does nothing. Neither is it a habit, for habits are not innate to a man, unless they are really identical with a natural power of his, and if they are acquired, they are such only through repeated acts. But to act freely, one must already have free choice, and thus one would have to precede the other--an impossibility. Neither does a habit confer the power to do something on a person, but rather facility in doing it; this is not what is meant by liberum arbitrium.[122]

In demonstrating that the power of free choice is not an additional power distinct from the intellect and will, Suárez points out again the mutual assistance these two powers give each other. In an intellectual creature, he maintains, a power which moves the others cannot be distinct from these two highest powers. The intellect moves the will by way of objective motion, or the influence of the object, while with respect to effective motion, or that which applies to operation, the will moves not only itself but also the other powers. We do nothing freely unless we wish to do so. A power which would be able simply to move other powers would not suffice here, for the power which grounds an act of free choice must be able to elicit its own act, being able to love an object or not love it without being moved by any other power.[123]

The remainder of this section five demonstrates that formal liberty resides not in the intellect, but in the will alone. There are only two ways in which liberty can be conceived to belong to a power--either by liberty of exercise or of specification. The intellect, possessing neither of these, cannot be the power in man which is formally free. In proof, one sees that if the intellect remains in a state of indetermination, the reason lies not in some free internal dominion of the intellect itself, but in an insufficient application of the object. The will, however, sees the object presented to it according to the varying amounts of goodness or badness in it, so that even when the object is perfectly known the appetitive faculty can remain absolutely indifferent, both in the order of specification and in the exercise of its act. Possessing dominion over its different acts, the will can tend towards this object or reject it; the will, not the intellect, is formally free as to specification. With regard to exercise, only an intrinsically voluntary power, which receives its impulse to act from itself and not from any other power which commands it, can be formally free. Obviously, this can be only the will itself.[124]

In discussing the point that only an appetite can move itself into act, since an appetite is nothing more than an intrinsic and spontaneous tendency toward an object of knowledge, Suárez has written a decisive passage concerning the manner in which the will moves itself into act. This section will prove of importance in determining the precise meaning he assigns to efficient causality in the will:

> The exercise of the act or (what is the same thing) the determination of the power to operate, must be either natural by the sole impulse of nature, or voluntary by the elicited inclination of the one operating. And it is not possible to understand any other reason by which a cause passes into operation except because it has such a nature determined by itself to that operation, or because it loves and desires that operation. But the power free with regard to exercise is not determined to operation by natural impulse alone; thus it must be determined voluntarily. It is, therefore, either determined extrinsically by a voluntary impulse realized by some other potency--and then it will not be a free power formally, but only imperatively, since it does not move itself with respect to exercise, but is moved and determined by another--or it is determined by what is intrinsically voluntary, and in that case it is necessary that the power under discussion be appetitive. Therefore, that a power be formally free with respect to exercise, i.e., capable of determining itself by itself to exercise a free act, it is necessary that it be a power which operates in an intrinsically voluntary way by means of its own act.[125]

This passage is actually the first one in the texts being studied in this dissertation where Suárez attempts to explain just how the appetite--here the rational appetite, the will--does move itself into act. This text will be discussed at length later on, but here it seems sufficient to point out that he identifies the exercise of an act with determination of the power to operate: idem est. What is implied here? Is Suárez doing anything more than eliminating any explanation for the power's acting except an intrinsic tendency? But what is this tendency--more than just nominally--and how does it really and fundamentally account for operation which is free and voluntary?

A significant qualification in the view of the intellect as the root of freedom is found in the next paragraphs of section five. The use of reason is stressed here as the root of liberty, not simply the intellectual power itself. Radically, that is, as a root, the understanding or reason does belong to the power of free choice, but reason is in no way a formal constituent of free choice, even if will and intellect were to be (incorrectly) considered together as one power. Suárez is here most insistent on this point. Liberum arbitrium, the power of free choice, is indeed a faculty of will and reason, but of the will formally. Reason belongs to it simply by way of a root or as something presupposed [praesuppositive]. Scotus, Henry of Ghent, and others deny that reason is the root of liberty, and they describe it as merely a necessary condition. Suárez believes this difference to be no more than nominal. "For, as knowledge is only a necessary condition previous to volition, therefore [these philosophers] only wish to give to the manner (modum) of knowledge the name of necessary condition for the manner of volition, which consists in liberty."[126] It seems best to say, however, that the use of reason or intelligence is the precise root of liberty, for although it is true that the soul, man's spiritual substance, is the root of both the intellect and the will, yet the cognitive power springs from it directly and immediately, while the appetitive power, the will, proceeds only through the cognitive. Because man's most perfect appetitive power has its immediate roots in his most perfect cognitive power, the formal perfection of liberty thus proceeds directly from the perfection of understanding or reasoning. Just as one passion gives rise to another and is its root, so also the "liberty of the will is rooted in the intelligence of reason" [ita libertas voluntatis dicetur radicari in intelligentia rationis (sec. 5, No. 21, p. 384)]. The acts of the will and of the intellect are related in the same way, for whenever there exists an essential or per se order among powers, so too among their acts. The causality involved in this relationship, even though it is essential and not accidental, is in the moral order and does not take away liberty, which is the very foundation of every moral act. In fact, the indifference in the acts of the will rises out of the judgment of the reason.

Most authors quote the foregoing statement quite frequently, but the meaning of indifference as it is used here must be clearly understood, if misunderstanding is to be avoided. The will may possess indifference in two ways--as a power and as that power in act. In the power itself indifference signifies the will's freedom to choose one thing or another, this act or that one. But even in the exercise of its act the will retains a certain indifference, for the act may at any time be halted and a different or contrary act be chosen in its place. Indifference of judgment, on the other hand, means something quite different, for indifference is nothing intrinsic to the judgment. It derives solely from the object, which displays various aspects of convenience or inconvenience, and because of these degrees of utility or difficulty is affirmed to be not strictly necessary. The object, not the judgment itself, is indifferent. The intellect accordingly presents the object, thus apprehended, to the will. Precisely here lies the root of free choice in man.[127] Although man's complete rational faculty--his intellect and will--participates in freedom, each power does so differently. Liberty belongs properly and formally only to the will; it proceeds from the intellect, however, as from a root.[128]

Moral confusion would inevitably result if both intellect and will were formally free. Simply to judge something bad would then contain some degree of malice, which would be intensified and increased by the will's adherence to it. In delineating the respective roles of intellect and will in the act of choice, Suárez emphasizes the perfection of the intellect as rule of the will--a perfection which, speaking absolutely, is even greater than that of liberty. It would be incompatible with the function of the intellect as rule to be itself free, for a rule must be certain and immutable--it cannot be indifferent, as the formally free power must be. Rule is not rule because of a tendency or impulse to an operation or the regulated thing, but because of a certain adequation between the reason and the object under consideration. This adequation must be certain and determined, not indifferent, if it is to serve as a guide for the will which in itself is blind and depends upon the direction of the intellect. The will, since it truly does possess liberty, surpasses the intellect in this one respect, but in the totality of its perfection it remains inferior to the intellect.[129]

Section six of the nineteenth disputation considers the manner in which the free cause is determined by the judgment of reason. This point gave rise to much controversy in the question of human liberty, especially with regard to the concursus of God and its precise influence on man's choice. Since this latter question is properly theological, Suárez does not investigate it extensively here, but this section has apparently been included with that further area of theology plainly in mind.

The beginning paragraphs of section six are devoted to showing that the judgment of the intellect does not necessarily determine the choice of the will. All the arguments can be reduced, it seems to me, to the simple fact that such determination would deprive the will of any real or formal liberty. This point has already been proved. The Suarezian statement of the position that the intellect and will exercise mutual causality, however, is worthy of special note. As the doctrine is formulated here, serious doubts concerning it do arise. According to Suárez, some thinkers maintain that the "practical judgment is free in virtue of the will which loves the proposed object, and that the will, on its part, loves the proposed object in virtue of such a judgment."[130] True, he admits, these thinkers do hold that each cause is operative in diverse orders of causality, and so they deny that any contradiction appears here, the will determining the intellect efficiently, and the intellect determining the will by way of final causality. Suárez, however, cannot accept this doctrine, and is convinced neither of its intelligibility nor necessity--in fact, "ostendo esse impossibilem," he writes.[131] Why is he so adamant on this point? He holds that such mutual priority and causality between two acts is unintelligible. For any vital act to take place, the object necessary for the act must be applied prior to the act itself in an absolute manner applying to every order of causality. The very application of the object, writes Suárez, could never proceed efficiently from the act to which it is ordained. The judgment of reason, however, is clearly necessary for the act of the will with respect to application of the object; thus this initial judgment of reason could not possibly proceed efficiently from that same will act. The manner in which natural acts take place proves this; every agent which needs a patient in order to operate must suppose the application of the patient to the action absolutely and in every order of causality. Furthermore, nothing can be desired except what is previously known, and all of the proffered explanations of this so-called mutual causality betray this very fundamental principle of free action. Suárez thus rejects this position of mutual causality, insisting repeatedly that the role of the intellect is indeed necessary, but only as a condition of the application of the object, not as any kind of necessitating cause.[132]

Suárez then presents his own solution to the problem. He seems to imply that the former positions err because of incorrect understanding of the precise function of this practical judgment of the intellect, and the type of indifference it possesses.

> The judgment of the understanding does not move the will except by means of the object which it proposes; but the object proposed does not always impose necessity on the will or determine it to only one thing, nor is this necessary that the will can tend to the object; thus neither is it necessary on the part of the judgment; and such a determination is not even possible.[133]

The intellect's function is to direct, guide, and regulate the will, and an efficacious causality on its part would not only be completely foreign to it, but would at the same time deprive the will of its proper role, which is to move the other powers efficiently to the exercise of their own acts. It cannot happen that the intellect, which is moved efficiently by the will, can on its own power move the will in the same way.[134] It seems evident, at this point, that Suárez has slipped away from the notion of the intellect's determining of the will in the order of final causality, and is talking simply of efficiency on its part. What is the significant difference, actually, between the notion of final causality and Suárez' position of the application of the object? Why does he invariably slip away from a discussion of finality into a dispute about efficiency? This problem still remains a major one.

Suárez disposes of the objection raised by some philosophers concerning the imperium of the intellect by explaining that it is simply a completely practical judgment of the intellect which takes all the circumstances into account and receives its total efficaciousness from the will--always on the condition that the will continues to desire it.[135] A tendency appears here on the part of Suárez to exalt the intellect and will into separate entities, or at least to treat them as if they were such. The problem of unity of action is thus confused to an even greater degree. Once a gap has been introduced between these two powers of one man, acting as a rational being who knows and loves, the thorny problem springs up of bringing about unity again. The aspects and consequences of this kind of unconscious hypostatizing must be investigated fully later on; here I merely wish to point to the evidence of it.

In conclusion Suárez sums up his reasons for holding that the object proposed by the intellect through its judgment does not--in this life--determine the will. His doctrine here is nearly identical with that of the De Anima V studied earlier: the will is by its very nature determined to the good in general, but not to every object that presents itself as good, because the necessary aspect of good does not appear in all of them. No good we encounter in this life appears to us as completely without some disadvantage or defect, and for this reason the will cannot be forced to love any one of them. But by the very same fact that a limited amount of good is seen to be really possessed by these objects, the will can be moved and stimulated by this good to move itself by its liberty and tend to that object freely. Any amount of good can attract the will; a determining or necessitating judgment on the part of the intellect is not at all necessary.[136]

The final paragraphs of section six answer the objections previously proposed, and focus on one point which needs discussion--whether or not the will must choose the object presented to it by the intellect as best. Suárez' answer is no, and he brings to this issue some cogent reasoning. When the will chooses some means, it is not necessary that the intellect present an alternative judgment for it to choose from, but merely that the will have sufficient knowledge of good to tend toward that object. The will is not hindered in its action by not knowing or considering an additional means--the judgment of the intellect that this particular means is worthy or eligible suffices that the will may freely choose it. The intellect need not judge that one of the means presented for choice should be preferred to the others; the will can of itself choose any one which the intellect marks "eligible."[137]

But if the intellect does so endorse one of the means, or when only one means is presented to the will, must not the will necessarily choose this means, and thus be determined by the judgment of the intellect? Again Suárez answers in the negative. The will is free, he insists, because it has the power both to love what is good and not to love whatever is not necessary. Thus, when two means of equal value are presented to the will, no state of indecision results; the will, by its own spontaneous movement towards any good presented to it, can choose whichever one of the two it wishes. The efficiency lies in the will. When the means proposed by the intellect are not equal, but one is clearly "better" or more useful than the other, Suárez still believes it more probable "although less certain" that the will is not necessarily determined because of the judgment to choose the means which is better. Since neither of these objects or means is presented as necessary, the will is essentially able to choose either or to reject either. Suárez stresses the qualifying phrase "in virtue of the judgment" because the will can be constrained to choose one particular means in virtue of a previous will act or intention, provided that this one means is the only possible way of procuring the end already willed. In this situation, the means is presented not only as more useful, but as necessary, and the will must choose it if it wishes to achieve or realize the end. Even when the intellect contemplates only one object, apprehended as both helpful and good, and exhorts the will "as much as is in its power" to desire this object, the will remains free to accept it or reject it. To refrain from exercising its act, the will needs no additional judgment; the apprehension--even simply implied--that this particular good is not necessary here and now for the supreme good of beatitude is sufficient.[138] Consequently the will may suspend its act, direct the intellect to think of some other object, or choose to investigate the proposed object more thoroughly, until other judgments can be formed about it which make its desirability or undesirability more manifest. In sum, then, the "judgment as such never determines the will in an absolute manner except when the object may have this power by reason of the excellence of its goodness."[139] With this comment, Suárez considers the proposed difficulty solved to the best of his ability.[140]

Section seven considers the problem of moral defect. Is the root and origin of a defect in the free cause always to be found in some error of a previous judgment? Suárez thinks not, at least in any absolute fashion, but he does hold, in giving his own position on the question, that some defect is always to be found in the moral order in the judgment of the intellect, even if this is no more than a certain amount of inconsideration of the various aspects which would help persuade the will not to sin. To act thus is to act without prudence, which is a defect, a practical error not in conformity with right appetite. This judgment, Suárez believes, need not be formally comparative, in the sense of being chosen in preference to another, nor the fruit of a positive series of deliberations, but simply a sort of simple and absolute judgment that this object or this good is here and now to be desired for the sake of pleasure, honor, or some other reason attractive enough to move the will without further deliberation. This situation often occurs, comments Suárez in an astute sentence, for when a man wishes to choose something wrong, he most often merely turns the "eyes of his mind" away from any other reasons, and just concentrates on that one which moves his will to such an act. Precisely this kind of permitted negligence results in an error in the practical judgment, since it includes virtually--though not explicitly--the comparison and preference of the desired wrong object. Such imprudence is consequently not in conformity with the appetite as it should act. It is probable, after this free choice of the will, that the practical judgment which follows it in the intellect, judging that "these things are here and now to be done," is always in error, but this is an error in the practical order, not the speculative. It follows the efficacious act of free choice; it does not precede or determine it--quite the contrary. The word "imperium" which is applied to this consequent judgment of the intellect does not refer to the fundamental act of choice itself, but rather to the carrying out of whatever is necessary to attain the desired object, or--if the act is internal and needs no further action--to the sort of notification a man gives himself of the choice he has made. The command, then, refers to the act subsequent on choice, not the act of choice itself, which is performed by the will alone; it is not commanded in a determining way by the judgment of the intellect.[141]

Section eight inquires whether the will is able to perform some acts freely and others necessarily. After some discussion of various interpretations of the term "free," Suárez points out that he himself prefers to exclude any presence of necessity in the operation of what is truly free--

what is free must be voluntary (in accord with the will), but what is voluntary is not always free. The will may without contradiction love some things freely and others necessarily, for different and distinct acts of the will are involved, directed to different objects, and--as was shown above--it is from the object presented to the will that necessity or indifference results in the following act.[142]

A natural operation, taken in its meaning of any inclination of nature viewed as determined to only one thing--even when this inclination proceeds from some knowledge and from a vital appetite--includes whatever is voluntary, so that the will could be by its very nature determined to one particular act or end, but still be free concerning its movements towards different objects of varying goods. The voluntary is perfectly coextensive with whatever is willed, while liberum arbitrium has a more limited extension, since it adds to the notion of "voluntary" a further difference or qualification--the power of not operating. The object of the will is simply the good as such, which must be previously known, for to operate voluntarily is "necessarily to operate with previous knowledge and by way of appetition."[143] Under this adequate object of the absolute good, however, may be contained many different objects, varying greatly in their degrees of goodness and thus of lovableness. The mode of acting --necessarily or freely--of the will agrees with these objects. Furthermore, any act flowing intrinsically from the will is voluntary as a positive and inseparable mode of the act itself, but freedom in such an act is simply an additional qualification derived from the capacity of the potency or power to reject or discontinue the act. Liberty is thus a further quality which may or may not be present in a voluntary act, depending on whether or not the will exercises dominion over it.[144]

The power of free choice is directed toward whatever is chosen for the sake of the end. Everything movable and variable must have its foundation in something immovable, and in this fashion free choice, which is of itself changeable, must be grounded in something invariable: the intention of the end. But ends can be of different sorts, either ultimate or proximate, and the two types of liberty possessed by the will--freedom of exercise and freedom of specification--may accordingly exert varying influences.[145] No act of the will, either in regard to means or ends, is absolutely necessary as to exercise in this life, for the will can always divert the consideration of the mind away from any good whatsoever, outside of the beatific vision seen clearly in itself. This statement holds true even for the first act of the will. The amount of goodness perceived in the object is the primary factor in determining the degree of necessity or freedom exercised by the will. Because of this fact, even in the first act of the will where deliberation might be wholly natural or necessary, the object applied to the will need not move it necessarily, since it lacks perfect goodness, and the will by its very being possesses a certain dominion over the exercise of its own acts. Although its natural inclination is to operate, the will can at the same time refrain from the act entirely or suspend it at any moment.[146]

The first act of the will is free also as to specification, for only the absolute good is powerful enough to necessitate the will in this manner, and it is not perceived as such, even in this initial act.[147] Whenever the will acts, it in effect desires both the good object and the good of its own act. For an object to move the will necessarily with respect to exercise, "it is necessary that the man apprehend and judge such exercise here and now as an absolutely necessary good, in such a way that the lack of that act cannot be apprehended under any aspect of good."[148] Experience shows, of course, that this never happens in this life. This same point Suárez has made before, but the phrasing used in this passage gives a much more unified view of the man who acts through his intellect (apprehending and judging) and his will (being attracted and choosing). This same passage continues to talk about a man acting in this manner--it is one of the few places where Suárez notably avoids the ever-present temptation to hypostatize the intellect and will in man.

The will is moved necessarily to love the universal and absolute good, or--to put it another way--the will is determined with respect to specification when confronted with the ultimate end of man. But even though the will is fixed upon the perfect good, it yet moves freely to choose any ends which are particular or proximate, since they are not totally good and cannot fully determine it even in the order of specification. Necessity of specification really consists in the fact that, once the will is confronted with the perfect and absolute good, even though it may not be forced to love it here and now in act, it cannot turn away from it, because there is no evil present in it to cause rejection or hatred. Thus, if the will chooses to exercise its act in this situation, the act must be one of love, not of hatred or rejection. Only when some aspect of evil can be apprehended in an object is it possible for the will to hate it, just as it is the good there which makes possible an act of love.[149]

Most properly speaking, the freedom of the will does appear more plainly and perfectly in the choice of means, so much so that every free act partakes somehow in the aspect of a choice following on at least a virtual deliberation. When the will adheres to an end as such, it is moved by a natural inclination in itself toward the good, even though the movement is free. When a means is chosen, however, the will moves itself in virtue of its desire or inclination for an end--an appetite over and above its simply natural inclination which it has made its own. The will thus exercises more freedom, moving itself to its own acts, in the choice of means rather than in the intention of the end. Even if the deliberation is not fully actual, at least a virtual comparison of aspects of goodness and desirability takes place before a free choice in fact occurs. Whenever a particular means or some proximate end is chosen, the reason for the choice is always an underlying inclination toward the perfect good. Every intention of a particular end is thus at the same time a virtual choice of happiness or man's ultimate end. I here and now intend or choose this because I see it--at least implicitly--as a means for obtaining happiness. The natural inclination or "set" of the will on the perfect good is the reason for choice, and the basis of freedom in the acts of the will. Every deliberation in man is naturally turned toward a choice for him to make, and every free act likewise shares in some aspect of choice. The act in man, therefore, which is most properly free is the act of choice itself proceeding from the intention of an end, this act which is exercised by the liberum arbitrium, and indeed practically identified with it.[150]

One and the same faculty, then, is able to operate both freely and necessarily, depending on the nature of the object to which it is drawn. Which manner of acting is more perfect? The rule or measure of perfection in an act is not always the manner in which it is performed; a free operation is not always superior to a necessary action. The dignity and perfection of the object essentially determine the perfection of the act; so that if the object is loved to the full extent of its capacity, being at the same time the supreme and all-perfect good, it is loved with entire necessity--but most perfectly in every respect. Thus God loves himself both necessarily and perfectly, and speaking with due proportion, the same is true of the act by which the created will loves God in himself.[151]

Does the free cause possess liberty in the actual moment of its operation? In section nine Suárez rejects the position of the Nominalists, who taught that the will was free only in the moment immediately _before_ its operation. Once the act is in process, they maintained, the will is no longer free with respect to it, but necessitated. Were this theory true, the will could never perform a really free act, for it would be ordered only to a "free instant," never to actual and effective freedom.[152]

There is a distinction between a priority of nature and one of time. The will is by nature in command of its acts. Immediately before the act, the will must certainly be able to realize it or not, if it is to be called free; all agree on this. Nothing, however, takes this essential power away from the will, and hence it is also free in that moment of placing the act or rejecting it. The necessity of the action itself is merely one of supposition, which does not alter the act's essential freedom. The will still retains causal priority over it. A consideration of sanctions reinforces this position, for a man is worthy of praise or blame not for something he is _going_ to do, but for something he actually does.[153] Neither does any contradiction result from the fact that the will simultaneously has the _power_ to actuate itself or not, for obviously both choices cannot be exercised at once. Even while effecting one act, the will at that very moment has the power to cease from acting in this precise way and to exercise its capacity of choosing something contrary or simply different.[154] Any opinion which would result in depriving the will of its liberty of exercise would delineate a "freedom" which would be in effect meaningless.

Section ten questions whether contingency would be found in the universe if liberty were completely lacking in the efficient causes. An effect may, of course, be contingent in two ways. In the strict sense, contingency implies an act that is simply the result of chance, which is outside the intention of the agent. This type is not at issue here. More generally speaking, contingency is taken to mean a sort of intermediary between what is necessary and what would be impossible, so that "contingents" include at the same time things that may possibly exist, and those that may possibly not exist. These must be studied more closely.[155]

The relation of such a contingent effect to its cause may be considered in various ways. If one studies the entire series of causes producing the effect in its absolute totality, thus including God, then no effect takes place that is not contingent, for every one of them needs the power of God concurring with it. God, being free, can deny this concursus to any effect or any cause--nothing is so necessary that it can happen without God's consent. This solution, although true, is not particularly helpful in distinguishing man's free acts from other happenings in the universe. Because God ordinarily lends his concursus, however, according to the established laws of nature, it suffices for philosophy to consider the contingency or necessity of natural events in their relation merely to the secondary or proximate causes involved, just as if they did not depend ultimately on the first cause, or as if God could not impede or change the action of secondary causes. Miracles, as such, lie outside the realm of philosophical investigation.[156]

When an effect proceeds from a proximate cause which acts necessarily, any contingency which may occur flows not from the intrinsic power of the cause acting, but from some defect in that power. A necessary cause is set upon the production of one effect; all its power is directed to this. But the action may be impeded either by a defect in the power of the cause itself, by the presence of opposing or contrary forces, or by the lack of the necessary divine concursus. The effect, therefore, may be in fact contingent--that is, it may or may not take place--but only in an extrinsic sense, since the proximate cause has no real power to perform the action or to refrain from doing so.[157]

Effects, however, are said to possess an intrinsic contingency when they proceed from a cause acting by its own inner power. Contingency here is more than a mere attribute of the effect designating rather broadly the manner in which it was produced; it signifies a higher power and intrinsic perfection of the cause itself. A free cause must be involved to produce such an effect. Why so? Extrinsic contingency is quite possible whenever the proximate cause is impeded in the production of its effect, no matter how many other causes--

necessary or free--are involved in the causal series.[158] But only when some free cause, be it Creator or creature, intervenes in the series would true contingency result, for only here would some cause have intrinsic power to act or to refrain from doing so.[159]

To summarize then, in which precise cause does the root of contingency lie? Extrinsic or relative contingency has its root not in liberty, but simply in the nature and condition of the secondary cause, which can be impeded by one or another obstacle originating in another cause. The ultimate root of this contingency, of course, is God, since he is the first cause of every effect in the universe, and has ordained them to their own proper effects. The immediate reason for absolute or intrinsic contingency is found in the freedom of the proximate cause and the exercise of it; but again in an absolute sense, its original root must be the liberty of the first cause itself.[160]

Sections eleven and twelve are concerned with fate, luck, and chance. In section eleven Suárez wishes chiefly to correct some of the possible errors concerning fate, and his main point is that any position which would deprive God of his freedom or omnipotence or detract from man's free will and immortality is against both faith and reason.[161]

Section twelve of the nineteenth disputation takes up the study of chance and luck, in order to discover whether they belong to the order of efficient cause. Some implications concerning the relations of causality and freedom are evident here. In the short introductory paragraph, Suárez makes the point that certainly nothing can be produced except by an efficient cause of some type, and yet--since many effects seem to take place in the universe simply by chance and quite fortuitously--the precise meaning of chance or fortune must be investigated. Chance certainly does not appear to operate freely, for a free cause acts always with knowledge of its end, and that which happens by chance is by definition unintended by the causes involved. But neither does it seem to cause necessarily, for a necessary cause produces its effect always or nearly always, while the chance event is a rare occurrence. Apparently, then, chance and fortune cannot be efficient causes.[162]

What is of interest here is not so much the clarification of the chance event as the further exploration of *per se* causality. A chance effect can be described as any happening which comes about in an accidental way outside of the knowledge or intention of the cause, but which is nevertheless united in some way to a *per se* effect of this cause. The chance event does occur rarely, but this infrequency results not because the *per se* cause involved acts rarely (for *its* effect follows in a determined way each time the cause is placed, ordinarily speaking), but because the various concurrence of causes at work in the production of the chance event is a rare occurrence. No one of them, furthermore, is a certain and determined cause of the very concurrence which results in the chance event. By definition, also, that which happens by chance is outside of the intention of the agent, and is an effect *per accidens*, not *per se*. If any agent involved in the production of the event is consciously intending it, or the concurrence of the causes producing it, *for him* that event loses the characteristic of chance.[163]

"Chance" is spoken of at times as if it were the cause itself of the chance event, but chance in this sense is not a *per se* cause ordained to the production of a particular effect. It signifies no more than some created efficient cause which, in an accidental manner and without intending it, produces--along with its *per se* effect--some other unusual and totally accidental effect. Chance is clearly neither an intellectual *per se* cause, which acts always in virtue of knowledge and intention--both totally foreign to the chance event, nor a natural cause, which always inclines to a given determined effect.[164]

Not every event must have a *per se* cause; it need only be related or joined to the *per se* effect of some cause. This is the meaning of the statement that the *per accidens* event can be reduced to a *per se* cause. The material cause involved, which may be defective in one way or another, often influences a chance event. The disposition of the matter, however, will necessarily produce the particular effect its potencies allow; the outcome is by chance only for the efficient cause, and is designated as such according to the agent's intention.[165]

Such are, in sum, the main points of doctrine professed by Suárez in the nineteenth disputation. Although the differences in his position on the relative causalities of intellect and will in the act of choice may not be violently altered from the earlier statements of De Anima V, developments and shifts of emphasis--particularly in the concept of efficiency--are significantly evident.

In De Anima V Suárez made extensive use of the term radix rather than causa when referring to the intellect and its judgment as the origin of freedom in the will. Do any changes appear in his usage of radix in the nineteenth disputation? The first important passage occurs early in the disputation--in section one, paragraph thirteen.[166] Causa and radix are both used here, and although their meanings are much closer than in De Anima V, they still do not quite appear as synonyms. The text states that the adequate root of liberty is the use of reason, and that consequently the lack of the use of reason is the adequate cause of a lack of liberty. Why the variant cause rather than root? When the use of liberty is lacking, declares Suárez, necessity in the operation must consequently follow; there is no hesitancy in using the word cause when the operation or activity is plainly necessitated. This usage seems to be a continuation of the same distinction rather carefully preserved in De Anima V, where root was delineated as meaning something which has something else rising out of it as from a point of origin which would certainly be a source of union and definiteness, but which would not necessitate.[167] The same text, however, goes on to use radix to refer to a necessitated power itself --in this instance, the sensitive appetites of man--but qualifies it with the word intrinsic. The intrinsic root of lack of freedom in such faculties is the very nature of the powers in question, which is determined to only one activity. These necessitated powers simply do not participate in the "greater amplitude" of the rational powers of man, and cannot exercise any real dominion over their activities. The modification of radix by "intrinsic" is significant here, for it implies that the ordinary usage of the term refers to an extrinsic source or origin, somehow remote from its actual fruit.[168]

The conclusion of this text, however, boldly brings in causa again: "because indifference in operating intrinsically and adequately rises out of the amplitude of the rational faculty, . . . and just as an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, so a negation is the cause of a negation."[169] The basic distinction is still upheld, because the statement "an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation" remains in the logical order and in the safe and clear realm of formal causality--a realm which may actually not be so safe as it appears. Indifference is here described as "rising out of" the rational faculty--a phrase which maintains the same slight remoteness of radix, since Suárez has consistently used orior or nascor to express the type of development or emanation which comes from a root. Apparently, then, a kind of logical or formal necessity is all that is implied by this causal connection of affirmations as well as of negations, but a closer association and less rigid distinction of causa and radix does seem to become noticeable here. Is this shift haphazard, or does it point to a development in Suárez' understanding of the various types of causality?

Let us consider another text from section four, number four.[170] Here Suárez castigates earlier philosophers and thinkers who failed to distinguish sufficiently between the root of liberty and the liberty to be found formally in the power and the act. The indifferent judgment is again pointed out as the root of freedom, and once more described as indifferent only objectively, not intrinsically. So far, no additional development in doctrine is evident. A further textual precision concerning the use of liberty, however, helps to clarify the earlier description of the use of reason as the adequate root of freedom, though not the adequate cause. The implications of "adequate" must also be considered, for its definite connotations of absolute equality and sufficiency become startlingly clear in a Descartes or a Spinoza just a few decades later; Suárez published the Disputations in 1597. In the text presently under consideration, "adequate" does not appear, but "sufficiently" does:

> The indifferent judgment indicates sufficiently, in a nature which is able to judge in this fashion, some faculty which is formally free, and consequently also a free use or free act, if this same faculty is left to operate in the manner which is proper to it, and no extrinsic force is imposed on it . . . by which it would be moved necessarily to tend to an object which, in every

> other respect, might be indifferent in itself. . . . [Hence] absolutely and without the indicated restriction, the indifferent judgment and the faculty free in itself do not suffice for the free use of the power.[171]

Noteworthy here is the statement that the indifference of the judgment, which Suárez has insisted repeatedly is grounded in the indifference of the object, is a sufficient (adequate?) indication of some faculty formally free. This faculty, since it is formally free, must be other than the faculty forming the judgment, but its very existence is sufficiently vouched for simply because the indifferent judgment exists. Though the word radix is not mentioned here, Suárez could not be explaining its nature more clearly. From the root, the indifferent judgment, necessarily and naturally arises a power formally free. Its free use and free act, of course, are another question. At this point Suárez seems to be laying the foundation of an answer to the difficult problem of how a free faculty can arise necessarily from its source, and yet be capable of free acts.

Later on, in paragraph seven of the same section, this point is explored more fully.[172] To define the free act as one proceeding from the will simply in virtue of an indifferent judgment of reason is false and incomplete. Such a definition proves only that the indifferent judgment is the root of liberty. To explain the free act completely one must not only indicate its root or source, but also add that the faculty must act in accord with this judgment, and be unimpeded by any extrinsic necessity: positis omnibus requisitis, possit agere et non agere.[173] Once again the basic distinction between radix and causa is maintained and reinforced. The root explains simply the origin of the power, but more active and effective causes are needed to explain the actual occurrence of the free act.

The next mention of radix occurs in a summary of the position of Durandus on liberum arbitrium in section five of the nineteenth disputation.[174] Durandus made the intellect itself formally free, with a greater and more perfect freedom than the will, precisely because it is more rational. Free in itself, it is therefore the root of the freedom of the will, since the indifference of the judgment grounds the indifference of choice, and a prior cause must possess in a greater measure the perfection it causes. Durandus sees liberum arbitrium as a composite of intellect and will, both possessing actively the formality of freedom. The conjunction and, however, Suárez insists, should be understood here not in a copulative sense, as if freedom belonged to each power separately, but in a collective sense. Both powers together make up man's free faculty--the will formally, the intellect radically.[175]

Paragraphs twenty-one and twenty-two of the same fifth section are extremely important for further clarification of the meaning of radix. The title of paragraph twenty-one again cites the use of reason as the root of liberty.[176] Suárez is immediately concerned with showing that the power of free choice (liberum arbitrium) cannot consist formally in a sort of joining of both intellect and will, for freedom belongs to each faculty in a different way; understanding is a part of free choice only radically or *praesuppositive*. He here introduces this synonym for *radicaliter* for the first time, immediately raising thought-provoking questions. Reason belongs to the faculty of choosing "praesuppositive seu radicaliter."[177] Is this word meant to denote exactly the same thing as "radically"? A simple presupposition or condition certainly fails to exert the same degree of influence as a root. An examination of the entire text seems to warrant the assumption that Suárez introduces this word here--practically for the only time--merely to pave the way for an easier refutation of the Scotist position. The Scotists argued that reason was not the root of liberty, but only a necessary condition for it, and Suárez declares that this disagreement is more a matter of words than things. By using "praesuppositive" he is, as it were, conceding that there is not too much difference between the concept of *root* and *condition*. He goes on, however, to show very clearly what he means by *root*, using some form of the words *radix* or *radicare* ten times in this same paragraph. The meaning is the one already established--a dynamic source exercising some determining influence in a formal, but in no way necessitating, manner. He labors over the word in a way that bears quoting. According to the Scotists,

> since knowledge is only a necessary condition previous to willing, they therefore want to give only to the *mode of*

> knowledge the name of necessary condition for the mode of willing, which consists in liberty. But it can be very well said that the root of liberty is the use of reason or intelligence; because, if we speak of the powers themselves, the appetitive powers follow from the cognitive in such a way that, even though the root of these is the soul, nevertheless the soul is the root of the cognitive power immediately, and through it of the appetitive; in this way the most perfect appetite is rooted [radicatur] proximately in the most perfect cognitive power, and therefore also this formal perfection of liberty proceeds from the perfection of understanding or of reasoning. Therefore, just as one passion is the root of another, the freedom of the will is likewise said to be rooted in the intelligence of the reason [in intelligentia rationis].[178]

Suárez does not seem to be agreeing with the Scotists here, but simply explaining what he means by radix, so that they will also come to see it as more than a mere condition, though not a necessitating cause. The shift of emphasis to the mode or use of reason is not important to Suárez; given his understanding of radix, either the power or its use will suffice to prove his point. He appears to be phrasing the solution in this way so as to make it clearer to the Scotists and others of similar bent. But the very insistence on radix and the repetition of it point to a Suarezian vocabulary lesson.

The next paragraph in the text is devoted largely to a discussion and explanation of the different types of indifference, formal and objective. The doctrine of this has already been explained. One new word is introduced in treating of radix, however, which adds a new depth to the discussion. Suárez is explaining the objective indifference of the judgment as the root of liberty, and concludes that since the judgment of reason, precisely because of its perfection and amplitude, can see in the object under consideration many varying aspects of suitability and of inconvenience, it can propose that object not as necessary, but simply as indifferent. The intellect, in its act of judgment, may seek out and judge the helpfulness or utility of the object in attaining the desired end, it may propose other possible means, and the like. This power of discernment makes the judgment of reason the foundation [fundamentum] of the free choice of the will.[179] Radix is not only a source point of origin, a necessary and presupposed condition, but it is also a foundation, a ground. This new deepening of meaning for radix determines it more firmly. It seems to be a settling into the realm of formal causality somewhat more fixedly. No efficiency is implied, of course, on the part of the judgment of indifference, which remains strictly in the formal and determining order. Surely, however, foundation manages to give a more solid impression; radix seems rather tenuous in comparison with it, even though its connotations are more dynamic.

Radicaliter is used again in paragraph twenty-three, but with no new meaning. Suárez is simply pointing out once more the error of not distinguishing firmly enough between the cognitive and appetitive aspects of man's rational faculty. The whole faculty may certainly be called free, but each aspect possesses freedom in its own proper way--the will formally, the intellect radicaliter.[180]

Two other sections in which radix occurs reveal no new doctrinal significance,[181] but there are two final passages which merit closer study. In section ten, paragraph thirteen,[182] Suárez is seeking to pinpoint the free agent in which is found the root of liberty. He formulates the question in a rather intriguing way, by asking in what cause is situated the root of contingency, whether in the liberty of the first cause, or of the second, or perhaps both at once. Is this an identification of cause and root at last? I think not, for although the agent certainly exercises efficient causality, the root of freedom seems to be thought of not as the agent itself, but as some quality in the agent, determining it in the formal order so that it can produce an effect of a certain kind--in this case contingent. Each time this phrasing is used, Suárez is careful to put the root in the cause; he does not identify them.[183]

Extrinsic contingency, which results merely from the interplay of various unequal causes, needs no positive root in a free cause at all. Such contingent events are rooted ultimately in God, but in exactly the same fashion as with all secondary causes. God has ordained and fashioned them to act in their own natural ways, which may at times be impeded from achieving their determined effects, thus becoming contingent, but only extrinsically so. With regard to events, however, that are intrinsically contingent or free,

> their immediate reason is found in the liberty of the proximate cause and in some exercise of it, . . . but their primordial root is the liberty of the first cause. . . .[184]

"Reason" is, of course, the word *ratio*. What does Suárez mean here by this? Admittedly, *ratio* is an ambiguous catch-all, but it still moves in a rather consistent circle--that of formal causality, mind, definition, determinate explanation. It is significant, I believe, that Suárez does *not* say simply "their immediate cause." He means here the whole configuration of intellect as root and will as cause, the exercise of the entire rational faculty of man. His use of *ratio* avoids too great an emphasis on the efficiency of the will alone, yet it does not exclude it. He is speaking here of the contingency of the *act* or event itself, not just the freedom of *liberum arbitrium*. Thus, *root* would be too limited a term in this context, while *cause* would be too broad; *ratio* seems well chosen as a compromise candidate.

Why then does he go on immediately to say that "their primordial root is the liberty of the first cause"? Why not *ratio* here also? Because, it seems to me, everyone then recognized God as the first efficient cause of all things. The question concerns rather the precise quality or aspect in that first cause which grounds freedom in all other subordinate causes. And this aspect or foundation or root is what God is by nature: free. God's efficiency is not at stake here. It is because God is free that creatures can participate in this perfection. Freedom in God is the *root* of freedom in creatures. The atmosphere of formal causality is still maintained.

Radix occurs a final time in the section which deals with fate.[185] The doctrine Suárez teaches here does not further our discussion of liberum arbitrium, but his use of radix does help to solidify one point. The word fate was commonly taken to mean the root of a fatal and absolute necessity in things. Fate, of course, was personified or reified in different ways, but the point at issue in this passage is that root may give rise to necessitated things as well as free. This view has been indicated earlier, where Suárez spoke of the sensitive appetites as roots of the determined and quite natural passions developing from them.[186] Thus radix is established as a formal determinant whose intrinsic quality has a definite influence on the kind of result emanating from it. "Affirmation causes affirmation; negation causes negation." Root, as such, neither necessitates nor leaves free--it is the particular quality and determination of the root in each case which must be investigated. Its way of being, its formality, will produce a similar or appropriate quality in whatever develops from it.

Before summing up the significance of the term radix as it has developed in the nineteenth disputation, a look at the texts containing orior or nascor, the verbs that Suárez consistently uses with radix, may shed some additional light on the problem. The important radix texts in which they occur together have already been studied, but their independent use may reveal some deeper nuances.

In general, these two words show no major shifts in significance. Suárez continues to use them almost without exception as complements to radix. At one time orior is used to indicate the way in which difficulties rise out of certain problematical doctrines.[187] The translators have used the words "originated by" to express the Latin oriuntur, and the context seems largely to imply that it is simply the nature of these mysteries which gives rise to serious difficulties in their solution. No efficiency is indicated; the consequent remains almost completely in the essential order.

One of the objections posed against the argument from experience that man is free uses orior to describe a necessary determination of the will act by a prior judgment.[188] But even here the meaning remains consistent, for necessario is stressed as a modifier. If orior ordinarily implied necessity, the term would not need to be expressed. Moreover, the context in which this orior appears is an objection, soon to be refuted. The answer to another objection which had claimed that a passive potency may be free,[189] reveals a definite stress on formal incompatibility. The objection states that a passive potency can either resist or receive the efficiency coming to it from the agent, and the will is accordingly pictured as being able to love or not love the particular object whose efficiency is moving it. Resistance in any passive potency, however, is not the result of any efficiency or activity on its own part, but simply the natural and determined outcome of a formal incompatibility. The form of water, for example, prevents one from drawing pictures on it; the presence of one form prevents or hinders certain others from being received. But this cannot be the case with the will, Suárez points out, because such resistance is certainly not actively indifferent or free--"it only rises out of [oritur] formal incompatibility or opposition of substances [entitatum]."[190] I am using the word "substance" here to translate "entitatum" because Suárez is clearly referring to the being as already formally determined in the order of substance. He goes on to insist that if the will, by its very "entity" were at any one time to resist formally the impression of love from some particular object, then it would always have to resist it, for it would always have this same formal repugnance by its very substantial constitution. Likewise, if it were once to accept it, for the same formal reason, it could never resist it in any case. Thus the will would have no intrinsic freedom or active indifference at all; freedom would be meaningless. What is implied here? That there must be some efficiency, some intrinsic active power in a free faculty. What is purely passive can never be called truly free, and formal causality alone can never suffice for liberty. A distinction becomes quite evident here between formal and efficient causality--one is always intrinsically necessitated by the determination it receives, the other may at times act freely. The absolute requisite for freedom is again seen to lie in this active indifference of the faculty which possesses true dominion over its own acts, even when all the prerequisites for action are present. Formal causality is certainly necessary for freedom, but it is not enough. How necessary, how insufficient will be developed fully in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

An important text[191] in which the use of nascor points to the same type of formal equivalence between intellect and will presents an a priori argument which follows from the perfection and manner of knowing which is natural to the intellect. Liberty is born out of intelligence, for any vital appetite follows on knowledge in a way proper to the type of knowledge. The more perfect the knowledge, the more perfect the appetite, so that a universal and indifferent knowledge would be followed naturally by a universal and indifferent appetite. In the same way that the intellect judges and apprehends the various degrees of goodness in things, just so the will is attracted to these things. Precisely in this fashion free choice [electio libera] follows rational deliberation. Two things are implied here--not only the formal agreement between the root and what rises out of it, but also a careful distinction between the power or faculty of free choice [liberum arbitrium], which includes both intellect as root and will as cause, and the act of choice itself [electio libera] as a distinct moment in the causal sequence.

The other uses of orior or nascor in the nineteenth disputation invariably refer to this same type of "rising out of" something which acts as a determining factor almost completely in the formal order.[192]

The use of the phrase liberum arbitrium itself in the nineteenth disputation is much less frequent and less significant than one would expect. Nearly always it simply refers to man's power of free choice, and appears in the text as easily and as matter-of-factly as any other word which presumably everyone understands. It usually receives no more explanation than such words as ratio, causa, or voluntas. For example, liberum arbitrium appears for the first time in section two of the nineteenth disputation, where Suárez, who is proving that man does frequently operate freely, cites different authors such as Augustine and Bernard who defended liberum arbitrium against the heretics, or were concerned with explaining how it was to be reconciled with the action of divine grace and knowledge.[193] No interpretation whatever or liberum arbitrium itself is even hinted at. By the time the Metaphysical Disputations were published in 1597, of course, the public disputes about man's free choice and God's causality had been raging for more than a decade; surely everyone in the philosophical world could be presumed to know the meaning of liberum arbitrium. The Alvarez edition of the De Anima shows even more unconcern for the term, although--as was shown above--the primitive manuscript did give it attentive study. The same reasons seem to hold: Suárez taught De Anima in 1573; the Disputations were published in 1597; Alvarez published De Anima in 1621. The progression in time reveals less and less space given to detailed explanation of the term liberum arbitrium. The emphasis in the Metaphysical Disputations is much more on the free cause, or man's free faculty specifically, whether Suárez be speaking of man's free act, his *electio libera*, his freedom *in agendo*, or simply of *voluntate sua et libertate*.[194]

In section five, however, of the nineteenth disputation the meaning of *liberum arbitrium* as such is fully explained, after much previous discussion of free causes, the meaning of true liberty as active indifference, and similar related questions. Section five, as has been pointed out earlier, tries to discover the precise faculty in which the freedom of the created cause resides formally and properly.[195] *Liberum arbitrium* is rather suddenly mentioned in paragraph four of this section, which sets out to show that *liberum arbitrium* is neither an act nor a habit, but a power. It cannot be an act, because man has free choice even when he does nothing or ceases to act. The accepted description of freedom as the ability either to act or not to act, when all the requisites for action are present, underlines the fact that *liberum arbitrium* must make a man ready to act, capable of action--this is clearly the role of a power.[196]

Suárez stated earlier his position that man does have a free power which must be intrinsically active if it is to have any real dominion over its acts. This point is so important that without it a correct understanding and defense of man's *liberum arbitrium* is impossible.[197] Section five now simply points out the reasons why this must be so. *Liberum arbitrium* is not just an act, because if it were one would have to ask whether freedom in man preceded this act; if so, then the freedom is formally in the power from which the act proceeds, not in the act itself; if not, then the act must be necessitated, and not free. How could such an act be truly called liberum arbitrium?[198]

What sort of necessity and of influence do reside in the judgment of the intellect which immediately precedes the free act of the will? Certainly every act must rise from some principle--in the case of liberum arbitrium, this principle is an act of the understanding. This intellectual act is neither free nor voluntary, properly speaking; it is simply natural. Such a judgment preceding the first act of the will can certainly not be free, nor can it proceed from the will. This judgment itself cannot be the very liberum arbitrium of which it is the ground and foundation. Such a situation would be openly contradictory. Rather, this judgment which is, in its own genus, the origin and foundation of the use of liberty, is nothing more than a required condition and application of the object, so that the free power of man can use its own ability.[199] Suárez has from the first insisted on this same position, denying any efficiency whatever to the role of the intellect and its judgment. The judgment does contribute something to liberum arbitrium, yes, but only by way of a formal presentation of the object as such.

So far, liberum arbitrium is seen as a power grounded in an intellectual judgment which enables man to act freely, but which is not identical with the act of free choice itself. Is liberum arbitrium then a habit? Clearly not, for a habit must be either natural or acquired, and liberum *arbitrium* can be neither. What is given by nature is the power itself, while facility in acting or choosing rightly comes from the use of the power. The power must be prior to the habits it acquires, and cannot therefore be identical with them. *Liberum arbitrium*, furthermore, does not necessarily imply ease in its right use; the essential qualities of a free cause are its "absolute power of operating or not operating, with all the requisites present."[200]

The process of delineating *liberum arbitrium* goes on. The next step shows that as a power it is not something distinct from the intellect and the will. Once Suárez establishes clearly the identity of *liberum arbitrium* as formally in the will, radically in the intellect, he will simply continue referring to man's free power or free faculty without any more explanation. I believe his reason for doing this is chiefly metaphysical. The topic of the *Disputations* is not just man and his powers, but the whole realm of being, from God down to the smallest of creatures. Thus Suárez will be much more concerned here, it seems to me, with the entire order of free causes, God included, than with the narrower concept of *liberum arbitrium* which would belong properly to man alone, at least as far as philosophy can tell. As soon as he has clarified its meaning sufficiently, he proceeds on to the wider context of liberty.

In paragraphs nine and ten of section five, however, Suárez does establish in opposition to Alexander of Hales that *liberum arbitrium* is not some moving potency in addition to intellect and will, which would be both unnecessary and unintelligible.[201] Neither is it a composite of intellect and will in which both constitutive powers would be formally free. The Suarezian position on the respective contributions of intellect and will to liberum arbitrium is here set out again, but with positive and definitive terminology, as if anxious to settle the question once and for all. The definition given by St. Thomas Aquinas is quoted and explained:

> Liberum arbitrium is a faculty of the will and reason; but that conjunction et must be understood collectively, not copulatively. Thus the role of liberum arbitrium consists neither in the judgment alone nor the election alone, but in both of them simultaneously.[202]

The doctrine Suárez is about to profess has already been stated many times in this dissertation. But what of his terminology? From this point on, he begins talking about "freedom" and the free agent and act much more than of liberum arbitrium. He has already laid the groundwork, however, for this broadening of reference. In paragraph nine, for example, where it is demonstrated that liberum arbitrium is not some third power in addition to intellect and will, Suárez makes the identification with will quite explicit. His whole proof tends in this direction, and then towards the end of the paragraph he writes:

> If we are speaking of effective motion or that which applies something to operate; in this sense the will is that which moves, not only itself, but also man's other powers, for we do not apply ourselves to operate freely unless we will to do so. . . . Only by desiring and willing do we incline and apply ourselves to operate.[203]

Suárez adds immediately that if Alexander of Hales means merely that liberum arbitrium differs from the will only by a distinction of reason, not a real distinction, then "he differs only in words."[204] A thorough study of liberum arbitrium, however, reveals that its function is not only to move the other powers of man, but also in the "willing of any object whatever, with the power of not willing it."[205] The identification of liberum arbitrium and will could not be clearer.

In paragraph twenty-four of this same section five, towards the end of his argument, Suárez appeals to several authorities to enforce his position. The ancient Fathers of the Church, he writes, very often called liberum arbitrium free will, or at other times they spoke of the free choice of the will [liberum voluntatis arbitrium], as can be seen in St. Augustine, St. Ambrose and others.[206] Another and final explicit identification is made in paragraph twenty of section eight of the disputation, which states that every intention of a particular end is a virtual choice of happiness. One can truly say that every deliberation is concerned, in a proportional way, with some choice, and every free action participates to some extent in choice. Because of this, the usage of the term liberum arbitrium signifies almost exclusively the act of choice, although the power may have many other free acts.[207] In this passage liberum arbitrium plainly equals the will, particularly as it is involved in making free choices, and this same equivalence was also brought out in paragraph seven of the same section, where liberum arbitrium is compared to the will as reason is to the intellect. The intellect in its function of reason is focused not on principles as such, but on what can be drawn from them, and the will as liberum arbitrium is not concentrated on the end as such, but rather on those things which are to be chosen for the sake of the end. Toward the end of this same paragraph electio libera is used as a synonym for liberum arbitrium.[208]

Nevertheless, liberum arbitrium is not totally identical with the will, as is made clear in paragraph six of section eight. There Suárez is explaining how the will can only move itself voluntarily, for this manner of moving is adequate to the will, i.e., perfectly comprehensive, while what is free is included in the voluntary, but not coextensive with it. In effect, the will is completely and adequately will, but it is not adequately liberum arbitrium, since the faculty of choosing freely is logically inferior or more limited than the will. Liberum arbitrium adds the quality of indifference, or the power to act or not to act, to what is already voluntary--that is, a good known by the intellect and presented to the will as an object of love.[209]

In summary, then, the doctrine of liberum arbitrium in the nineteenth disputation is substantially the same as that in De Anima V. No really startling change or development has taken place, and yet there are indications of some slight shifts of emphasis. The reasons for these shifts, such as the stress on the free cause or the will itself rather than simply on liberum arbitrium as in the early manuscript, can only be conjectured in view of the total purpose of the work, the historical developments in the controversy de auxiliis, and other similar influences, tangible and intangible.

Some changes of emphasis in the treatment of the efficiency of the will do occur between De Anima V and Disputation XIX. These differing views, although generally rather slight, have been pointed out above as they occurred in the summary of the doctrine of the nineteenth disputation. As a whole they show a greater certitude concerning the meaning of efficient causality, or at least a clearer delineation of what an efficient cause precisely does. Only one of the most pertinent texts on this point will be examined here, for the complete question of the meaning of formal and efficient causality in these two Suarezian works is the topic of the third chapter of this dissertation. There the texts and their implications will be analyzed in detail.

Perhaps the most significant text of the nineteenth disputation with regard to difference or development in the Suarezian view of efficiency in the will occurs in section three, which asks whether or not a free action demands freedom in all of the causes contributing to it, or whether only one free cause is sufficient.[210] In De Anima V Suárez insisted continually that the will--and only the will--contributed efficiently to the free act. This insistence revealed a certain ambiguity in his view of efficient causality, which was still too volatile to permit much exposure to air and light. His chief concern in De Anima V was to get efficiency into the will and keep it there--only there. The implications that efficiency from outside would necessarily determine the effect and take away its intrinsic freedom were quite obvious.

In section three of the nineteenth disputation Suárez seems to reject or drastically modify this position. Although, as Anton Pegis says of Molina on this same point,[211] Suárez may have tried to prove too much in this section--namely, that even if God acted through necessity but continued to bestow only the same degree of concurrence on man as he does at present, man could still act freely--his views are extremely helpful in pinpointing the role of efficient causality. No matter how many naturally necessitated causes are involved in the production of any effect, he insists, the presence of only one truly free and actively indifferent cause contributing to an action suffices to make that action really free and intrinsically contingent. He calls this, in paragraph twenty, a "general rule,"[212] and says it may be more easily understood through some examples. The example he gives first calls for an exact quotation:

> One [example] is--according to a probable opinion--that the knowledge or the known object concurs efficiently to the act of the will; because that concurrence, insofar as it proceeds from knowledge, is natural and without freedom, and nevertheless the act is simply free on account of the indifference of the will.[213]

By this time Suárez is apparently so sure of the active indifference and dominating power of his free cause, the human will, that he can even afford to include God--hypothetically, of course--in the range of necessitated efficient causes contributing to the act. What has happened since De Anima V to make him so positive of the untouchability of his free human will? The fact that the very example he chooses to illustrate this "general rule" is the practical judgment-will complex seems to me extremely indicative that a radical change or clarification has taken place in the Suarezian view of efficiency. He is more certain of what it means. He explains this quoted passage immediately by stating that although the knowledge of the object certainly does influence the will act through a natural necessity, still "because its actual influence does not acquire reality without the actual influx of the will,"[214] the causality is consequently not necessary in an absolute sense. What does this mean? It is a complete avowal that all actual efficiency really does belong in the will, for the practical judgment or knowledge presented by the intellect only becomes efficacious, only moves the will actually, when the will itself chooses to give it this efficiency. The influence of the object is no influence at all unless the will wants it to be. Thus, since its efficacy--if it has it in re--comes from and is due to the will itself, the absolute autonomy of the will as free cause is maintained and even underscored.

This position certainly appears radically different from that of De Anima V, where the indifference of the will, though certainly active, was grounded in and a consequence of the perfection and universality of the intellect's knowledge. Is this later position really so different? Is Suárez simply explaining action here, rather than being? How does one follow from the other? Suárez seems to be sure of the answer; he does not yet make us equally sure. One might object that Suárez calls this only a "probable opinion"--but he almost always uses this particular phrase to introduce his own position on a question, although he usually describes it then as the "more probable opinion." Here, this opinion is presented merely as probable--but it occurs in first place in the paragraph and is explained carefully. Suárez gives no indication at this point of repudiating it later on, or of assuming it simply for the aid of his demonstration. The full implications of this text and the others involving the efficiency of the will remain to be investigated in chapter three of this dissertation. The issue at present is simply to cite a few of the texts which show development on this important doctrine and to point out the directions the investigation will have to follow.

Can we formulate at this point a basic statement of the early Suarezian position on the causality of intellect and will in the human act of free choice? Two things, it seems to me, must be done first. When Alvarez omitted the eighth chapter of De Anima V, "Whether the will is free in its acts," from his edition of the work, he stated unequivocally that he had left it out because the same doctrine had already been widely treated by Suárez. He cited the nineteenth of the Metaphysical Disputations, section two and following, as a chief source, but also named the first prologomenon of the De Gratia, and a few other scattered references, chiefly theological. The doctrine in these two places, cited by Alvarez as identical with that of De Anima V, must be summarized at least briefly. Secondly, the treatise De Voluntario et involuntario must be looked at carefully. Both De Gratia and De Voluntario were edited posthumously by Alvarez, the former (Books I and III) in 1619, the latter in 1628; both are subject to the same wariness of treatment necessary for De Anima V, and for the same reasons. One would want to check the editions against a primitive manuscript before putting too much trust in either of them.

As has been shown, the doctrine of De Anima V is not identical with that of the nineteenth disputation, although certain strong and basic similarities do persist. What of the omitted chapter eight? Is there anything distinctively there which is absent from the nineteenth disputation? Or is the doctrinal correspondence even more exact, as Alvarez seems to claim? Free cause is defined identically in both places, and the demonstrations that man does many times act freely are certainly similar, but one rather striking difference is that Disputation XIX lacks the inclusive and explicit confrontation and refutation of the Thomists' views that forms a major part of the omitted portion of De Anima V. It seems evident that by the time Suárez wrote his metaphysics he had learned to distinguish somewhat more readily between "the Thomists" and St. Thomas. De Anima V almost always uses the plural form, "Thomists," often rejecting and refuting their position, while in the nineteenth disputation, names are named and doctrines attributed with much greater accuracy and precision. St. Thomas himself is more often "explained" than "refuted," and his position is even frequently endorsed. In paragraph nine of section eight of the nineteenth disputation, for example, having just named Capreolus, Cajetan, and others in the previous paragraph, Suárez speaks of "St Thomas . . . and the Thomists in general."[215] He singles out Cajetan as misrepresenting St. Thomas' description of the first truly universal thought and the will act following on it, and insists that Cajetan's interpretation is "contrary to St. Thomas and to the truth."[216] Such a close proximity between St. Thomas and "the truth" would never be found in De Anima V. The reasons behind this more exact and more enthusiastic welcome of the doctrines of St. Thomas would make an interesting historical study, which is of course beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the change in attitude can at least be pointed out. Is it valid to infer from this that the doctrine of Suárez on the role of the will has become more truly Thomistic in the Metaphysical Disputations? On the surface, his description in the quotation cited earlier from paragraph twenty of section three[217] of the interplay of final and efficient causality in liberum arbitrium might seem to indicate this. A final verdict will have to wait, however, until after the deeper exploration of the various types of causes and their meaning to Suárez. This will be the topic of chapter three of this dissertation.

What is the basic doctrine on _liberum arbitrium_ presented in the first prolegomenon to the _De Gratia_? Alvarez had mentioned this source as one where Suárez had expounded "extensively" on the meaning of free choice in man. The treatise is primarily theological, of course, but in the several prolegomena Suárez deals with some illuminating pre-theological or border-line issues. One of these is _liberum arbitrium_.[218] The doctrine covered is in general the same as that in the _De Anima_: the meaning of free choice, "nature" in an intellectual being, the necessary requisites for freedom, its definition, the ways in which God can influence or move the will, and so forth. The existence of _liberum arbitrium_ as a power or faculty in man is again supposed from the beginning. Rather than proving _that_ man has such a power, the treatise discusses the _how_ and _what_ of it. _Liberum arbitrium_ must be active, possessing a dominating indifference, able to act or not to act--given all the requisite conditions.[219] So far there is no addition or significant change of the doctrine presented in _De Anima V_, chapter eight, but Suárez does include a lengthy section on the doctrine of the Dominican Báñez, which he refutes. The theological nature of this treatise _De Gratia_ makes this inclusion quite natural, but the more philosophical and perhaps more cogently explained arguments of _De Anima V_ are noticeably missing. A selection from chapter four of the first prolegomenon will help to illustrate the similarity of doctrine prevalent throughout the prolegomenon:

> But the object of that judgment, even though indifferent in itself, nevertheless cannot be the form according to which the human will is called free, because [the will's] formal liberty is not a property of the object. It is an intrinsic property inhering in the will of an acting man, and therefore, in addition to the indifference of the object--which is supposed as the foundation of liberty--an intrinsic indifference of the power itself is required.[220]

This prolegomenon of De Gratia thus reveals nothing philosophical to add to the doctrine already established by Suárez; indeed it lacks some of the philosophical breadth and calmly rational inclusiveness that Suárez showed in the early manuscript De Anima. Even though many of his philosophical views or interpretations had undergone modification since those early years of the 1570's, a purely philosophical development of the Suarezian thought on the soul would be most valuable. Most of Suárez' later works, even when not essentially theological, incline in that direction; the philosophy occasionally tends to limp. Even the edition De Anima, as Carreras y Artau has pointed out,[221] has been revised to show a definite theological orientation rather than the philosophical humanism more visible in the early Suárez.

What of the De Voluntario?[222] The textual difficulties and doubtful authenticity have already been discussed;[223] does the doctrine itself display any additional insights or developments? A look at the table of contents reveals a totally different approach to the problem. One small section of De Anima V, where Suárez speaks of the various acts of the will, is here expanded into a whole treatise. The issue here is not at all what liberum arbitrium is, but rather what the will itself does, and in what order. It is concerned with acts, not with potencies.[224] The orientation is plainly ethical, as it is concerned with the influence of circumstances, ignorance, violence, concupiscence, and similar problems. Out of the ten disputations in this work, three are pertinent to this dissertation--the first compares and distinguishes the free and the voluntary; the sixth studies will and intention, as well as the intellectual acts proceding them; the eighth is concerned with the act of choice [electio] and consent. These sections do yield some helpful data.

The basic doctrine of De Voluntario shows little development, although it is much closer to the De Anima than to the Metaphysical Disputations. This similarity is quite natural, since the De Voluntario was edited from course notes taught by Suárez around 1580, only seven or eight years after the most probable date of the De Anima manuscript. The freedom of the will rises out of [oritur ex] the perfection and amplitude of reason;[225] the knowledge of the object is only a condition for the free act, but is necessary for that act, etc. Several intriguing texts on causality--both efficient and final--will be useful for discussion in chapter three, but here I will simply mention a few texts that situate the treatise definitely in the earliest work of Suárez. While insisting that all the efficacy belongs only to the will,[226] the *De Voluntario* explicitly denies both mutual causality between the intellect and will, and also the claim that the practical intellect always moves the will effectively.[227]

A rather typical text which will serve to identify and situate the basic doctrine of the *De Voluntario* on this point might be the following:

> I say that liberty rises out of reason, not merely because [reason] can judge that *this* is better than *that*, but especially because it can ponder exactly the weight of any good. Because of this the will can love in that perfect way, i.e., in that [same] extent and manner in which the good in question is lovable. An evident example of this is the liberty of the divine will, which confirms everything we have said, because from two equal things [God] chooses that which He wishes for no other reason except *because* He wishes. [Indeed,] He often chooses that which is less useful. Now our freedom is a participation of that, and has the very same root, keeping all due proportions. For the confirmation of that opinion I deny that the will is determined by the intellect in such a way that the will does not also determine itself, but is rather determined by the intellect, as if with respect to sufficiency. The will itself truly determines itself as to efficiency, and it needs no other reason to yield this determination, in addition to liberty and because it *wills*, supposing a sufficient reason on the part of the object.[228]

The lack of an early manuscript of the *De Voluntario* can only be deplored, for a close study of its doctrine and formulations would certainly aid in clarifying Suárez' early position on free choice. At present, however, with only the dubious text of the Alvarez edition to deal with and no primitive Suarezian manuscript readily available, the doctrine of *De Voluntario* can at best be summarized and briefly characterized. A deeper and more extensive study must await a text which is undoubtedly authentic.

Leaving until later the more profound analysis of the causality implied in these various Suarezian texts, we must now attempt a basic formulation of the early position of Francisco Suárez on liberum arbitrium. What is free choice in man? It is a power, distinct only in reason from the will, but grounded firmly in the perfection and universality of the intellect. Liberum arbitrium is the active and dominating power man has to act or not to act, to do this thing or its contrary, even when all the requisite conditions for acting are present. Free choice is actively indifferent. Its decision is not forced by the intellect; it need not follow the judgment presented to it. This judgment is simply a condition necessary for the application of the object; it in no way forces the will to choose. Liberty belongs formally in the will, radicaliter in the intellect. Whether the object and/or knowledge of it contribute efficaciously or only through specification--a problem to be clarified in chapter three--the intrinsic power of the will to maintain control of its acts is not impaired. Although the will may be considered a higher power because it possesses freedom, still in an absolute sense the intellect is a higher power than the will, since the will lacks independence, is grounded in the intellect, and must look to it for the objects it may choose or reject. The intellect is the rule for the will; this is to be a more perfect power, since the will is at least morally subject to the rule of the intellect.

There remain questions to be answered. We have described the different factors involved in the *liberum arbitrium* in the early Suarezian doctrine. But exactly how does the intellect influence the will? Is it merely a root or also a cause? If a cause, formal or final? Does efficient causality always necessitate? Does it simply make "something" actual? Is it a further determination of a thing? What makes the will possess efficiency? To sum up, in what factor or aspect of being is the power to cause efficiently really grounded? What accounts for the power itself, and its ability to move itself into act? Does Suárez really answer these questions? *Can* he answer them, given his metaphysical ground?

Chapter three will now attempt to ferret out the solutions, as far as possible in Suárez' own terms and from his viewpoint, using as a basis the texts already analyzed and studied.

CHAPTER II--NOTES

[1] This information is readily available. The Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, perhaps the best single source for a totally integrated presentation, contains a critical and accurate account of Suárez' works, manuscripts, and editions by P. Monnot. On the De Anima, see especially t. XIV, cols. 2611 and 2645. An invaluable article on this early treatise of Suárez is that by Joaquín Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto del tratado 'De Anima' de Francisco Suárez," Pensamiento, XV (1959), 293-308. See on this point pp. 293-95.

[2] P. Baltasar Alvarez, "Ad lectores," Opera Omnia of Francisco Suárez, t. III of Vives edition (Paris: Luis Vives, 1856), p. v. Also "Intermissi Operis: Ratio, ejusque supplementum ex eodem auctore," p. 562, following chap. xii of Book I De Anima.

[3] In the latter excerpt Alvarez describes the situation in these words: "Hoc, inquam, inchoatum opus ex iis commentationibus, quas Soarius juvenis quidem aetate, sed jam doctrina longaevus auditoribus propinaverat, complendum censuimus. . . ." A more specific reference to the exact date occurs in the preface by Alvarez to the first part of the De Gratia, published posthumously in Coimbra in 1619 (Vives edition, t. VII), where Alvarez states that the early commentaries were taught forty-five years before the death of Suárez, who was only twenty-five years old at that time. See Raoul de Scorraille, "Les écrits inédits ... ," p. 161. Carreras y Artau thus definitely places the teaching of these early commentaries in Segovia in the years 1572-73. Carreras y Artau, p. 294.

[4] Jesús Iturrioz, S.J., "Bibliografía Suareciana," Pensamiento, IV (1948), num. extra., 607*. To date, no translation of the De Anima into any modern language has been made, though some few studies have been published, e.g., that of George H. Mahovald, S.J., "Suarez: De Anima," New Scholasticism (1932), pp. 108-21, and brief doctrinal summaries in various Spanish histories of philosophy. Marcial Solana's, cited above in chap. i, n. 1, is one of the most comprehensive. See especially pp. 471-74. The article by Carreras y Artau is, of course, a textual rather than a doctrinal study.

[5] Carreras y Artau, p. 297. Suárez died in September

of 1617, but apparently he had not received assistance from any helper for very long, since only in January of the same year, nine months previous, Suárez had written to the General of the Society of Jesus, Father Vitelleschi, that he would very much appreciate the help of Father Juan Perlin in his philosophical labors. Suárez realized that he was too advanced in age to finish the work he had begun and felt that with Father Perlin beside him, he could leave completed a philosophy that would correspond to his theology, and--not the least--that he could know a man would be left in Spain who was able to carry on the work Suárez had undertaken. This would be for him a great consolation. (Unedited letter from Coimbra, January 16, 1617, cited in de Scorraille, "Les écrits inédits ... ," p. 159.) Father Alvarez presumably was appointed rather than Father Perlin; one wonders what became of the latter.

[6] Consult Alvarez' comments cited above, notes 2 and 3. Also Mahovald, p. 109.

[7] Carreras y Artau, p. 295. The manuscript itself is available on microfilm from the Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Spain.

[8] Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P., "Los manuscritos de los teólogos de la escuela salmantina," La Ciencia Tomista, XLII (1930), 348-49. On the Suarezian method of teaching see de Scorraille, "Les écrits inédits ... ," p. 162, and the other sources mentioned in chap. i, n. 55.

[9] Alvarez, comments on p. 562.

[10] Carreras y Artau, p. 301, gives a succinct summary of various possibilities. He concludes, however, that given the authenticity of MS 583, the present conclusion must be that the published edition is defective and not wholly Suarezian. "It is more: the character of some among the many differences noted, for example the use of stereotyped phrases which reflect the scholastic practice of disputations and the dogmatic tone of some affirmations on highly disputed subjects, incline one to think that the true author of the emendations introduced in the primitive text of Suárez is the same Baltasar Alvares [sic]."

[11] See bibliographical data above, n. 1.

[12] Carreras y Artau, p. 304. He characterizes the early manuscript as purely philosophical in orientation and strongly humanistic in tone. Although written at such a youthful age, the text, in his opinion, testifies to the height of Suárez' genius and is certainly worthy to be "exhumed." Ibid., p. 307.

[13] MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 248v. All further references to this manuscript will follow this same form.

[14] Edition, chap. iii, No. 8, p. 760. Unless otherwise stated, all further references to this published edition refer to the Vives edition of the De Anima, Book V, and will be made in the same way.

[15] Alvarez, edition, chap. viii, p. 773. "Caput hoc integrum ex autographo praeterivimus, quoniam late tractatur in priori tomo de Gratia, Prolegomento 1 [sic], et in Metaphysica, dist. 19, a sect. 2, et ultra, tum etiam non pauca pro eodem argumento videri possunt in opusculo 4, de Libertate divinae voluntatis." This dissertation will compare the doctrine found in the MS with that of the Metaphysics only, since our chief interest is philosophical rather than theological.

[16] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 258v. Edition, chap. vii, No. 1, p. 771.

[17] Edition, chap. viii, pp. 773-74. Alvarez had edited the De Gratia, parts I and III, two years earlier in 1619, and the De Angelis in 1620.

[18] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265v.

[19] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775. Earlier, in chap. vi, No. 5, p. 770, Alvarez does follow the manuscript in stating that liberty always rises out of some indifference of knowledge--although the MS has rationis where the edition has cognitionis--but while the MS promises that this will be explained at length in a following question, Alvarez notes he will explain it fully in chap. viii--the very chapter he later omits from the edition. Suárez keeps his promise; Alvarez does not.

[20] Edition, chap. vii, No. 5, p. 772. "Quod ideo addimus . . ." the parenthesis begins. In other passages Alvarez is not so frank, bothering neither with parentheses nor explanations.

[21] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r. Edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773. "[A]d actum voluntatis, neque intellectum, neque objectum elicitive concurrere."

[22] Ibid.

[23] MS 583, disp. xi, q. 3, fol. 258r. Edition, chap. vi, No. 7, pp. 770-71.

[24] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r. Edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773. The passage in question is the

last sentence of paragraph six in the edition.

[25] MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 247v: "Item si efficeret non distingueretur concursus causae finalis ab efficienti."

[26] Edition, chap. iii, No. 6, p. 759: "Secundo, si efficeret, non distingueretur jam concursus causae formalis ab efficienti."

[27] See for example chap. iii, No. 3, p. 758. In chap. v, No. 6, pp. 765-66, Alvarez inserts an entire paragraph explaining the opinions of Valles and others on the sensation of pain.

[28] Edition, chap. vii, No. 3, p. 771.

[29] MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 246r. Edition, chap. iii, No. 1, p. 758.

[30] Edition, chap. x, title, p. 777. MS 583, disp. xiii, title, fol. 267v.

[31] Edition, chap. i, pp. 753-55. MS 583, disp. x, q. 1, fol. 242r-243v.

[32] Edition, chap. ii, pp. 755-57. MS 583, disp. x, q. 2, fol. 244r-245v.

[33] Edition, chap. iii, pp. 757-61. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 246r-249r.

[34] Edition, chap. vi, pp. 769-71. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 3, fol. 257r-258r.

[35] Edition, chap. vii, pp. 771-73. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 258v-260r.

[36] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 262v. (This question, omitted by Alvarez, would have been chapter eight in the edition.) The comparison with the Thomists is one which Suárez himself introduces, explains, and maintains.

[37] Edition, chap. viii, pp. 773-74. Alvarez has substituted two paragraphs of comment for this omitted question. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 260r-264v.

[38] Edition, chap. ix, pp. 774-77. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 264v-267v.

[39] Edition, chap. xi, pp. 777-81. MS 583, disp. xiii, q. unica, fol. 267v-270v.

[40] In the published edition of the De Anima Alvarez frequently substitutes a more distinguished term for Suárez' simpler word. For example, Alvarez writes "intelligent supposits" where Suárez has "intellectual things." Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775; MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265v.

[41] See for example MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 262r; ibid., q. 3, fol. 265v (Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775).

[42] Edition, chap. i, No. 3, p. 754. MS 583, disp. x, q. 1, fol. 243r.

[43] Edition, chap. i, No. 2, p. 754. MS 583, disp. x, q. 1, fol. 243r.

[44] Edition, chap. vii, No. 7, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r. Also MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 260v.

[45] Edition, chap. vii, No. 1, p. 771. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 258v.

[46] Edition, chap. v, No. 17, p. 769. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 2, fol. 256r.

[47] Edition, chap. v, No. 3, p. 765. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 2, fol. 252v.

[48] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 262r. The context reveals that the two words are not used here as synonyms.

[49] Ibid. This entire question is the one omitted by Alvarez from the published edition of De Anima.

[50] Ibid. "Additur tamen [to the formula that free choice is a faculty of will and of reason] voluntatis et rationis, quia libertas partim in ratione partim in voluntate consistit. In illa tamquam in radice; in hac tamquam in subiecto formaliter libero."

[51] Proofs of this position will be investigated more thoroughly in the study of liberum arbitrium itself. Here the main point at issue is radix.

[52] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265v. The differences here between manuscript and edition are noteworthy. This is also the only occurrence of the term "liberum arbitrium" in the Alvarez edition of De Anima V. The term occurs frequently in the manuscript, but --except for this once--exclusively in the section omitted from the edition (chapter eight; disp. xii, q. 2). The two texts are as follows: MS 583--"Et hoc enim ostendit quod radix voluntatis est intellectus nam eo ipso quod dicimus

hominem esse rationalem quassi [sic] in virtute et radice dicimus esse appetitivum, et liberi arbitrii. Ergo." Edition--"Id quod etiam inde ostenditur, quoniam voluntatis radix ipse intellectus censetur: siquidem eo ipse [sic], quod asserimus hominem esse rationalem, quasi virtute et radice pronuntiamus volitum esse, ac liberi arbitrii: quare, etc."

[53] Ibid.

[54] Edition, chap. x, No. 11, p. 780. MS 583, disp. xiii, q. unica, fol. 270r.

[55] Edition, chap. i, No. 2, p. 754. MS 583, disp. x, q. 1, fol. 243r.

[56] Edition, chap. iii, No. 8, p. 760. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 248r.

[57] Edition, chap. v, No. 15, p. 768. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 2, fol. 255v.

[58] Edition, chap. vi, No. 7, p. 771. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 3, fol. 258r.

[59] Edition, chap. vi, No. 5, p. 770. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 3, fol. 258r. The edition gives all these conditions of intellectual knowledge "ex qua proinde possit oriri libertas in ipso appetitu, etenim libertas oritur semper ex indifferentia aliqua cognitionis, ut latius dicemus, cap. 8." The manuscript declares that liberty always rises "ex aliqua indifferentia rationis, ut latius quaestione sequente." Alvarez and Suárez both promise to go into this question at length at a later time, but chapter eight is precisely the section omitted by Alvarez.

[60] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 262r.

[61] Ibid., fol. 262v. "Thomistae communiter explicant quod libertas voluntatis oritur ex indifferentia intellectus."

[62] Ibid., fol. 262v-263r. "Alius modus dicendi est quod voluntatis libertas oritur ex intellectu non ex indifferentia illius, sed ex perfectione et universaliter. . . . Et lex [ex] hac perfectione cognitionis oritur perfectio in appetitione voluntatis."

[63] Ibid., fol. 263r.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265v. This text is one of those where Alvarez

substitutes *nascitur* for *oritur* in the MS. The meaning, however, is identical.

[66] Edition, chap. ix, No. 7, p. 777. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 267r.

[67] Edition, chap. ix, No. 8, p. 777. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 267r.

[68] Edition, chap. v, No. 11, p. 767. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 2, fol. 254v. This reference concludes the study of *orior*. Significant uses of *nascor* have been treated where they occurred as replacements for *orior*. I have been unable to discern any change of meaning between *orior* as used by Suárez in the MS and *nascor* as occasionally substituted by Alvarez.

[69] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265v. See note 52 above.

[70] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 260v.

[71] *Ibid.*, fol. 261r.

[72] For a very helpful and enlightening history of the use of this term, *liberum arbitrium*, and the development of its meaning see Dom Odin Lottin, *La théorie du libre arbitre depuis S. Anselme jusqu'a S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont-César, 1929). This is an excerpt from the *Revue Thomiste*, 1927-1929.

[73] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 261r-261v.

[74] *Ibid.*, fol. 261v-262r.

[75] *Ibid.*, fol. 262r. The expression seems to have achieved its widespread acceptance from Peter Lombard, who makes use of it in the *Sentences*, Book II. See Petri Lombardi, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, lib. II, dist. 24, cap. 3, Quaracchi edition (1916), p. 421. Quoted in Lottin, p. 15. See note 72 above.

[76] *Ibid.* See also the discussion above on the meaning of "root" in this passage, pp. 81-82, and notes 50-52.

[77] *Ibid.*, fol. 262r.

[78] *Ibid.* See pp. 87-88 above, for discussion of the verb *orior* in this text: "Quod voluntatis libertas ex ratione oriatur patet 1° quia appetitus ex cognitione oritur, ut supra est ostensum. Ergo modus appetitus et voluntatis illius oriuntur etiam ex modo et proprietatibus cognitionis."

[79] See p. 75 and note 42 above.

[80] Suárez, professedly following St. Thomas, states in the beginning of this same question that intellect and will are both powers of the soul, really distinct from each other and from the essence of the soul. This position is assumed throughout De Anima V. Ibid., fol. 260v.

[81] Ibid., fol. 262v.

[82] Ibid., fol. 262v-263r.

[83] Ibid., fol. 263r.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Edition, chap. vii, "Of the Object and Acts of the Will," pp. 771-73. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 258v-260r.

[86] Edition, chap. vii, No. 3, p. 772. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 259r.

[87] Edition, chap. vii, No. 4, p. 772. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 259r.

[88] Edition, chap. vii, No. 4, p. 772. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 259r-259v.

[89] Edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 259v.

[90] Edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r.

[91] Edition, chap. vii, No. 7, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r.

[92] Edition, chap. iii, pp. 757-761. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 246r-249r.

[93] Edition, chap. iii, No. 6, p. 759. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 247v: "Apprehensio est conditio obiecti tantum requisita ad applicationem obiecti ad potentiam, non ergo efficit actum ipsius potentiae." This is the one significant use of conditio in De Anima V. It seems to mean here simply a formal requisite without efficiency.

[94] Edition, chap. iii, No. 8, p. 760. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 248r: "Apprehensio obiecti tantum concurrit ad amorem ut causa per accidens loquendo physice etiam nihilominus est necessaria."

[95] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, pp. 774-75. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265r-265v.

[96] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 774. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265r.

[97] See, for example, Thomas E. Davitt, S.J., The Nature of Law (St. Louis: Herder, 1951), esp. pp. 146-47. Father Davitt calls Suárez a complete voluntarist in his theory of law. Also Armand Maurer, C.S.B., Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 367-71, and notes 60-74, pp. 426ff.

[98] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265v.

[99] Ibid. At the same time Alvarez substitutes "volitive" for the manuscript's "appetitive." This change does not really alter the meaning, however, as Suárez frequently uses the term "appetitive" to apply to the will as rational appetite.

[100] For example, a lengthy paragraph on pain (Edition, chap. v, No. 6, p. 765), which presents the opinions of some other philosophers, is entirely the work of Alvarez. It includes original criticism not present in the remainder of Suárez' doctrine on this subject. Just a few paragraphs earlier, an example occurs of Alvarez' more belligerent and dogmatic tone, for where Suárez, treating the appetitive act of delight, states that Scotus "erred" on this point, Alvarez boldly declares "hallucinatum fuisse Scotum." Edition, chap. v, No. 4, p. 765. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 2, fol. 252v.

[101] Edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r.

[102] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r: "Ubi enim tantum definimus quo ad elliciendum actum voluntatis non concurrit intellectus nec vero ellicitive."

[103] Edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773: "Ubi tantum definimus ad actum voluntatis, neque intellectum, neque objectum elicitive concurrere."

[104] Edition, chap. iii, pp. 757-60. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 246r-248v.

[105] MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 247v.

[106] Edition, chap. iii, No. 6, p. 759.

[107] MS 583, disp. x, q. 2, fol. 245r: "Voluntatem non posse respuere aliquod bonum nisi quia in illo invenit aliquam rationem mali."

[108] Edition, chap. ii, No. 6, p. 757: "Voluntatem non posse respicere [could this be a scribal error for respuere?] positive bonum aliquod, nisi in quantum in illo excogitatur aliqua mali ratio."

[109] MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 266r.

[110] Edition, chap. ix, No. 2, p. 775.

[111] Sergio Rábade Romeo, "La metafísica suareciana y la acusación de esencialismo," Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez (Universidad de Granada), III (1963), 82. This article is scholarly in tone and very sanely presented. See the notes to chapter one above, note 72.

[112] See chapter one above, notes 71-77.

[113] Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones Metafísicas, Vol. I, prologue, pp. 203-04. (See chapter one above, note 9, for full bibliographical data.) Hereafter in the notes this edition will be referred to as DM, followed by the number of the disputation referred to, e.g., "DM XIX" for the nineteenth disputation. The numbers of the sections and paragraphs will be cited where necessary, as for example: DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 2, p. 369.

[114] Gómez Arboleya, p. 72. Clare C. Riedl, pp. 6-7. See chapter one above, notes 1 and 7, for complete bibliographical data.

[115] Jesús Iturrioz, Estudios ... , pp. 21-38. See chapter one above, note 18, for complete bibliographical data.

[116] Julian Marías, "Suárez en la perspectiva ... ," pp. 447-48. Solana, p. 465. See chapter one above, note 1, for complete bibliographical data. Gómez Arboleya, pp. 85-86. Rábade Romeo, introduction to DM, I, 8-10, etc.

[117] DM XIX, pp. 309-449.

[118] Ibid., sec. 1, pp. 313-25.

[119] Ibid., sec. 2, pp. 326-43.

[120] Ibid., sec. 3, pp. 344-57. For discussion of this precise point, No. 20, pp. 355-56.

[121] Ibid., sec. 4, pp. 357-68.

[122] Ibid., sec. 5, Nos. 1-8, pp. 368-75.

[123] Ibid., Nos. 9-10, pp. 375-77.

[124] *Ibid.*, Nos. 11-18, pp. 377-82.

[125] *Ibid.*, No. 19, pp. 382-83. Italics mine. Paragraph 20 simply explains this point further.

[126] *Ibid.*, No. 21, p. 384.

[127] *Ibid.*, Nos. 21-22, pp. 383-85.

[128] *Ibid.*, No. 23, p. 385: "Ad potentiam autem rationalem ut sic solum consequitur quod sit libera formaliter aut radicaliter."

[129] *Ibid.*, Nos. 24-25, pp. 386-87.

[130] *Ibid.*, sec. 6, No. 5, p. 390.

[131] *Ibid.*

[132] *Ibid.*, Nos. 5-6, pp. 391-93.

[133] *Ibid.*, No. 7, p. 393.

[134] *Ibid.*, pp. 393-94.

[135] *Ibid.*, No. 8, pp. 394-95.

[136] *Ibid.*, No. 9, p. 395.

[137] *Ibid.*, No. 11, pp. 396-97.

[138] *Ibid.*, No. 12, p. 397.

[139] *Ibid.*, Nos. 13-14, pp. 397-99.

[140] *Ibid.*, No. 14, p. 399.

[141] *Ibid.*, sec. 7, pp. 399-405.

[142] *Ibid.*, sec. 8, Nos. 1-4, pp. 406-08.

[143] *Ibid.*, No. 6, p. 409.

[144] *Ibid.*, Nos. 5-6, pp. 408-09.

[145] *Ibid.*, Nos. 7-8, pp. 409-11.

[146] *Ibid.*, Nos. 9-11, pp. 411-13.

[147] *Ibid.*, Nos. 12-13, pp. 413-14.

[148] *Ibid.*, No. 14, pp. 414-15.

[149] Ibid., Nos. 15-16, pp. 415-16.

[150] Ibid., Nos. 17-20, pp. 416-19.

[151] Ibid., No. 21, p. 419.

[152] Ibid., sec. 9, Nos. 1-3, pp. 420-21.

[153] Ibid., Nos. 4-6, pp. 421-23.

[154] Ibid., No. 7, pp. 423-24.

[155] Ibid., sec. 10, No. 1, p. 425.

[156] Ibid., No. 2, pp. 425-26.

[157] Ibid., No. 3, pp. 426-27.

[158] Ibid., No. 4, p. 427.

[159] Ibid., Nos. 5-6, pp. 427-28.

[160] Ibid., Nos. 12-13, pp. 431-33.

[161] Ibid., sec. 11, pp. 433-42.

[162] Ibid., sec. 12, No. 1, p. 442.

[163] Ibid., Nos. 2-3, pp. 442-44.

[164] Ibid., No. 5, pp. 445-46.

[165] Ibid., Nos. 6-8, pp. 446-47.

[166] Ibid., sec. 1, No. 13, p. 324.

[167] Ibid. See above, pp. 75-83, for the use of radix in De Anima V.

[168] "Result" would seem to be a more natural word here than "fruit," but perhaps "result" carries too heavy a causal implication at this point.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid., sec. 4, No. 4, p. 359.

[171] Ibid. Italics mine.

[172] Ibid., No. 7, p. 361.

[173] Ibid.

[174] Ibid., sec. 5, No. 11, p. 377. I would argue with the translators here, who translate "esse" in the Latin title of this paragraph by "radica," "is rooted in," "resides in." This is a permissible use of the Spanish radicar, but here it lacks clarity. "Libertatem formalem non esse in intellectu, sed in sola voluntate" becomes "La libertad formal no radica en el entendimiento, sino en la voluntad sola." Why not retain the verb to be in translation? The change seems unwarranted and ambiguous, given the cautious usage of radix and its variant forms by Suárez. It is true that formal liberty does not reside in the intellect; it is not in that power. It is equally true, I believe, that for Suárez formal liberty is firmly rooted in the intellect.

[175] Ibid., pp. 377-78.

[176] Ibid., No. 21, p. 383.

[177] Ibid., p. 384.

[178] Ibid. Italics mine.

[179] Ibid., No. 22, p. 385.

[180] Ibid., No. 23, p. 385.

[181] Ibid., sec. 6, No. 4, p. 390; sec. 7, title, p. 399.

[182] Ibid., sec. 10, No. 13, pp. 432-33.

[183] Ibid., p. 432. "In quo agente libero sit radix libertatis." "[I]n qua nimirum causa posita sit radix contingentiae, an scilicet in libertate primae causae, vel in libertate secundae, vel utriusque simul."

[184] Ibid., p. 433.

[185] Ibid., sec. 11, No. 12, p. 441.

[186] Ibid., sec. 1, No. 13, p. 324. See above, pp. 154-55.

[187] Ibid., sec. 2, No. 1, p. 326.

[188] Ibid., No. 14, p. 335.

[189] Ibid., No. 20, p. 341.

[190] Ibid.

[191] Ibid., No. 17, pp. 338-39.

[192] See, for example, ibid., sec. 3, No. 5, p. 346; sec. 4, No. 3, p. 359; sec. 5, No. 21, p. 385; sec. 6, No. 6, p. 393, etc.

[193] Ibid., sec. 2, No. 12, p. 334. Cf. also ibid., No. 16, p. 338; sec. 3, No. 18, p. 355; sec. 5, No. 7, p. 373; sec. 6, No. 1, p. 388; ibid., No. 10, p. 395; sec. 9, No. 2, p. 420; sec. 11, No. 8, p. 436; ibid., No. 9, p. 438; ibid., No. 11, p. 439.

[194] Ibid., sec. 2, No. 12, p. 333.

[195] Ibid., sec. 5, especially Nos. 4-11, pp. 371-78. The main doctrinal points were explained in the summary of this position given earlier in this dissertation, pp. 128-35. The section in the MS De Anima which treats of liberum arbitrium was discussed above, pp. 94-101 of the dissertation.

[196] Ibid., sec. 5, No. 4, p. 371.

[197] "Quae pars est valde notanda ad recte explicandum et tuendam arbitrii libertatem." Ibid., sec. 2, No. 18, p. 339.

[198] Ibid., sec. 5, No. 4, p. 371.

[199] "Impropriissime autem ac falso dicetur illud iudicium esse ipsum liberum arbitrium eo quod in suo genere possit esse fundamentum et origo liberi usus, quia solum est conditio requisita et applicatio obiecti ut potentia libera possit sua facultate uti." Ibid., sec. 5, No. 5, p. 372.

[200] Ibid., No. 8, pp. 374-75.

[201] Ibid., Nos. 9-10, pp. 375-77.

[202] Ibid., No. 11, p. 378.

[203] "Si autem de motione effectiva seu applicativa ad opus, sec voluntas est quae movet et se et alias potentias; non enim applicamur ad operandum libere nisi quia volumus . . . . [N]on nisi appetando et volendo inclinamur et applicamur ad operandum." Ibid., No. 9, p. 376.

[204] Ibid., No. 10.

[205] Ibid., p. 377.

[206] Ibid., No. 24, p. 386.

[207] Ibid., sec. 8, No. 20, p. 419.

[208] *Ibid.*, No. 7, p. 410.

[209] *Ibid.*, No. 6, pp. 408-09. The other important text in which *liberum arbitrium* occurs, sec. 5, No. 21, pp. 383-84, has already been studied thoroughly in connection with *radix* (Notes 176-78; dissertation pp. 158-60). One other mention of *liberum arbitrium* is found in section eleven, paragraph eleven, p. 440, where the point is made in the discussion on fate that *liberum arbitrium* can be immediately influenced by God alone and by no other cause, except in some remote or accidental way. No real development of meaning is evident here.

[210] *Ibid.*, sec. 3, pp. 344-57. Dissertation pp. 125-26. The most pertinent part of section three is paragraph twenty, pp. 355-56.

[211] Anton C. Pegis, "Molina and Human Liberty," in *Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance*, ed. Gerard Smith, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1939), pp. 110-11.

[212] DM XIX, sec. 3, No. 20, p. 355.

[213] "Unum est, iuxta probabilem sententiam, quod cognitio seu obiectum cognitum concurrit effective ad actum voluntatis; nam ille concursus, ut est a cognitione, naturalis est et sine libertate, et nihilominus actus est simpliciter liber propter indifferentiam voluntatis." *Ibid.*, pp. 355-56.

[214] "Unde licet cognitio, quantum est ex se, ex necessitate naturae influat, tamen, quia eius influxus actualis in re non ponitur sine actuali influxu voluntatis, ideo absolute non est necessarius." *Ibid.*, p. 356. The same point is stressed in sec. 5, No. 5, p. 372.

[215] *Ibid.*, sec. 8, No. 9, p. 411.

[216] *Ibid.*, No. 10. For another example, picked quite at random, see Suárez' respectful treatment of St. Thomas in sec. 8, No. 18, pp. 416-17.

[217] Dissertation page 176. Cf. n. 213 above.

[218] Francisco Suárez, *Tractatus de Gratia Dei seu de Deo Salvatore, Justificatore, et liberi arbitrii adjutore per gratiam suam, Opera Omnia*, t. VII (Paris: Luis Vives, 1857), *Prologomenum primum*, pp. 1-44. The exact title of this prolegomenon is "De Requisitis ad formalem libertatem et usum liberum."

[219] See, for an example of this, the long explication of the various ways of describing *liberum arbitrium* in

chap. iii, No. 5, p. 11, concluding with the now famous words: *positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum*.

[220] "Objectum autem illius judicii, licet secundum se ~~sit~~ indifferens, non tamen esse potest forma a qua ipsum velle humanum denominetur liberum, quia formalis libertas non est proprietas objecti, sed est intrinseca proprietas hominis operantis voluntati inhaerens; ergo, praeter indifferentiam objecti, quae supponitur ut fundamentum libertatis, requiritur intrinseca indifferentia ipsius potestatis. . . ." *Ibid.*, chap. iv. No. 15, p. 22.

[221] Carreras y Artau, "Notas sobre el texto . . . ," p. 304. See nn. 10-12, above.

[222] Francisco Suárez, *De Voluntario et involuntario in genere, deque actibus voluntariis in speciali, Opera Omnia*, t. IV (Paris: Luis Vives, 1856), pp. 157-274.

[223] See above, chap. i, n. 83.

[224] *De Voluntario*, disp. I, sec. 3, No. 1, p. 168.

[225] *Ibid.*, disp. VI, sec. 5, No. 2, p. 246, and other similar passages, such as disp. VIII, sec. 4, No. 2, p. 262.

[226] "Tota efficacia movendi est a voluntate." *Ibid.*, disp. IX, sec. 3, No. 7, p. 269.

[227] *Ibid.*, disp. VI, sec. 6, Nos. 5 and 6, p. 249.

[228] "[D]ico libertatem oriri ex ratione, non solum quia potest judicare hoc esse melius illo, sed maxime quia potest perpendere uniuscujusque boni pondus: propterea potest voluntas illo perfecto modo amare, id est, eo gradu, et modo, quo ipsum est amabile: et exemplum hujus evidens est in libertate divinae voluntatis: quod confirmat omnia quae diximus: quoniam ex duobus aequalibus eligit quod vult non alia ratione, nisi quia vult, et saepe eligit, quod minus utile est: nostra autem libertas est participatio illius et eamdem radicem habet servata proportione. Ad confirmationem illius sententiae nego, voluntatem ita determinari ab intellectu, ut ipsa non se etiam determinet, imo ab intellectu determinatur, quasi quoad sufficientiam: ipsa vero se determinat quoad efficaciam: neque oportet aliam rationem hujus determinationis reddere, praeter libertatem, et quia vult supposita sufficienti ratione ex parte objecti." *Ibid.*, disp. VIII, sec. 4, No. 11, p. 264.

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF CAUSALITY IN THE EARLY TREATISES OF SUAREZ

The beginning of a deeper investigation of the underlying meaning of causality to Suárez in his earlier writings stirs up an almost irresistible temptation to look ahead at his later works for illumination on the problem. Much of what has been uncovered in the fifth book of the _De Anima_ and the nineteenth disputation of the _Metaphysical Disputations_ serves more as a tantalizing question than as any kind of solution. Yet it seems to me that such a temptation to look ahead must be resisted. Suárez himself saw to the editing of the _Metaphysical Disputations_; the book in its entirety was made available in 1597. But surely all fifty-four disputations were not written in one year. Suárez himself admits that he had been working on his metaphysics since his earliest years as a teacher. How much revision of the earlier sections did he actually engage in? Was his doctrine on causality entirely clear in his own mind when he began the work, or did it clarify itself as he went along? As he wrote the nineteenth disputation, for example, did he then have in mind the doctrine he would later present concerning final causality? After completing the twenty-third disputation, did he go back to the nineteenth and make his distinctions there more precise? At present his procedure of editing is unknown to us, although ambiguities with regard to final causality certainly still appear in the text of the nineteenth disputation. After pondering these questions, I have decided to analyze the position of Suárez in the nineteenth disputation as if it stood alone at least with respect to what actually comes after it in the completed work. I will try to limit myself as much as possible to the view of causality as stated or implied in the nineteenth disputation itself--as well as in the fifth book *De Anima*--so that the position of Suárez up to and including this point of his development may be manifest. Should it become necessary at times to mention some clarification occurring elsewhere in his work, the interpolation or reference will be kept carefully distinct and precisely identified.

It is evident by now that the point Suárez keeps insisting on whenever he mentions or explains a free cause is the supreme activity that characterizes it. The more actively indifferent a causal principle is, the more free it is. Any introduction of true efficacious causality from outside immediately inserts a note of passivity and therefore of determination. Whatever simply receives action from another has no control, no active influence, over its becoming. Thus we have seen that Suárez, in his early treatise *De Anima*, was careful to exclude any extrinsic efficiency at all acting upon the human will in the act of choice. He has modified this position in the Metaphysics, however, to hold that as long as any one of the causes concurring to produce an effect is intrinsically free, the effect will truly be a contingent one. With regard to liberum arbitrium, then, causal influences upon it may help to produce a certain effect, but so long as these influences do not hinder the absolutely inviolate active dominion of the will, enabling it to retain its ability to act or to refrain from acting at any moment, the resultant act may be genuinely free. Any degree of passivity which would impair or remove this dominion of liberum arbitrium over its own acts would effectively destroy freedom in the will. Determinism would inevitably result, at least insofar as man's human actions are concerned.

This emphasis upon active indifference which has grounded Suárez' position from the beginning is the key, I believe, to his insistence that while no efficient causality can ever be allowed to act directly on the will (at least to the extent of impairing its dominion), yet the efficiency of the will does not take away contingency in the free acts resulting from it. Whenever an efficient cause acts, the result must take place, for the cause causing is identical with the effect being effected. Thus, for example, when I move the pencil on the page, words are formed. Moving the pencil is the words being written. There is no freedom in this fact. Efficiency has a result, or it is not efficiency. Rather, the question of freedom occurs in the cause of moving the pencil, the source of the activity. If the pencil has no choice in the matter, but is writing words simply because it is being moved by another agent, it is not free. The efficiency being exerted upon it would have the same effect as its moving has upon the words being formed. But if the pencil is the source of its own movement, if it has the option of moving or not, of choosing to write or refraining from it, if it has dominion over its own writing and can stop it at any moment, then it is free. Its beginning to write is within its own power (even though influenced, perhaps, by outside factors and goals); its writing is truly free. The crux of the problem, then, is the source of the movement, not the hypothetical necessity which always follows upon any actual agency. A free agent must be proved to be in no way passive with respect to the action performed. Passivity and true freedom in an agent as agent are incompatible.

With this emphasis in mind, we can now search more deeply into certain Suarezian texts to discover the foundation of efficiency and actuality as they appear in the acts of liberum arbitrium. Many texts could provide a jumping-off place, but perhaps the following selection from the nineteenth disputation, section six, paragraph seven, points up many of the avenues which need exploration. The choice of vocabulary is especially rich:

> . . . I judge that for the free determination of the will such a practical judgment that would determine it totally is not necessary. . . . [T]his can be explained a priori and from reality itself, since the judgment of the understanding does not move the will except by means of the object it proposes. The proposed object, however, does not always impose necessity on the will or determine it

> to only one thing, nor is this needful to allow the will to tend toward the object. Neither is such a determination necessary, then, on the part of the judgment, nor is it even possible. The major [premise] is proved because either the judgment moves only by way of the object, or the judgment itself, on its own account, has a peculiar efficacy for determining the will. This last cannot be affirmed, seeing that such efficacy would be contradictory to the freedom of the will, as has been said, and also because such a type of movement is foreign to the function of the understanding,--a function which consists in illuminating, directing, and regulating the operations of the will. Finally, such an efficacious way of moving is proper to the will, which is given to us especially for this end, namely, to move efficiently the other powers with respect to their exercise. It cannot happen, then, that the intellect, which is moved efficiently by the will, could on its part move the will in the same manner.[1]

Suárez speaks of determination in the will, but it must be, obviously, a free determination, one which is not totally extrinsic or outside of the will's dominion. Conjointly with this text, another which will help to clarify the meaning of determination to Suárez, especially as occurring in the will, should be considered. Here Suárez points out that a formally voluntary act is always realized by the appetite, never by the intellect:

> The act elicited by the will takes place in the manner of an intrinsic and spontaneous tendency and inclination toward the object, and thus that tendency itself is also spontaneous. This type of tendency is proper to an appetitive power, and therefore it is also proper to it that its act be intrinsically voluntary through itself. Consequently, since the intellect is not an appetitive power, it is clear that its act is not intrinsically voluntary in itself.[2]
>
> The first part--that a power alone can be free with respect to exercise when its act is intrinsically voluntary--is explained as follows: the exercise of the act, or (what is the same) the determination of the power to operate, must be either natural out of the sole impulse of nature, or voluntary out of the elicited inclination of the one who operates. It is not possible to understand

> any other reason on account of which some cause might pass into some operation except (1) because it has such a nature determined by itself to that operation, or (2) because it wishes and desires such an operation. But the power free with respect to exercise is not determined to operation by natural impulse alone; thus it has to be determined voluntarily. Therefore [one of two alternatives follows: it may be determined] extrinsically by the voluntary action elicited by another power, and then it will not be a free power formally, but only imperatively, since it does not move itself with respect to exercise, but is moved and determined through another. [The other alternative] is that [the power is determined] by the intrinsically voluntary, and in this case it is necessary that the power in question be appetitive. Therefore, that any power may be formally free with respect to exercise, i.e., capable of determining itself by itself to exercise a free act, it is necessary that it be a potency operating in an intrinsically voluntary way through its own act.[3]

I have cited these rather lengthy quotations in full so that the complete context of Suárez' thought here might not be slighted. The passage that seems to me most significant in tying the three selections together is the parenthetical statement of Suárez that the exercise of the act of a power is the same thing as the determination of the power to operate. "Exercitium actus, seu (quod idem est) determinatio potentiae ad operandum. . . ." What exactly does determination mean in this context? Is Suárez thinking of it simply in the formal, rather static, meaning of making something definite, of giving it a quality, a firming, it previously lacked? Or does determinatio here have a literal meaning of initiating a dynamic process, pushing the power, as it were, off base (de termino) and into action? His very emphatic insistence on the nature of the will as tendency or inclination seems to indicate the more dynamic interpretation. Let us look more closely.

The first text quoted above, pages 206-07, reveals the following doctrinal points of emphasis: (1) the will must determine itself freely; (2) any extrinsic or external determination on the part of the judgment or the object that would impose necessity on the will is neither necessary nor possible; (3) judgment moves the will only by way of the object; (4) function of intellect and its judgment is to illuminate, direct, guide, regulate the movement of the will; (5) function of will is to move the other powers--including the intellect--efficiently to the exercise of their operations. The other two texts serve to illuminate more precisely the meaning and equivalence of the intrinsically voluntary, of self-determination in the will, and finally of its tendency and inclination to operate. The examination of these doctrinal points will, it seems to me, reveal the basic understanding that Suárez had at this time of the various causalities operative in the act of human choice.

The first point made was that the will must determine itself freely. This characteristic of active self-dominion has been stressed repeatedly by Suárez all through the _De Anima_ and the _Metaphysical Disputations_, and with reason. He is concerned, above all, with maintaining the absolute truth of the fact of man's freedom, and he sees any determination from an outside efficient cause which would introduce passivity into the will as completely destructive of this most basic liberty of man. His insistence on this point has developed considerably from the earliest parts of his work (here, the De Anima and the De Voluntario), as we have shown, but it will be treated in detail in the later section on efficiency.

The main outlines of what happens when a man makes a choice are certainly clear by now, as are the chief questions brought up by the Suarezian positions. What does the continual insistence of Suárez that the will is not necessitated from outside reveal about his view of causality? At stake here is not only efficient causality, though clearly this is most at issue, but also--by indirection--the respective roles played by formal and final causality.

Suárez seems to have two aspects of this doctrine in mind whenever he reiterates this position on the will. In the De Anima he was concerned with showing that all efficiency lay in the will; no efficiency at all was to be found in any of the other powers, though later on this position becomes rather cautiously modified as his understanding of efficiency deepens. The second issue at stake seems to be that the will need not always follow the "better good," as some of the Thomists and other philosophers seemed to be saying. For Suárez, to maintain this would be simply another way of determining the will and taking away its freedom. The will must be completely free to accept or reject the offered choice, to choose among the various objects, or not to choose at all. Active, indifferent dominion must be maintained.

One of the problems connected with this issue is the unalterable foundation in the intellect of the active power of the will itself. That man have a rational appetite is entirely natural. His way of response to what is known universally and intellectually must be just as perfect, just as universal as his awareness. Suàrez even advances this necessity as an *a priori* proof for the existence of the will. How, then, can he account for the fact that the will is free, even though (or perhaps because) it rises with a natural necessity out of the intellect? The point at stake is quite other than the hypothetical necessity of a passive receiver of action. By his careful development of the word *radix* to describe the intellect as source and ground of the will, Suárez has established firmly the type of connection that holds between the understanding and its resultant appetite. A root is a principle, a starting point that determines, unites, and makes definite in a formal way the perfection arising from it. The very fact that the intellect can know all being in a universal way is the formal root of the ability of the will to love the universal good. The causality remains exclusively in the formal order--a necessitating order, to be sure, but precisely because of this necessity the objective indifference of the intellect gives rise to the active indifference of the will, which is made to love the universal good but *need* not love anything less than that. The will receives no direct efficiency from the intellect--*that* would indeed necessitate it by making it passive. The causality from the intellect which is the *source* of the will is strictly formal. It does necessitate, but only in the formal order, where the will's necessary similarity to the quasi-infinity of the intellect results in a free and active indifference in its choice of the good. Notice that the point under discussion here is the very ground of the power of willing, or liberum arbitrium. The intellect itself is the formal foundation. The precise role of the practical judgment in the act of free choice must later be investigated more fully to discover precisely how its causality operates, and in what order--formal or final. Most evident at this point is Suárez' refusal to allow this judgment any efficiency on the will whereby the will would be forced to choose one good rather than another. Even face to face with the Beatific Vision, the necessity with which the will would love this supreme good would be the result, not primarily of the judgment as such, but of the absolute perfection of the object. The will is perfectly free to reject any good which is perceived as limited or qualified in any way. It can love anything in which it sees some amount of good, but it need not love it. A proposed good need not be the worse of two possibilities in order to be rejected; it simply need not be perfect. Suárez is extremely careful to explain this point deliberately and repeatedly. He seems fearful of being caught in the trap of claiming that the "better good" determines the choice of the liberum arbitrium, for he felt this position could ultimately lead to extrinsic determination of the will. This he will never permit. The "better good" view he attributed to the "Thomists"--chiefly unnamed--in the *De Anima*, but in the *Metaphysics* he apparently excludes St. Thomas himself from this particular grouping. At this later stage of his thought Suárez is less dogmatic about the choice of the better good, for he states that he considers it most probable, but not completely certain, that the will is never forced to choose the better means, at least --as he qualifies it--because of the judgment. Occasions do exist when, due to a prior will act, one is forced to choose a particular means if one wishes truly to attain the intended end. To cross the street, for example, some method of locomotion must be used. There is no other means. This development in Suárez' position shows, I believe, a greater insight into the true experienced reality of man's choices, and a more balanced openness towards the insights of other philosophers. One would expect this growth in a truly serious thinker.

By now the meaning and ground of the second doctrinal statement implied in the text quoted above, page 206, should be evident: "Any extrinsic or external determination of the part of the judgment or the object that would impose necessity on the will is neither necessary nor possible." In the *De Anima* Suárez insisted firmly that the causality of the apprehension of the object, presented through the judgment, was only a *per accidens* causality, though certainly a necessary condition for any act of the will. At that point he apparently felt that any *per se* causality would inevitably merge into efficiency and thereby deprive the will of active indifference and freedom.[4] In the *Metaphysics*, however, although Suárez does not explicitly use the term "apprehension," he is no longer afraid to speak of a *per se* causality and order between the very acts of the intellect and of the will, not merely between the powers. The causality involved is *per se*, he explains, i.e., essential, and rooted in the powers of the one soul, but it remains in the moral order, not the physical, and therefore does not take away liberty. Indeed, the foundation of the whole moral order is liberty,[5] for without liberty, morality would be meaningless and even non-existent.

The practical judgment of the intellect, then, is a *root*, a necessary condition *without* which the will could not operate, but *with* which it need not. Recall that each time Suárez has defined the free cause in the nineteenth disputation he has added to the statement that such a cause is able to act or to refrain from acting the significant qualification: "even when all the requisite conditions for acting are given." One of these prerequisites is the practical judgment of the intellect.

What is the precise role of this judgment? How does it exercise its function without necessitating the will? What type of influence does it actually have? These questions bring us naturally to the third doctrinal point of the text under discussion--that the judgment moves the will only by way of the object. It is abundantly clear that Suárez is here removing any direct agency or movement affecting the will by the judgment which might be interpreted as transitive causality. Rather, the judgment is repeatedly termed "objectively indifferent," that is, possessing its peculiar type of indifference only in a derived sense from the object. The intellect must present the object formally as it is to the will. This relation of intellect to object is obviously not free; it is determined, firm, definite. Otherwise objective truth would be an impossibility. Since the object, however, must be presented as it is, the amount of goodness which it displays will always be--at least in this life--limited and qualified. Such a limited object, which is all that we can humanly experience, must be an object of indifference to the will. It cannot command our love. In this sense--objectively--the judgment is termed indifferent. But it clearly exerts no efficiency on the will; its only function is to present this object as it is, so that then the will may freely choose it or reject it.

Suárez often uses the phrases "application of the object," or "apprehension of the object" to describe the function of the practical judgment. He means these words quite precisely, I feel, to explain the exact role played by the judgment. "Application" comes from the Latin term meaning to bring together or to join, while "apprehension" means to lay hold of something. The intellect, by means of the practical judgment, presents to the will some particular object "laid hold of" as good or desirable; the judgment, regarded as the foundation of choice, is the moment or the place of joining object and will. The two must be brought together for any act of choice to occur--the formal presentation of the object takes place in the intellect; the efficient choice or adherence in the will. The "movement" exerted by the judgment, therefore, is real, but only mediate. The focus of emphasis of necessity now shifts to the object, which seems to exemplify a different aspect of causality. How does Suárez describe this kind of influence where the goodness of the object calls out to the will for an affective response?

Suárez uses three intriguing terms to describe the type of motion exerted by the end. He calls it "final," which really says nothing more than the type of motion characteristic of an end, but he more often uses one or both of two other terms in explanation--"metaphorical" and "moral." He explicitly excludes any type of efficiency from the end as such, going so far in the De Anima, for example, as to say that all moving causes ought to be reduced to the efficient cause rather than to the appetible object.[6] Whatever the end does, it certainly does not cause in the way an agent does.

Two texts in which Suárez uses these terms will be of great aid in clarifying his meaning for us. The first is taken from the eighteenth disputation, section seven, which deals in general with the question of whether the efficient cause must always be really distinct from the subject which receives its action. This particular text forms part of paragraph forty-nine, which comes under an affirmation concerning immanent actions, inquiring specifically whether the knowledge of the object concurs effectively, i.e., efficiently, in the act of willing.[7] The pertinent section follows:

> I do not accept this opinion, for I hold that the knowledge of the object concurs to the act of appetition only as a necessary condition by way of application of the object, seeing that the will is moved only by the goodness of the object. Consequently, if that motion, insofar as it comes from the object, is not effective--as in fact it is not, but rather final and metaphorical--then insofar as it proceeds from knowledge it has no reason for being effective, seeing that, once the good object has been presented, the appetite has no need of an extrinsic agent in order to be drawn to it, but it can be drawn to it in virtue of [its own] natural inclination, or rather it is the soul, insofar as it is living, which is drawn out through it.[8]

Then in the nineteenth disputation, section eight, paragraph ten, Suárez writes further:

> Just as the will has no act without the concurrence of the object in its own genus, so neither does it suffer any necessity in its act (I refer to an intrinsic and connatural necessity) which is not caused by the object in its order, that is, in its aspect of final cause which invites and moves [the will] metaphorically.[9]

As early as the De Anima, as we have already seen, Suárez was using the terms "moral" and "metaphorical" to describe causality which does something, but not efficiently, i.e., without necessity in the subject which receives the influence.[10] As Suárez uses the term, metaphorical motion certainly does not mean merely figurative or imagined. A metaphor points instead to a real similarity between two things that are different in other respects. When he calls the influence of the end "metaphorical," I believe he implies that the influence of the end is a real cause that brings about a change in the one who apprehends it as good--here is its "similarity" with a moving cause or agent. This motion, however, is not efficient, not necessitating, but only inviting, so it cannot truly be called effective or efficient. The end really influences being so it is similar to a moving cause--but not in a necessary fashion--so it is only metaphorical motion.

Moral is another word which Suárez uses generally in contrast to what is simply physical. He seems to use it with quite a literal meaning. Any physical motion must be received in a necessary, determined way, as was pointed out in the beginning of this chapter. When the pencil moves, words are formed on the paper. Result: passivity and lack of freedom. Moral causality is of an entirely different type, for it persuades rather than coerces. Suárez uses this term to describe both the causality of the end attracting the will, and also of the will in its exercise of influence over man's other powers.[11] Moral motion, simply in contrast to physical motion, seems to be effective only accidentally, but this is not really so in the moral order, for the influence of one power on another results from their essential foundation in the same substantial being. United with each other by their very constitution in being, they may exert a true moral causality on one another which transcends the merely accidental.[12]

What did Suárez really think of finality? His detailed treatment of the final cause does not occur until the twenty-third disputation, so it is not actually within the scope of this study, but his statements up to this point--the nineteenth disputation--have not been particularly illuminating. Only a few other places in De Anima V or in the nineteenth disputation does he mention finality as such. One of these occurs in chapter three of the early manuscript De Anima, in a curious reference that Alvarez changed, in editing, to read "formal" instead of "final." Suárez wrote in the manuscript that if the appetible object were really to exert efficiency on the will, then it would be impossible to distinguish the concursus of the final cause from that of the efficient cause.[13] If efficiency occurred everyplace, causality would have to be univocal. Where, then, would freedom be? In the Alvarez edition the phrasing is almost identical, except that "formalis" is substituted for "finalis," which is very plainly written in the manuscript. Was this a scribal error, or was Alvarez showing some awareness of the ambiguity this early work showed between formal and final causality? Both these works, the De Anima and the Metaphysics, certainly show that Suárez at least stated the basic doctrine of final causality as it was traditionally held. Often, however, he tends to make one or two statements about what a final cause actually does, and then he glides quickly away into a discussion of efficiency or of the formal role of the intellect and practical judgment. Frequently he does not really explain finality; he merely says things about it and leaves it to the reader to ferret out what he means. Is this because he is leaving the body of the investigation until later? Or does he not quite know, at this early point, what he means by finality? It is impossible to answer this question without a few more definite textual signals. One text, however, which was mentioned earlier, may throw some light on the reason why Suárez invariably goes from a few statements concerning final causality into a forceful and emphatic dispute about efficiency--either the lack of it in any power influencing the will, or its presence in a nearly invincible way in the liberum arbitrium.

This text occurred in the De Anima,[14] where Suárez made the rather surprising statement that Aristotle was mistaken in reducing all causes to the appetible object. Suárez holds, on the contrary, that all causality must be reduced to the efficient cause. The context of this position concerns the role of apprehension in the liberum arbitrium, where its sole function is the application of the object. Suárez had been particularly insistent throughout the De Anima, as was mentioned, that neither the object nor the knowledge of the object contributed anything efficiently to the will act. What are the relative roles, then, played by the object, the judgment, and the will? Isn't Suárez saying, in this text, that nothing really happens without the operation of some efficient cause? The object has a certain amount of goodness, and is waiting, so to speak, to be apprehended and loved. The intellect lays hold of this good thing, and presents it to the will as able to be loved. Here are the main human requisites for the act of liberum arbitrium--a good formally presented by the practical judgment to the will. But nothing really is chosen, nothing actually is loved, unless the will --that eminently active efficient power in man--chooses to act, decides to love that good. The good must be *known as good*, presented formally in this way to the will. Thus it seems that the goodness of the object appears to Suárez as a basic attribute of the thing, the ground of its being desirable at all, but once there, once recognized as such, nothing more remains to be said about it. The process must move on immediately to the formal act of knowledge and thence (if so willed) to the act of choice. This analysis can only be conjecture, of course, but it seems based on a consistent tendency of Suárez, at least so far as the texts from *De Anima V* and Disputation XIX are concerned.

A final text which in my opinion bears out this explanation is an intriguing one in the eighth section of DM XIX, where Suárez quotes St. Thomas on the influence of a moving cause on the thing moved. Someone had objected that if the object actually does move the will in this fashion, the will must certainly be necessitated; it cannot respond freely. Suárez cites the *Summa Theologiae*, Part I, question 82, article 2, the second objection with its solution. The italics are his:

> [T]he argument was that the object is compared to the will as the mover to that which is moved; but movement follows necessarily in the moved from the mover. And [St. Thomas] responds *that the mover causes movement necessarily in the moved when the power of the mover exceeds that of the moved, in such a way that all of the latter's*

> possibility is subject to the mover. Now, as the capability of the will is referred to the universal and perfect good, its entire capability does not subordinate itself to any particular good. Therefore it is not moved necessarily by such a good.[15]

With this quotation, of which Suárez obviously approves, his dual problem of allowing some real influence on the will from outside causes--even some degree of efficiency--and at the same time retaining the solid basis of freedom in the objectively indifferent judgment is fundamentally solved. So long as the will retains its dominion, i.e., so long as its range of possibility is not exhausted by the moving influence of the object, its freedom is not destroyed. With this deeper insight into efficiency Suárez may permit a certain amount of efficiency surrounding or acting on the will. A new question raises its head here, however. Is Suárez now holding that the object moves the will efficiently? Has he changed his position that the true efficiency in liberum arbitrium lies in the will? I think not, particularly in view of the many texts where he states that mutual causality by the intellect and the will in liberum arbitrium is both unnecessary and contradictory. Rather, I believe he quotes St. Thomas here to show that even in this Thomistic position of mutual causality (which Suárez always tends to interpret in a mutually efficient sense), the will would still be free, still be its own master. Even if the practical judgment or the object were to exert efficient causality on the will, the will--because of the fact that it need not choose any qualified or limited good--would still retain its freedom and its primal active status. Again, Suárez' chief dictum concerning the will remains essentially untouched.

The fourth doctrinal point of the original text under analysis comes up quite naturally at this stage: "The function of the intellect and its judgment is to illuminate, direct, guide, and regulate the movement of the will." These terms all have an aura of formal causality, it seems to me, and I believe that Suárez' explanations of the causality of intellect and will in _liberum arbitrium_ intensify this view. None of these words implies any efficiency, nor do they refer in any definite way to finality. The attractive influence on the will remains clearly the object, simply presented by means of the intellect's judgment. Final causality, however, is _not_ the role of the judgment.

Before investigating the meaning of formal causality in _liberum arbitrium_ as exemplified in the practical judgment of the intellect, the Suarezian view of the "mutual causality" position must be clearly understood. Suárez always characterizes this position as Thomistic, though he frequently does not distinguish--especially in the early treatises--between St. Thomas himself and the lesser members of his school. At issue here is not the mutual _dependence_ of intellect and will. Suárez believes firmly in this. The point is mutual _causality_ in one and the same act of _liberum arbitrium_. As I have mentioned, whenever Suárez states this position or begins to explain it, he always tends to slip into an argument about efficiency, showing that two powers could not possibly influence each other efficiently and simultaneously. This, of course, is not the position of St. Thomas. Does Suárez interpret it this way because, by itself, the final cause really does not effect anything actual? A few examples of his words on this point will be helpful, as in this passage from the De Anima where he summarizes the Thomistic position:

> The intellect moves the will through the manner of a final cause by applying the object, while the will moves the intellect effectively, namely by applying it to operate.[16]

The statement of the doctrine does no violence to St. Thomas, but Suárez' treatment of it is curious. He makes no further explanation of this passage, though he explicitly refers to St. Thomas as the source of this position. Instead, he immediately goes on to discuss whether the intellect is ever able to command the will efficaciously in the act of imperium. He declares it cannot, in fact, since any efficiency the intellect demonstrates in this act is derived from the prior efficiency of the will, and may be suspended at any time the will so chooses. The discussion is not truly relevant to the passage just quoted from St. Thomas, for the imperium and execution of what has been chosen must plainly follow after the actual decision or choice (liberum arbitrium), where the mutual causality is supposed to hold. What Suárez is really trying to prove here, as careful examination of the passage reveals, is that the intellect cannot influence efficiently. He leaves the point of finality for a later time. Suárez does not in this place dispute the Thomistic position, but rather makes use of it to help him demonstrate his point--that the intellect is able to move the will only finaliter, that is, not efficiently.

Later on, in section four of DM XIX, he uses a slight variation in terminology to say approximately the same thing:

> . . . [S]peaking of objective motion, it is thus that the intellect moves the will; if we refer to effective motion, or that which applies to operation, in this sense it is the will which moves, not only itself, but also the other powers, for we do not apply ourselves to any free operation unless we will to do so.[17]

Suárez does not mention mutual causality here, but he plainly means by "objective motion" the same influence he described above as "moving the will through the manner of a final cause by applying the object." He prefers, always, the terms of "objective causality" or "objective motion" in this context of intellect-will. Perhaps he is afraid that the term "finality" will not be understood properly. Evidently for Suárez the Thomistic position borders closely on that thin dividing line between finality and efficiency which becomes more and more apparent. If this were not so, why would he immediately proceed to an insistent denial of efficiency on the part of the intellect nearly each time he mentions liberum arbitrium as an act involving both intellect and will?

Just a few pages before the original text that we have been commenting on from section six of DM XIX, Suárez openly and emphatically rejects the mutual causality position. Indeed, as he formulates it, the doctrine is certainly open to serious question, for he declares this opinion to hold that the practical judgment is free because of the will which loves the object, and that the will, on its part, loves the object because of that particular judgment. The will, that is, because of its love, determines the intellect to judge practically in this way, while the intellect determines the will to love that particular thing. Philosophers who hold this position, he affirms, insist that they avoid contradiction because the two causalities are in different orders.

> For the will determines the intellect efficiently, while the intellect determines the will finally. But this doctrine is not proved, to my mind, first because it has no foundation in reason, nor is it at all necessary. For another reason, such mutual priority and motion between those two acts can hardly be conceived. Furthermore, I will show that it is impossible.[18]

Suárez immediately proceeds to do so, but one discovers at once that he is speaking about a mutual efficient causality, in which a definite time sequence is necessary. The agent must be prior, in every order of causality, to what it effects. This statement continues:

> [I]n every vital act, the sufficient application of the object necessary for the act precedes that act absolutely and in every order of causality. It cannot happen that the same application of the object may come efficiently from the act to which it is ordained. But the judgment of reason is required for the act of the will with respect to applying the object; therefore it is impossible that the judgment of reason necessary for the act of the will proceed efficiently from that same act.[19]

Apparently Suárez thinks either that these Thomists are equating final and efficient causality, though not openly, or he himself does not distinguish clearly between the two types--after all, he did say earlier that all causality should be reduced to the efficient cause--or, finally, he simply does not understand the possibility of simultaneous causality as the Thomistic doctrine of potency and act is able to explain it. Given the Suarezian view of potency, which has, for him, already a certain amount of act which would in some sense make it temporally prior to the agent, this last alternative is entirely plausible. Implications arise here with respect to the essence-existence controversy which will be investigated later on. The words of the above text referring to "motion between those two acts" seem to reinforce this judgment, for the Suarezian position that this explanation is totally contradictory seems based primarily on the fact that he views the situation as involving two acts which must already be fully actual in order to produce anything at all, much less each other. The conditions or prerequisites required for the will act must evidently be really prior and already actually constituted. Then--and then only it seems--can the will act effectively. What is actuality for Suárez? This is a crucial problem that explains, I believe, why he holds the positions he does with regard to causality. The concluding remarks of this chapter will attempt to evaluate this particular concept in Suarezian thought.

The careful statement of Suárez in the doctrinal text under analysis concerning the precise function of the intellect now bears mentioning again: its role is "to illuminate, direct, guide, and regulate the movement of the will." It does not command, however; "direct" clearly means here to point in the right direction. So it throws light on the object; it points out the best way to go; it reminds, admonishes, and evaluates; it provides the rules for right action. But it does not enforce them. The intellect, in this text at least, is portrayed as completely lacking in efficiency. Its function is obviously a formal one.

How does the intellect fulfill this role? Much has already been stated on this by indirection, since the explanation of one power frequently involves comments on others concurring with it. A few texts stressing this aspect of the intellect and its practical judgment, however, will serve to pinpoint Suárez' emphasis here. In my opinion, his position on the meaning of formal causality has far-reaching effects on his views of actuality, efficiency, and existence itself.

Our earlier analysis of the texts in these two Suarezian treatises showed that Suárez always referred to the intellect as the _root_ of liberty. Freedom is formally in the will, _radicaliter_ in the intellect. _Radix_ was revealed as a basically formal determinant, a necessary ground which gives rise to the being of something, but also conditions, specifies, and limits its possibilities to a certain and quite definite degree.[20]

A short but pregnant text from the chapter omitted in the Alvarez edition of the _De Anima_ is one of the best early expressions of the extent of formal determination from the intellect in _liberum arbitrium_:

> That the freedom of the will does rise out of reason is first of all clear because the appetite rises out of knowledge, as was shown above. Therefore the mode of the appetite and of the will also rise out of the mode and properties of knowledge.[21]

The scope of influence in the formal order is both explicit and definite, so that the very real dependence of the will on reason is abundantly clear. In the De Anima, of course, where Suárez took an extremely strong stand on the fundamental superiority of the intellect over the will, this view of his was primarily based on this precise point.

An important aspect of the formal connection between intellect and will is the fact that Suárez views the intellect as a rule and guide for the will. This position was clear in the De Anima and maintained in the Metaphysics, and although Suárez insists that the judgment never necessitates the will to choose even the best good, still it remains the rule and the norm of perfection in the will's choice. Thus conformity is the gauge of perfection for the will, which possesses moral goodness only to the degree that it conforms itself to right reason.[22] "Conform" means to share the same form with something else, so the will, if it is to acquire perfection in the moral order, must bring itself morally into line with the good as judged by the intellect. It must adhere to the same form, to have perfection in the same order.

The ramifications and extent of formal causality are indeed great, but no matter how influential in the area of specification, the intellect or judgment never adequately causes the act of the will. Suárez distinguishes carefully between a root and a cause, as is evident from a passage in the De Anima where he shows that although joy is certainly a root of laughter, it is not at all a sufficient cause,[23] i.e., it simply lacks the complement of efficiency it would need to bring about the total effect. A root, such as the intellect, undoubtedly accounts for one part of its result, but this part remains entirely in the area of specification. Other causes operating in the realm of efficiency are demanded before complete actuality can be achieved.

A further insight into what Suárez means by "formal" results from reflection on his frequent use of the expression that freedom is formally in the will. What is it to be formally in something? The accepted meaning of "form" is that act which makes something to be of a definite kind. Together with matter, form constitutes the very nature of a physical thing. Thus, when Suárez speaks of a perfection or quality being possessed formally, the implication is that it belongs there by the nature of the thing (if the form which constitutes it in an essential order of being is meant), or at least that it is properly and actually a determination intrinsically possessed by the being in question. Repeatedly he states that liberty is found formally in the will, not in the intellect, or he affirms that the indifference of the judgment is not formally free, but merely objectively, i.e., in virtue of the object it applies to the will. He speaks of the will as a "formally free subject,"[24] which would signify that subject which is constituted precisely to be what it is through its possession of the quality of freedom. Freedom is not extrinsic to the will, not bestowed somehow from outside causes or influences (something totally foreign to the very notion of active indifference), but belongs to it naturally. When any other faculty or act is termed free, it can only be in a derived sense, due to some efficacious or influencing action from liberum arbitrium.

It must be noted, however, that what the will possesses formally is not any one particular, determinate form, but rather the quality of freedom itself. Suárez has a fascinating argument involving this very fact in section two of the nineteenth disputation, where he is proving that a passive potency as such cannot be free. He points out that if a passive potency is able to resist a quality coming to it from an agent, this resistance can never be the result of any truly active indifference, but only the natural outcome of a formal incompatibility. There is no true freedom here, but only an opposition brought about the prior natural determination of the substance. Applying this to the will, Suárez remarks that if the will by its "entity" were ever to resist an attraction of love for some particular object, then it would have to resist it always, for its very substantial constitution would possess this formal determination and repugnance. For the same reason, if the will were ever to adhere to an object in the same formal way, it could never change or desist from this love. Freedom would then be completely without meaning.[25]

This passage, then, reveals a basic distinction between formal and efficient causality. A formal cause is always essentially and intrinsically determined to one perfection rather than another. It cannot be truly free. An efficient cause, on the other hand, may at times act freely, depending on the extent of active indifference intrinsically possessed by it and the lack of impeding obstacles from outside. Again, plainly, the keynote of freedom for Suárez is active and truly indifferent dominion. Neither indifference nor dominion can be the intrinsic properties of a formal perfection, which by its very nature as form is already determined and necessitated.

The nineteenth disputation lays the same stress on formal equivalence between the intellect and the will, or between intelligence and freedom, as did the De Anima, with little alteration but often with increased emphasis.[26] There are two other significant passages, however, that deepen our understanding of the importance and scope of formal causality for Suárez. They occur in sections eight and ten of DM XIX, and the first to be considered explains the criteria for judging the perfection of an act:

> If one asks which is more perfect--to operate freely or to operate necessarily--it must be said that operating freely is not always nor in every case better than operating through necessity. The rule of perfection is that the object be loved according to its dignity and capacity. Therefore, if the object happens to be the supreme and perfectly necessary good, it may be loved with entire necessity, while if it is an object which is less good, or not necessary, the act directed towards it remains under the dominion of the one who loves.[27]

Although this text obviously deals with acts of the will itself, which are certainly not adequately explained by formal causality alone, still the emphasis upon the object serves to bring out the essential norm of perfection. Undoubtedly, unless the efficient cause goes into action there will be no new act at all--perfect or imperfect--yet the measure of that perfection depends more fundamentally on the formal determination of the act as directed toward a more perfect object than on the single fact of its existence. So, while this passage stresses the variety in mode of activity of the will, it nevertheless seems to imply that the will, as efficient cause, has nothing to do except adhere (or not adhere) to the object, which is already totally determined and accounted for by the various formal causes. Exactly what does the will, as efficient cause, do? The very perfection of its act comes not primarily from its actuality or existence, but from the object's essential and formal perfection, as known and applied by the intellect. This role of the intellect is clearly implied by Suárez' expression that the object must be loved and adhered to according to its dignity and capacity. This measuring up to the real object is the gauge of perfection. But how can the will love the object in its true perfection if the intellect does not truly apprehend and present it to the will as an object of love? Therefore, it seems that not only the goodness of the object, but also the accuracy of the intellect in grasping it, set the limits to the way in which the will may love it. Both these norms of perfection come from the formal side of liberum arbitrium, i.e., the intellect and its practical judgment.

In the other text worthy of more thorough analysis, section ten of the nineteenth disputation, Suárez is inquiring about the "free agent" in which the "root of liberty" may be found. Most interesting here is the phraseology, which reveals a marked difference between "root" and "cause" to Suárez. Here he almost equates "cause" with efficient cause, but since he has mentioned "free agent" in the title of this paragraph, he may thus consider it clear that he is describing only the efficient cause as such.

> [Concerning that other difficulty,] in what cause is situated the root of contingency, whether in the freedom of the first cause, or of the second, or of both simultaneously, it must be said . . . that God can only be called the first root of this contingency in the same sense that he is first cause of all the effects of the universe. . . . Speaking of contingency simply, however, its immediate explanation [ratio] is found in the liberty of the proximate cause and in some exercise of it, but its primordial root is the liberty of the first cause.[28]

The carefulness with which Suárez repeats his wording here, of root being situated within the cause, but obviously not being identical with it, signifies once again the distinction which has now become quite clear to him. "Cause" is being used here as a synonym for "agent." Is not "root" being used to point out a particular quality, a determination, in that cause or agent?[29] The existence of the formal quality as such is the ultimate ground for any perfection whatever. Truly, for Suárez, it seems to be formal causality which permits and underlies all the other types.

This insight brings us at last to the final portion of the doctrinal text (above, pages 206-07) that we have been using as a point of reference. What, then, is the precise role of the will, the efficient cause in liberum arbitrium? "The function of the will is to move the other powers efficiently to the exercise of their operations." This statement actually does not tell us very much. Many questions have been raised about efficiency in the process of analyzing the other types of causality. The final process of sifting out the true Suarezian meaning of efficient causality must now be attempted.

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the efficient cause as understood by Suárez has proved to be its active dynamism. The will, in particular our concern here, must have an intrinsic active dominion over all its acts that are to be called free. Passivity and freedom are unalterably opposed.

As early as the De Anima problems concerning efficient causality made themselves felt, as Suárez seemed to be defining the will by indirection--denying efficient causality to any other faculty. All his early treatises are most emphatic on this point. An efficient cause invariably produces its effect, and the will must not be allowed to be determined by any other power. Apparently the early position of Suárez on efficiency did not go much farther than this with respect to man's free choice. He described the process of liberum arbitrium, which was equivalent to the will making its free choices about means to be taken, by saying that the judgment of the intellect was necessary only as a condition for the application of the object, not as a cause of the free act. The universality and perfection of intellectual knowledge was indeed the root of freedom, but in no way did it necessitate or force the choice of the will. This statement of the position, which highlights the main points Suárez made in the *De Anima*, really does not solve the problem of efficiency and freedom of the will. What Suárez was doing was denying efficiency to any other power, but he left its precise meaning quite vague.

The *Metaphysical Disputations* show a significant advance in understanding efficiency. As we have seen, the same basic position is held, where the objectively indifferent judgment of the intellect is maintained as the root of liberty, but it is also stressed that the will must be fundamentally unhindered in its choice of the good. Some outside efficiency may be permitted at times, but never enough to necessitate or impede the will from its own self-dominion. Suárez' citation of St. Thomas on the way in which a moving cause imposes a result on what is moved (so that unless it exhausts the capacity of the receiver some freedom or self-dominion may still remain in the power receiving the influx[30]), provides the most illuminating insight into his reason for at least considering the possibility of efficiency acting on the will.

Many of the texts bearing on efficiency have already been mentioned in the course of this analysis, but there are several which need to be focused more specifically now. Particularly of note, I feel, is the gradual emphasis upon actuality as the precise gift donated by the efficient cause. Such a progression should not be too surprising, since from the beginning Suárez has insisted upon active dominion as the core of the will's efficiency. What is in act must give actuality if it gives nothing else. The curious thing seems to be that to Suárez the will does give nothing else. The question then becomes a search into the exact type of act given by the will. Can one even call it a type of act if it has no determination of its own? Is this perfection or a lack of it? How separated from the intellect is the act of liberum arbitrium which Suárez declares only rationally distinct from the will? Does not the very independence of the will from extrinsic determination on the part of the practical judgment or the known object make Suárez into a voluntarist at this very point when he is insisting so strongly that all the formal determination and perfections of liberum arbitrium are firmly rooted in the intellect and its judgment of the object? Even while affirming this condition he seems to be structuring a situation that will eventually result in a will not really bound or limited in its choice by the object presented to it by the intellect. He does not in fact hold this latter position at the time of the Metaphysical Disputations, but it seems to me that the border line is crossed at this very point. Subsequently, Suárez will be more of a voluntarist. Let us see what the texts reveal.

In the chapter of the De Anima where Suárez is discussing the relative perfection of intellect and will, an extremely significant passage occurs.[31] All of the Suarezian arguments in that treatise were firmly on the side of the intellect as the more perfect power. This particular argument--the first Suárez puts forward--is described by him there as very precise. He remarks that it does the best job of proof on this question, even though Scotus often made fun of it, "and Cajetan defends it abundantly."[32] The passage argues that the intellect is more perfect than the will because the cognitive power is able to consider the object in a manner that is far more immaterial, more perfect. It abstracts the object from existence and considers "the naked quiddity of the thing." The will, on the other hand, cannot do this; it is drawn to an object only insofar as it has some order to "actual existence, for nothing is ever desired except insofar as it exists in act or will exist."[33] Suárez goes on to explain that the intellect can consider any thing at all under any precision, even having the ability to separate essence from existence for this purpose. The will, however, is attracted in a simple way to the object itself as it actually exists. Its act really consists in desiring the existence of the object, "which certainly is a less precise way of operating, and less immaterial."[34]

The will, then, since it goes out to the whole thing and is unable to abstract the perfect and inviolate essence, is a less perfect power. In my summary of Suárez' thought in the De Anima,[35] I pointed out that this emphasis seemed an indication that Suárez placed a higher value upon the formal and the essential than upon the existential. His idea of efficiency at that time was certainly unclear, and although efficient causality was surely of supreme importance to account for the actuality of anything, its intrinsic value was problematical to Suárez. The connection between the formal and the essential, as well as between the efficient and the existential, was becoming evident even then. Later in this thesis I will investigate the implications of this point more fully. What is clear now is that for Suárez perfection is measured chiefly by the immaterial and the essential.

In DM XIX there is more stress on actuality than on existence as such--perhaps a somewhat more sophisticated approach. I have already noted Suárez' greater confidence in the efficient activity of the will. He is now unafraid to permit a certain degree of efficiency acting upon it, so long as it does not completely dominate or exhaust the capacity of the will. One passage demonstrating his deeper understanding of efficiency would be the whole of section three, where Suárez shows that an action can take place in a truly free way provided that at least one of the causes cooperating in its production is really and intrinsically free.[36] This advance in doctrine over the De Anima is startling enough, but it becomes even more striking when Suárez brings forth as an example the very situation which, previously, he was so careful to exclude from the influence of any necessitating cause. He mentions specifically the "probable opinion" that the act of liberum arbitrium is considered an instance of a necessary and a free cause acting together. According to this view,

> the knowledge or the known object concur efficiently to the act of the will; because that concurrence, insofar as it proceeds from knowledge, is natural and without liberty, and nevertheless the act is simply free through the indifference of the will.[37]

This passage goes on significantly to stress actuality. Suárez at once adds the explanation of the situation described:

> Although knowledge, in that which depends on it as such, influences through a natural necessity, nevertheless, because its actual influence does not acquire reality without the actual influence of the will, consequently it is not absolutely necessary.[38]

The role of the will as efficient cause can now be seen in its full importance. It gives actuality to every other impulse or power under man's control. Without the dominating influence of the will, then, in re non ponitur any human act at all, no matter how many or how necessitated the other causes concurring in the act, I do not think that the efficient power of the will as bestowing actuality can be more strongly stated.

What does "actual" mean? It is very close to "reality," but I am not sure that, for Suárez, the two are perfectly synonymous. It does seem safe to say that anything that fully exists is actual, but I believe that Suárez would hold that things possess differing amounts of actuality according to the different levels of their being. Actuality is certainly conferred only by the agent, the efficient cause, whenever anything comes into act. A very close connection between existence, actuality, and efficiency is thus evident, and deepens the conviction that this problem of causality in liberum arbitrium, like so many others in philosophy, has its final roots sunk deep in the soil of metaphysics and the essence-existence doctrine.

In order to gain a deeper insight into Suarezian doctrine in this area, at least as it relates to liberum arbitrium, three different questions must be answered. First, how does the liberum arbitrium go into act? Second, what are the implications here with respect to essence and existence, and third, precisely who acts in the act of choice?

With regard to the first question concerning the manner in which the will moves into act, only the texts of these early treatises will be discussed. A passage in the De Voluntario proves helpful in discovering the earliest thought of Suárez on this important aspect of the will's efficiency. After describing the way in which liberty does rise out of reason (the will being able to love the good in the same way that the intellect presents it), Suárez insists--as is completely in keeping with the position of the early treatises--that the will is never determined by the intellect in such a way as to lose its own self-determination. He concludes:

> The will itself truly determines itself as to efficiency, and it needs no other reason to yield this determination,

> in addition to liberty and because it wills, supposing a sufficient reason on the part of the object.[39]

According to this text, then, the will has everything it needs to move itself into act, once an object sufficiently good has been presented to it. The only intrinsically necessary factors in the will are the basic quality of liberty and the actual will act itself. Suárez does not in fact prove these statements here, but his declaration of them is so strong that--at least for him--it apparently needs no formal demonstration.

Clearly enough, no efficiency from outside acts on the will in its production of its own act. The central question remains, however: precisely how does the will move itself into act? The passage just quoted says, in effect, that the will wills because it so wishes. This is true, but not particularly helpful if one does not already know the processes and causality involved.

One of the first texts noted in De Anima V described the appetite as a sort of weight [pondus] inclining that power towards its particular good, i.e., the object which provided its completion or perfection.[40] "Pondus" has a long and honorable history, at least from the time of St. Augustine, and Suárez evidently agrees that the object of the will pulls, or attracts, or inclines (but does not force, in limited goods) the will to itself. He distinguishes carefully between a natural appetite and a vital appetite, for the former is common to all natural things and is really identical with their natural inclination to achieve their own end. A vital appetite, on the other hand, such as the will, must follow on knowledge of some type. "Appetite follows form," he insists. "If forms are diverse, so too will appetites be."[41] He enforces this view in a different way by stating that "appetite is the cause of execution"[42]--a significant phrasing, I believe, because the common scholastic view would be that the end itself is the cause of causing. Suárez does not quite say this. Even though it may be the end, or the known goodness of the object, which calls to the appetite for a response, it is the appetite *itself* which causes actual efficiency. The appetite itself brings about the execution *in re* of its power. The typical Suarezian emphasis appears on the appetite as totally efficient in its own order, not moved *effective* by the object. After some careful discussion on these points, Suárez sums them up by declaring:

> From this knowledge a certain weight [*pondus*] arises [*oritur*] . . . an appetite by reason of which the knowers are moved spontaneously to perfections not possessed.[43]

This early passage gives a good insight into the meaning of tendency, as Suárez will develop it later on in the *Metaphysics*. This tendency or natural inclination of the will *as will* is the basis for its efficient activity.

In the second text under analysis quoted at the beginning of Chapter Three (page 207), Suárez makes his most explicit statement in DM XIX of the meaning of tendency, identifying it as the type of operation that belongs to an appetitive power as such. His language is more precise than in the De Anima, as would be expected, but the note of spontaneity is still stressed just as strongly, while the insistence that the inclination be completely intrinsic is brought out to an even greater degree than in similar passages in the early treatise. "The act elicited by the will," he writes, "takes place in the manner of an intrinsic and spontaneous tendency and inclination toward the object."[44] The stress on efficiency and self-dominion is very clear, and a certain dynamism makes itself strongly felt. The inclination is "spontaneous," however, i.e., not necessitated in any way by the object. Suárez is still insistent upon this point.

He repeats that only a faculty which acts in this way, as does an appetite, is capable of an intrinsically voluntary act. The precise implications of this remark will be taken up in a few pages, but first the source of this implicit dynamism of an appetitive tendency must be traced down. Suárez does not use the word "dynamism" here, but the spontaneity and activity of the impulse going out to the object certainly suggest it. A text in which he denies this kind of quality to the intellect will throw some illumination on the meaning he assigns to tendency. In paragraph twenty-five of the same section five, Suárez points out that the intellect would fail in its role of guide for the intellect if it also were to operate through a spontaneous tendency. I find the argument curiously attractive. Suárez had just stated that not being free does not really detract from the greater perfection of the intellect because

> absolutely it constitutes a greater perfection to be the rule of the will. A liberty rooted formally in the same power [that is its rule] would be incompatible with that perfection of being a rule. This is so not only because the rule ought to be certain and of itself immutable, but also because that operation which is a rule is not such by way of inclination and tendency to the thing regulated, but by a certain conformity [commensuratio] to it--a conformity which is not indifferent, but certain and determined. But the will, which is, as it were, blind [quasi caeca] needs the rule or direction of the understanding. Because [the will] tends to its object by a perfect voluntary inclination, [the will] is capable of liberty. In this one point it can relatively surpass the intellect, even though absolutely it is inferior in perfection.[45]

The will "tends" to its object; its inclination to it is "a perfect voluntary" act, i.e., belonging to the will "all the way through." What does all this tell us about tendency, particularly as Suárez declares at the same time that the intellect's grasp of the object must be certain, determined, and fixed? The impression arises that a tendency, contrary to these qualities, must be volatile, movable, somewhat irresolute. The picture I invariably see at this point is of the intellect as a simple white china mug, the old-fashioned type, sitting very primly on the table, and full almost to the brim with plain--but very necessary--water. The will, however, would be a champagne glass, teetering rather close to the edge of the table, in the process of being filled with bubbly effervescent liquid which, though necessary in a completely different way, totally lacks the stability and placidity of the other, making up for that particular lack by excitement, change, mobility. The metaphor may be a frivolous one, but it seems to me to capture the essential difference that Suárez was trying to convey in the distinct modes of operation of intellect and will.

Thus far, the manner of acting that characterizes the tendency that is the will has been described by Suárez. Through this tendency the will goes out to the object. The question then becomes a deeper one: what is the source of the tendency? Where do these "unfixed" characteristics come from?

In section eight of DM XIX, paragraph six, Suárez says unequivocally that to act voluntarily is to act with a previous knowledge and by way of appetition.[46] In the paragraph immediately following, he grounds the indifference and true freedom of the will by a syllogism as firm and unyielding as the principle it embodies:

> It is necessary that everything which is variable and movable have its foundation in something invariable and unmovable. But the free choice [electio libera] is of itself variable. Therefore it ought to have its foundation in something invariable, and thus it is so founded on the intention of the end. This intention, therefore, must be invariable and not free.[47]

Suárez adds immediately that this position must be understood and interpreted with moderation and careful explanation. He is concerned, apparently, that a necessity wrongly understood will lead to a misinterpretation of the true freedom and active dominion of the will with respect to means [liberum arbitrium]. Section eight as a whole is concerned with those precise acts toward which the will is truly indifferent. Suárez discusses at length the way in which the will intends the end, whether ultimate or particular, but most of his treatment varies little from the traditional presentation, and gives no deeper insight into what actually constitutes the will as actively indifferent and able to move itself into first act. There are a few sentences, however, which give intimation enough to admit some formulation of what must be the basis of his thought here.

Suárez seems at this point to take for granted the position that he explained so carefully in De Anima V, that the object of the will, corresponding equivalently to the universal scope of the intellect to know being, would have to be the universal good, or the good in general. That point he now considers proved, simply stating it here as the accepted doctrine. In paragraph nineteen of the eighth section, however, Suárez does illuminate the point:

> For the intention of the end the will is moved only out of some natural inclination, even though it moves freely. On the other hand, for the choice of means it is moved out of the force of the appetition of the end, an appetition which the will takes on itself in addition to its natural inclination.[48]

The will's natural inclination, of course, is toward the perfect and necessary good, or--as it is often stated by Suárez--the supreme happiness. This, the will has no choice but to desire. Suárez says in more than one place that the will is a power already constituted in first act,[49] and the very stress he maintains upon its intrinsic and active dominion is a continual reminder of this basic quality. The will, in common with the other appetites of man, has no need of a species to put it into operation, but is the principle of its own actions by its very being.[50] In another passage of DM XIX, section eight, he refers to the being of the will in the same way. While insisting on the fact that the will escapes any necessitating influence from the intellect, he writes that the will is able to realize its own act freely, "because through its very being it possesses a certain eminent power for exercising its act, and a natural inclination towards it. . . ."[51]

All of these texts, it seems to me, give a strong indication of what Suárez considers the very constitution in being of the will itself. It _is_ a natural appetite and tendency toward the universal and perfect good, which corresponds to and rises out of the universal knowledge of the intellect of the totality of being. Appetite follows and agrees with form. The being of the will, therefore, what it is _formally_, by its very nature, is a responsive and truly necessitated capacity to love the perfect good. The word "necessitated" must be understood here in the carefully delineated sense made clear in the earliest sections of our analysis of _root_ in Chapter Two. It is both natural and necessary that man have a will, a power loving the universal good. This power rises necessarily out of the intellect, whose capacity to know all being gives by that very fact the same scope to the tendency of the will. The _formal_ equivalence and dependence Suárez has insisted on from the beginning. The natural inclination of the will toward the perfect good, therefore, _is_ its very constitution in being as an appetitive power in man. It seems to me that because it is already a natural response following on the power of the intellect, the will is thereby in act as effectively adhering to this perfect object. It is precisely this active adherence which makes it a force capable of grounding and giving efficiency to the other acts of the will in adhering freely to lesser goods. The will is not merely a capacity to love; it is by its very being an active and effective adherence to the all-perfect good. Tendency, then, is the word which Suárez uses to describe this inclination and spontaneous going-out toward any good which somehow reflects the perfection of the supreme good, which is already being loved. When we see anything which reminds us--even remotely--of one whom we already love, the spontaneous leap of the heart towards that thing or person is immediate. It is grounded and explained by that first love; its strength and its vitality come from this. To specify a little more precisely, the inclination or spontaneous response is natural, in virtue of that first adherence to the perfect good. But the decision whether or not to go along with this secondary inclination, to say yes, to reinforce it, this is free. Here, I believe, is the ultimate human answer for Suárez concerning the source of the will's efficiency. And perhaps most importantly, it must be noted that this very efficiency is grounded firmly, formally, and necessarily in man's essential intellectual capacity to know in a perfect and universal way. Again, from a slightly different angle, the amount or degree of perfection in a being is seen to be its foundation in the formal or essential order.

Before closing the discussion of exactly how the will, or liberum arbitrium, does go into second act, a few points mentioned earlier ought to be stressed. Even though the being of the will as a power comes out of and derives its entitative support from the intellect, and though its acts are limited to the goods known and presented to it by the cognitive powers, still this area of formal causality is not sufficient that a free choice of the will actually take place. The simple application of the object to the will does not ensure the final actuality of the act of love. In order that a free event really ensue, the will must act in accord with the practical judgment presented to it by the intellect, and its act must not be impeded or hindered by any outside causes. It cannot be overstressed that although the formal presentation of the object by the intellect is absolutely required as a condition and root of the free act, it is in no way a sufficient or adequate cause. More active and effective causes--chief among them, the will itself--must go into operation before any human and free operation can truly issue into act.[52]

By now the meaning of the intrinsically voluntary as well as the active self-determination of the will ought to be quite clear. Suárez used these terms in one of the texts from the Metaphysics set up for analysis early in this Chapter Three (see above, page 207). What is voluntary follows on knowledge and agrees with the tendency of the will. Obviously, then, a truly free act must be intrinsically voluntary, i.e., coming from the efficiency of the will itself in harmony with its appetite, and not merely termed voluntary because of an extrinsic connection with some other power formally voluntary in itself. The phrase "intrinsically voluntary," then, means a quality belonging properly to acts of the will which have their source in its own efficiency. Self-determination, on the other hand, is more than a quality describing the truly free act. It is the act itself by which the will chooses a good. Suárez wrote in that same text under consideration that the exercise of a will-act is the same thing [idem est] as the determination of the power to operate. Why so? Because in moving itself into second act, i.e., actually desiring and choosing a particular good for itself right now, the will determines itself to love this one thing in virtue of its prior natural determination to love the supreme and perfect good. From this basic adherence to the ultimate good, the will can determine itself to love any lesser good that the intellect presents to it as included somehow in the aspect of good. It can choose it, but it need not. The formality comes from the intellect; the actuality of the free act itself solidly from the will. Self-determination, therefore, is precisely what the will does in the exercise of its act. Idem est.

Several of the texts already analyzed have made somewhat tangential references to existence, but the real meaning of this perfection seems to be equated with actuality for Suárez, especially as his thought develops. "Existence" is used more frequently in the De Anima texts studied than in those of DM XIX, where the term "actuality" is usually preferred. In treating of efficiency, this dissertation concentrated particularly on that early De Anima text where Suárez holds that the will is inferior to the intellect precisely because the will goes out to the whole existing thing, desiring it in its actual totality, while the intellect can consider the abstract and universal essence in a more perfect and immaterial way. The will desires existence, and it only desires anything else because it does or can exist.[53] What does this statement really imply for Suárez? He commonly views an efficient cause as an essential principle, extrinsic to its effect, with the primary aim of bringing about mutation or action. He insists on the point that the efficient cause produces its effect by means of action, and this exact characteristic distinguishes it from the other types of causes.[54] From the earliest formulation of this description in the Metaphysics, Suárez lays the stress upon action, which is both the means and the result of efficiency. Now what is action, if not an actual influx, which gives to its result some change or even beginning (when speaking of God as efficient cause) of actuality itself? Implied in this entire treatment is the fact that in order for anything to be good or an object of desire, it must have at least some reference to existence. One cannot effectively desire what cannot truly be actual. Since the will loves the good and seeks after it by its very nature, the existence or actuality of the thing must be the ground of its goodness--the ground, but not the measure. This last expression brings up once more the problem which insists on hovering about any Suarezian statement of will-intellect causality--the implied relationship to essence and existence. Suárez has shown again and again that essence is the determining and formal principle which provides the norm or measure for the perfection of a thing. Existence, on the other hand, is for him simply the actuality of the perfection, without which there is no perfection at all. But it must be remembered that for Suárez there is no real distinction, in the Thomistic sense, between essence and existence.[55] Without actuality no formal qualities would even have meaning, since ultimately their very actuation constitutes them as perfections. Actuality or existence alone would be equally meaningless. So, while holding the essential undividedness of any real being, Suárez continually refers one aspect of the thing's activity to the formal realm, another to the area of the efficient or the actual existent. These areas are not identical for him, since they obviously affect and ground different acts and powers in the being, but they are not at all separable, and remain distinct only in reason.

It is relatively easy for a Thomist simply to say that the will operates in the area of existence, while the intellect contributes the essential determination to the act of liberum arbitrium, which is a joint act of the two powers. Suárez will not say this, however, in the same sense. For him liberum arbitrium involves both powers, but it involves them in very different ways. The act of choice is formally in the will, i.e., really and completely there, and radically (as from a root) in the intellect. Liberum arbitrium is only rationally distinct from the will, he has told us, or rather it is the will in the act of choosing means to an end. This is no joint act in the true sense of the word for Suárez. The contribution of the intellect is a foundation and a root, not fully a co-cause. Thus, to summarize or criticize Suárez' view on intellect-will as if the Thomistic terms of reference could apply with an unchanged meaning to Suarezian thought is simply to miss the real core of his position. Of course, a Thomist tends to think this way, just as a Scotist tends to think like a Scotist, and a Platonist like a Platonist. But what does Suárez himself think on this question?

I believe no facile answer can be given. The echoes of the essence-existence problem which to the ears of the Thomist ring in the background simply do not have the same urgency for Suárez. He is quite aware of his own position on essence and existence, and though it is implied as a fundamental in the act of choice, it is not a question of central concern in the Suarezian statement of the situation. In fairness, I do not think we can expect Suárez to be other than he is. For him, I submit, the situation should be described in this way: because of its natural adherence to the perfect good, the will, in the act of liberum arbitrium, gives actuality to the influencing pull of some good object as presented by the intellect. To put it another way, the will effectively selects this object to be an actual influence on itself; it wills the object actually to become beloved by its very action of choosing. A criticism of the situation occurring in an act of choice framed in the Thomistic terms of essence and existence simply lacks relevance for Suárez, even though implications certainly make themselves felt there like burrs that nag for attention. But these implications cannot be singled out to the detriment of what Suárez considers the core of his doctrine. They cannot be attacked head-on by the Thomist or any other critic of Suarezian thought. Such an approach would result in frustration, as if a man were attempting to work a problem in mathematics by means of a number system quite different from the one given in the problem. Confusion would be further multiplied if the mathematician even failed to recognize that the number systems were different. The first step would have to be a conversion of one number system to another, or at least an equivalent interpretation. The same process applies here, for to understand the position of Suárez on essence and existence, and then to apply it meaningfully in the various aspects of his doctrine, one must begin gradually on the side of the formal determinations and build up systematically, as Suárez does, until the final perfection of actuality is reached. At that point, perhaps, a criticism will be validly in order. Let it suffice here to say that certain signs do appear in the Suarezian doctrine of *liberum arbitrium* which seem to give clear evidence of having their primary foundation in the view Suárez maintains of essence and existence. A further exploration of these signs must wait, however, until the final summing up of the Suarezian position in the concluding remarks of this dissertation.

Before the summary of the Suarezian views on causality as affecting the *liberum arbitrium*, one further precision remains. Three questions, which may actually only be one, must be asked of Suárez: (1) what does the intellect *do* in the act of choice, (2) what does the will do, and (3) what does *man* do? These three seem to be reducible to the one basic query: *who* acts in the act of choice? It is quite obvious today to those of us who still believe that man does have a power to choose freely, that even to ask these questions in their triple form is to fall heir to a pseudo-problem that has plagued philosophers ever since man's tendency to reify ideas began functioning--and who will venture a guess at *that* date? To talk about the intellect and will as though they were "two sparring partners,"[56] each of whom is attempting to knock out the other (or at least to gain a few points) is completely to misstate the problem. The two powers become beings in themselves, warring for supremacy in what threatens to be an endless struggle. Man, the human being, is lost someplace on the periphery, certainly outside the floodlights. Such thinking results in a splitting of the basic unity of man's actions that can only serve as an invisible but pervasive trouble area which then must be patched together by this theory or that. Instead of getting trapped on one side or the other of the split, one could avoid the problem at the outset with a little caution.

The history of intellect-will discussion seems unfortunately to have an unusual propensity for this type of description. St. Thomas Aquinas was careful to avoid such hypostatizing in his work, and would often qualify a phrase to clarify this precise point, saying, for example, that "the intellective principle, by which man understands, is not a substance existing apart from man. . . ."[57] He distinguishes often between the intellect as that by which man knows, and the man who knows. By the time of Suárez, however, discussion of the intellect-will complex had increased to the stage of controversy, and many disputants stressing their various points had served to crystallize more and more the encapsulated view of the two powers. Suárez fell heir, therefore, to this entrenched "separatist" mentality, and can hardly be expected to have avoided the prevalent attitude of his times. In spite of the hypostatizing appearance of many of the explanations he uses to describe the situation of liberum arbitrium, I do not feel that Suárez, in his thinking, is as prone to this tendency as it would seem. A few selected passages will bear out my opinion.

One text should be cited first as an example of the prevalent tendency to reify the two powers. Passages of this type are certainly by far the most frequent in Suárez' treatment of the problems. In DM XIX, section eight, he writes:

> On the other hand, when such an efficacious will does not precede [the imperium], it is impossible that the imperium of the understanding have that efficacious impulsive force. The contrary position would destroy the freedom of the will, and praise or blame ought then not to be attributed to the will, but to the intellect.[58]

This passage is fairly representative of the Suarezian statements on intellect and will. Not too extreme, it still shows a definite trend to think of the intellect and will in terms of two separate things, somehow or other working (or competing) with each other to produce the act of free choice. A particular man as the personal subject of acts of knowing and loving becomes little more than a location for the contest in this type of description.

Sections do occur in the work of Suárez, however, that are notable in their resistance of this tendency. A passage already studied in this dissertation, from the eighteenth disputation, section seven,[59] has a qualification tacked on to it somewhat in the manner of St. Thomas. The text concerns the manner in which the will is drawn out to the desirable object because of the will's own natural inclination, and Suárez adds: "or rather, it is the soul, insofar as it is living, which is drawn out through it."[60] Interestingly enough, this very problem must have caused some trouble to the various editors of the Metaphysics, for the critical edition which I am using lists a variant for this precise clause which is found in several editions. Instead of "seu potius anima, ut vivens per illam," the variant reads "seu potius anima, aut vivens per illam." The translation would then be "or rather the soul, or the living thing by means of it [is drawn out to the object]."[61] The latter phrasing would be even better for my purposes here, of course, as it not only situates the will in its subject--the living soul--but also makes clear that first of all the act belongs to the living thing, acting by means of the soul, and drawn out through the soul's power (the will) to the appetible object.

One other passage makes even clearer the fact that Suárez himself was not confused on this point. In section eight of DM XIX, where the argument sets out to show that the will desires not only the object, but also--at least virtually--the exercise of its own act, Suárez adds that in order for the will to be moved necessarily with respect to exercise,

> it is necessary that the man apprehend and judge such an exercise here and now as an absolutely necessary good, so that the omission of that act could not be apprehended under any aspect of good.[62]

I submit that this passage is a splendid example of concrete realism. Although Suárez is treating a highly metaphysical problem, he clearly envisions here a human person in all his subjectivity, making a judgment here and now about the desirability for him, a unique person in an historical moment, of the good under consideration. Even an Existentialist could say no more.

The answer to the threefold question proposed earlier should now be clear. The problem is not as thorny as it might first appear. Certainly it is man who acts, by means of these two powers of intellect and will; Suárez undeniably holds this as true. Granted that fact, however, he does assign them distinct and definite roles. Each has something to contribute to liberum arbitrium, but each does it uniquely.

Of these two powers, then, which one acts? Again, undeniably, the will. The texts studied above have repeatedly shown that the aspects of action, dominion, efficiency in free choice lie totally and formally in the will. The will is free to act or not to act, given all the requisite conditions for action. The requisite conditions--what are they? Some relate directly to the will itself; others come from the intellective power. The will must be unimpeded by any outside force that might prevent it from acting. Aside from this basic condition, however, the will itself has sufficient efficiency to move itself into action (or not) in the presence of any good whatsoever. On the side of the intellect, prerequisites abound. The intellect itself, as we have seen, is the formal prerequisite and root of the will. The intellect is the place of contact for the will and the desirable object, for the precise function of the intellect is to present to the will the object, apprehended and judged by it as good to some particular degree. The will constituted in being by its actual tendency to the universal good stands ready to love the object provided it display any amount of goodness at all. The will, however, is limited to loving the good as known and presented by the intellect. If one may so speak, the dimensions of liberum arbitrium are clearly signified by the intellect, while the actual existence of the act of choice depends--beyond that formal stage--completely on the will itself.[63] More briefly, the formality of liberum arbitrium has its roots and definiteness in the intellect; the act itself takes place in the will alone. What the will determines itself to is the actuality of choosing, and in doing this it gives actuality to the attraction of the object. It is the will's free choice which makes the influence of the good actually to influence.

A final summary of the Suarezian views of causality as manifested in liberum arbitrium is now in order. At the end of Chapter Two,[64] the questions implied in the basic analysis of texts from De Anima and the Metaphysical Disputations were formulated, and Chapter Three set out to answer them. The final point there asked whether Suárez could really answer those precise questions, given his metaphysical basis. I think the answer must be yes. Suárez could answer these questions, were they put to him personally. He in fact does not answer many of them in the works under consideration, if by "answer" we mean a studied response, properly formulated with that exact question in mind. It is rather difficult to anticipate the precise wording of questions to be asked of you two or three hundred years later. The questions are answered by Suárez, however, if instead we mean all the necessary data and information needed to provide the correct solution. These treatises do provide sufficient evidence, I believe, to explain thoroughly--and metaphysically--the early theory of human choice in the philosophy of Suárez. The same texts do more. The trend of development they have shown leads to a moment at which the opening to voluntarism does appear. An inexorable progression has taken place which separates the will more and more from the intellect, even while manifesting itself in texts which explicitly express dependence and formal connection.

Now to the substantiation of these statements. After reflection on the various ways in which Suárez has expressed the causalities at work in the act of human choice, I believe the questions in my mind condense to two. In the philosophy of Suárez, is formal causality *everything* or *nothing*? and its correlative, is efficient causality *everything* or *nothing*? There are points to be made on both sides. As I have indicated earlier, I feel that the solution depends upon the meaning and ultimate importance Suárez assigns to actuality. Suárez himself does not answer these questions in the terms in which I have asked them, but these treatises nonetheless contain the necessary data for an answer. The following summary, therefore, is my judgment of the answer Suárez implicitly states in *De Anima V* and *Disputationes Metaphysicae XIX*. It is, I submit, his position, so far as I am able to grasp and express it.

The texts studied here have increasingly emphasized the importance of the efficient cause and its donation of actuality to the Suarezian view of being. It is quite true that without efficiency and act there would be quite literally nothing. To agree with this, however, does not necessarily mean that efficient causality is everything. The texts have shown just as emphatically that for Suárez all the determinations of what something is, its definite powers and the scope of their capacity, the norm or measurement of their perfection in *being* itself come from whatever the being *formally* is by nature. The being and freedom of the will, as we have seen, are themselves formally rooted in and dependent on the intellect of man and its particular way of knowing. From the beginning of this analysis of Suarezian philosophy on *liberum arbitrium*, the word *radix* has been prominent. Its consistent use provides a strong clue, I believe, to the final position of Suárez on causality in the act of choice. Precisely because the intellect is a root of *liberum arbitrium*, because it is a part of this act only *radicaliter*, not *formaliter*, the act of choice itself cannot be in the full sense a joint act of intellect and will. It is rather an act of the will *rooted in* the intellect. Suárez insists on this distinction, as has been shown, because he wishes to avoid the error of those who made the intellect itself formally free. To do this, Suárez feels, would actually put freedom into the intellect (which could not possess it without contradiction while retaining its solid grasp of certain truths and invariable essences), and would make the will simply a handmaid following along behind, completely determined by the intellect's judgment. He will never permit such a view. Accordingly, he makes liberum arbitrium to be the act of the will, which alone is formally free.

At this point the direction of his thought begins to edge into voluntarism, something it surely was not in the De Anima, where so much stress was laid upon the superiority of the intellect. Even there, however, the seeds of this position were present. Now, in summing up the doctrine of the nineteenth disputation, the development can be seen more clearly. The intellect is a root, not a co-cause. Even though Suárez insists on the formal dependence and influence given in this way by the intellect, still he has in fact made a separation in the act of free choice which puts all the activity, the actual election, into the will. Given all these determinants, every persuasion of the desirable object as presented and applied by the intellect, still there is no direct causal influence on the will that would make these contributions from the intellect an essential part of the act of choice. These only become essential provided that the will makes them so by giving them their final actuality, by choosing them. Any effective connection in being, therefore, between these two powers, is severed in the act of choice. The act of choice is in the will alone, for Suárez. The will, and no other power, permits into the final choice the determinants it so chooses. The doctrinal development in DM XIX which revealed Suárez as maintaining the will's efficiency and active dominion even if the intellect did exercise some efficiency on it, simply reinforces this position. The causality of free choice remains in the will, because the causality--even if efficient--coming from the object via the intellect can be no greater than the object presented. No limited object can exhaust the capacity of the will's love for the perfect good; therefore the will is not forced and still retains its dominion and freedom. Since liberum arbitrium, then, is not truly a joint act of both contributing powers, it must be the act of one or the other. It cannot be the intellect, since liberty cannot formally constitute the truth-seeking faculty, so it must be the will. The intellect as radix has brought Suárez to this point; Suárez the voluntarist has been born.

I have just tried to explain this position from the intellect out, so to speak. I would now like to express it from the will in. The will gives actuality to the formal--to what is somehow already determined and definite, but not yet actual. Suárez insists that before the thing is fully actual, it is not; once actuality has been given to it, no further addition is needed to account for its existence. An actually existing essence, which has been made to exist by being made actual by an efficient cause, has no need of some further principle such as esse. It has all it needs by being actual. Suárez begins his philosophizing with the actual thing--here it is, existing. What accounts for its actuality? Obviously, not itself, for it is limited and contingent; it has no actuality until it is made to be actual. Where, then, does it come from? From the efficiency of the agent, from the actuality of the efficient cause. I believe this to be the basic position that Suárez will not alter here. Into this framework all his other remarks must fit. He would see any other view, I believe, as detracting from the utter dependence of limited things and the utter omnipotence of God, the first efficient cause from whom all other causality comes. The very close connection between actuality, existence, and efficiency is now evident. Existence is given by actuality through the efficient cause. The limited being is not composite for Suárez, really. The whole being with a certain amount of perfection is donated existence by being made actual. Essence seems to penetrate down even into the singular for Suárez, so that the being in its entirety is given by the agent's gift of actuality.[65] Actuality really does for Suárez what existence (*esse*) does for St. Thomas, but because the *manner* is different--for St. Thomas, reception; for Suárez, donation--anything at all real for Suárez must have some amount of actuality. This applies even to potency, even to primary matter. Where does this actuality come from? Not from the potentials, of course; this would be contradictory. Thus, any degree of actuality, no matter how small, must be directly communicated by the efficient cause, since this is the only being which possesses actuality already. Ultimately this *must* be God, for without Him no other efficient cause will have any efficiency, i.e., it will have no actuality to give.

The twofold question is now ready for an answer. It seems to me that if God is included in our area of perspective in answering, then we must say that for Suárez the efficient cause is everything, for without God as the ultimate or absolute first agent, no formal perfections will exist. The doctrines of analogy, creation, causality, knowledge, love--all depend on this relation to the efficient cause. In this view, the formal cause is relatively nothing, because without efficiency to make it actual, it has no being at all. All actuality comes from the efficient cause. This position is evident in the Suarezian doctrine of liberum arbitrium.

On the other hand, assuming that God has given actuality and existence to limited beings, and we are explaining the situation without explicit reference to Him, then it seems to me that formal causality is everything, and efficient causality really nothing. Why? Because the efficient cause has no meaning at all except to give the final "flip" of actuality. It is a desperately necessary flip; nothing can exist without it, but all perfections, powers, capacities, and qualities of the being are either solidly formal in nature or just as solidly rooted in the formal. Even final causality is reduced to this. The norms or measurements of perfection of every type of act come from the formal side of the being, as the texts of Suárez have shown again and again. Thus, the efficient cause has no gift to give except actuality, which is not a perfection "of a kind." Without the definite perfections of the formal causes, the efficient cause would have nothing to do; it would be nothing.

These two positions come together in the person of God, the first efficient cause, who is able to give both actuality and perfections of a kind by creating limited beings who can then operate according to their formal perfections. In God, finally, the theory of choice is unified. Not until that point, however, does the ultimate ground--both formal and efficient--for the tendencies and actualities present in *liberum arbitrium*, as in every other limited act or being, make itself fully evident. In consideration of this fact, then, I would transcend the horns of that particular dilemma and say that for Suárez, neither efficient nor formal causality as such is king. God is king. Under Him, both efficient and formal causes can operate in their own spheres and exercise their own proper causalities. Without Him, all causality would be meaningless. It would not exist.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

[1] Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones Metafísicas, Vol. III, disputation XIX, section 6, paragraph 7, pp. 393-94. (See chap. i above, n. 9, for full bibliographical data.) The same abbreviations will hereafter be used as in the previous chapters, e.g., DM XIX, sec. 6, No. 7, pp. 393-94. "[E]xistimo ad liberam determinationem voluntatis non esse necessarium tale iudicium practicum omnino determinans ipsam. Quod praeter discursum factum (qui videtur esse a posteriori et ab inconvenienti) potest a priori et ex re ipsa declarari, quia iudicium intellectus non movet voluntatem nisi medio obiecto quod proponit; sed obiectum propositum non semper infert necessitatem voluntati aut determinat illam ad unum, neque hoc est necessarium ut voluntas possit in obiectum tendere; ergo nec est necessaria ex parte iudicii, immo nec possibilis talis determinatio. Maior probatur, quia vel iudicium movet tantum ratione obiecti vel ipsummet ratione sui habet peculiarem efficaciam ad determinandam voluntatem. Hoc posterius dici non potest, tum quia talis efficacia repugnaret libertati voluntatis, ut dictum est, tum etiam quia talis movendi modus est alienus a munere intellectus, qui est illuminare et dirigere ac regulare voluntatis operationes, tum denique quia ille movendi modus est proprius voluntatis, quae in hunc finem peculiariter data est, ut alias potentias efficienter moveat quoad exercitium; ergo non potest fieri ut intellectus, qui a voluntate efficienter movetur, vicissim eodem modo illam moveat."

[2] DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 18, p. 382: "Nam actus elicitus a voluntate est per modum intrinsecae et spontaneae tendentiae et inclinationis in obiectum, et ideo talis tendentia seipsa etiam est spontanea; hic autem modus tendentiae est proprius appetitivae potentiae; ergo est etiam illius proprium quod actus eius sit per seipsum intrinsece voluntarius; cum ergo intellectus non sit potentia appetens, constat actum eius non esse per seipsum intrinsece voluntarium."

[3] DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 19, pp. 382-83: "Prior vero pars, scilicet solam illam potentiam esse liberam quoad exercitium cuius actus est intrinsece voluntarius, declaratur in hunc modum, quia exercitium actus, seu (quod idem est) determinatio potentiae ad operandum, esse debet aut naturalis ex solo impetu naturae aut voluntaria ex inclinatione elicita operantis. Neque enim intelligi potest alia ratio ob quam causa aliqua exeat in aliquod opus, nisi vel quia est talis naturae ex se determinatae ad illud opus vel quia vult et

appetit talem operationem. Sed potentia libera quoad exercitium non determinatur ad opus ex solo impetu naturae; ergo est determinanda voluntarie; ergo aut extrinsece per voluntarium elicitum ab alia potentia, et sic non erit potentia formaliter libera, sed imperative, quia ipsa non se movet quoad exercitium, sed movetur et determinatur ab alio. Vel per voluntarium intrinsecum, et sic necesse est ut talis potentia sit appetitiva; ergo, ut potentia aliqua sit formaliter libera quoad exercitium, id est, potens seipsam determinare ad exercendum actum liberum, necesse est ut sit potentia intrinsece voluntarie operans per suum actum."

[4] De Anima V, edition, chap. iii, No. 8, p. 760. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 248r.

[5] DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 21, p. 384. The meaning of "moral causality" to Suárez will be investigated more fully later on.

[6] De Anima V, edition, chap. iii, No. 7, pp. 759-60. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 247v.

[7] DM XVIII, sec. 7, No. 49, pp. 209-10.

[8] Ibid. "Haec tamen sententia mihi non probatur; existimo enim notitiam obiecti solum concurrere ad actum appetitionis ut conditionem necessariam per modum applicationis obiecti, quia voluntas non movetur nisi a bonitate obiecti. Quapropter, si motio illa, ut est ab obiecto, non est effectiva, ut revera non est, sed finalis et metaphorica, . . . ut est a cognitione non est cur sit effectiva, quia praesentato obiecto bono non indiget appetitus extrinseco agente ut feratur in illud, sed ex naturali inclinatione ferri potest, seu potius anima, ut vivens per illam." The editors point out that some editions have "aut vivens per illam," which would then make the last phrase read "or rather the soul, or the living thing by means of it."

[9] DM XIX, sec. 8, No. 10, pp. 411-12: ". . . sicut voluntas nullum actum habet nisi concurrente obiecto in suo genere, ita nullam necessitatem patitur in suo actu (loquor de intrinseca et connaturali necessitate) quae non causetur ab obiecto in suo genere, scilicet, in ratione causae finalis allicientis et moventis metaphorice."

[10] De Anima V, edition, chap. iii, p. 760. MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 248v. Also, perhaps more significantly, edition, chap. vii, No. 7, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r.

[11] Ibid. These terms often occur together. Another important passage explaining moral notion of the will is DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 21, p. 384.

[12] *De Anima V*, edition, chap. vii, No. 7, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 260r.

[13] MS 583, disp. x, q. 3, fol. 247v. Alvarez' version is in the edition, chap. iii, No. 6, p. 759.

[14] Cf. note 6, above.

[15] DM XIX, sec. 8, No. 10, p. 412: "[E]rat enim argumentum, obiectum comparari ad voluntatem ut movens ad mobile; motum autem necessario consequi in mobile ex movente. Respondet [D. Thomas] autem *quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur; cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono; et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo*." The context makes it obvious that Suárez agrees completely with St. Thomas on this point.

[16] *De Anima V*, edition, chap. vii, No. 6, p. 773. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 1, fol. 259v. The *De Voluntario*, another treatise representing the early thought of Suárez, categorically denies the mutual causality doctrine. See *De Voluntario*, disp. vi, sec. 6, No. 5 (Vives edition, t. IV), p. 249.

[17] DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 9, p. 376.

[18] *Ibid*., sec. 6, No. 5, p. 391.

[19] *Ibid*. "[N]am in omni actu vitali sufficiens applicatio obiecti necessarii ad actum, simpliciter et in omni genere causae, antecedit talem actum nec fieri potest ut ipsamet obiecti applicatio effective proveniat ab actu ad quem ordinatur; sed iudicium rationis requiritur ad actum voluntatis ut applicans obiectum; ergo impossibile est ut iudicium rationis necessarium ad actum voluntatis effective proveniat ab eodem actu."

[20] See the treatment of *radix* above, chap. ii of this dissertation, pp. 75-83. The section on *orior*, pp. 83-93, expands and reinforces the same position.

[21] *De Anima V*, MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 262r. Italics mine.

[22] Cf., for example, *ibid*., edition, chap. ix, No. 8, p. 777. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 267r. "[I]deoque bonitatem moralem consummari in voluntate, id tamen habere in quantum conformatur suae regulae, quae est recta ratio. Unde prius, ac perfectius moralis bonitas oritur ab intellectu."

[23] Ibid., edition, chap. v, No. 11, p. 767. MS 583, disp. xi, q. 2, fol. 254v.

[24] Ibid., MS 583, disp. xii, q. 2, fol. 262r.

[25] DM XIX, sec. 2, No. 20, p. 341.

[26] Many passages of DM XIX could be cited, but among the most pertinent are sec. 2, No. 17, pp. 338-39 and sec. 5, No. 21, p. 384.

[27] Ibid., sec. 8, No. 21, p. 419. Italics mine.

[28] Ibid., sec. 10, No. 13, pp. 432-33: "[De altera difficultate,] in qua nimirum causa posita sit radix contingentiae, an scilicet in libertate primae causae, vel in libertate secundae, vel utriusque simul; dicendum est. . . . Prima causa, sive Deus, solum dici potest prima radix huius contingentiae, sicut est prima causa omnium effectuum universi. . . . At vero loquendo de contingentia simpliciter, immediata illius ratio posita est in libertate causae proximae et aliquo usu eius, . . . primordialis autem radix eius est libertas causae primae."

[29] See my comments on this passage above in chap. ii, pp. 162-63 of this dissertation.

[30] DM XIX, sec. 8, No. 10, p. 412. Cf. n. 15, above, and dissertation pp. 221-22.

[31] De Anima V, edition, chap. ix, No. 2, pp. 774-75. MS 583, disp. xii, q. 3, fol. 265r-265v.

[32] An intriguing remark which occurs also in the manuscript. Apparently the fact that Cajetan defended it prolixe is not exactly a point in its favor in Suárez' eyes!

[33] Ibid. In the manuscript, fol. 265r, the text appears as follows: "Voluntas vero non fertur in rem nissi [sic] prout habet ordinem ad actualem existentiam. Nulla enim res appetitur nisi vel prout, actu, existit vel existet."

[34] Ibid. The manuscript, fol. 265v, has: "Voluntas vero simplici modo fertur in obiectum suum appetendo existentiam illius, qui modus operandi minus certe subtilis est, et minus immaterialis [sic]."

[35] See above, pp. 106-07.

[36] DM XIX, sec. 3, pp. 344-57.

[37] Ibid., No. 20, pp. 355-56.

[38] Ibid., p. 356. Italics mine.

[39] De Voluntario, disp. viii, sec. 4, No. 11, p. 264.

[40] De Anima V, edition, chap. 1, No. 2, p. 754. MS 583, disp. x, q. 1, fol. 243r.

[41] Ibid., fol. 242r.

[42] Ibid., fol. 242v: "Nam appetitus est causa exequtionis [sic]."

[43] Ibid., fol. 243r.

[44] DM XIX, sec. 5, No. 18, p. 382.

[45] Ibid., No. 25, p. 387.

[46] Ibid., sec. 8, No. 6, p. 409.

[47] Ibid., No. 7, p. 410.

[48] Ibid., No. 19, p. 417.

[49] Cf., for example, DM XVIII, sec. 7, No. 49, pp. 209-10, which was discussed earlier under the metaphorical movement of the end.

[50] Ibid., p. 209.

[51] DM XIX, sec. 8, No. 11, p. 413.

[52] Ibid., sec. 4, No. 7, p. 361.

[53] See above, pp. 239-40.

[54] This explanation of the efficient cause as such comes from DM XVII, sec. 1, Nos. 2-6, pp. 48-53.

[55] This problem of the real distinction, intriguing though it be, is simply not the burden of this dissertation. One of the best explanations and defense of the Suarezian view is that of Sergio Rábade Romeo, "La metafísica suareciana y la acusación de esencialismo," Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, Universidad de Granada, III (1963), 73-86.

[56] I am indebted to Dr. John O. Riedl for this felicitous way of viewing the participants.

[57] St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Soul, trans. by J. P. Rowan (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), a. xiv, pp. 182-83.

[58] Suárez, DM XIX, sec. 6, No. 8, pp. 394-95.

[59] See above, p. 217.

[60] DM XVIII, sec. 7, No. 49, p. 210.

[61] *Ibid*. See above, note 8, for complete Latin passage.

[62] DM XIX, sec. 8, No. 14, pp. 414-15.

[63] I prescind here from God's necessary *concursus* with man's actions. Suárez certainly holds this, as is well known, but that problem as such does not significantly affect the philosophical explanations of the human side of *liberum arbitrium* which form the burden of this paper. Whether Suárez' view of free choice led him to the position he held on God's *concursus*, or whether the causality went the other way round, is an intriguing problem, but it cannot be my concern here.

[64] See above, p. 186.

[65] Scholars have pointed out the influence of this view of Suárez on Leibniz. See, for example, the article by José Ferrater Mora, "Suárez and Modern Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (1953), 528-47.

CHAPTER IV

SECONDARY SOURCES--SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

The problem central to this dissertation was suggested originally by the unusual range of opinions concerning the position of Francisco Suárez on liberum arbitrium. As was noted at the close of Chapter One, he has been classified as an essentialist, as an out-and-out voluntarist, as an upholder of the supremacy of the intellect's practical judgment determining the will, as one holding the extreme opposite of this, as a man who did not understand St. Thomas, as a man who not only understood St. Thomas but improved on him, as a great innovator in philosophy, as a mere eclectic, as a man who did not know his own position, and even as a man who was implicitly denying the principle of non-contradiction in his basic metaphysical positions. What is one to make of all this? When the question of liberum arbitrium is raised, the issue becomes further obscured by dint of the theological smoke that is liable to issue from the disputes. The controversy de auxiliis which was raging during the time of Suárez has had definite influences on his thought both in philosophy and theology. As I have already made clear, I wished in this dissertation only to investigate the philosophical doctrine of Suárez on the theory of human choice, without becoming involved in the theological embroilments that tend to develop in the discussion of this question. Within Suárez' philosophical position, I have again selected only his early works as objects of analysis. Since several authors have remarked a shift in his position on the will as his thought developed, I considered it valuable to present a textual analysis of works embodying his early position, so that at least this much of the Suarezian thought and of its criticism could be clarified. This project has been completed in Chapters Two and Three of this dissertation. Now, I would like to present the major criticisms of Suárez as they appear in a few of the more widely used sources. I will summarize them first, as briefly but as accurately as possible, and then try to answer their criticisms from Suárez' own point of view, as I have discovered it set out in De Anima V and Disputationes Metaphysicae XIX.

Of the many books and articles devoted to Suarez' philosophy in one aspect or another, I have selected three major works for discussion here. The first is by Paul Dumont: Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez, published in Paris in 1936;[1] the second by Jesús Muñoz, Esencia del libre albedrío y proceso del acto libre según F. Romeo, O.P., Santo Tomás y Francisco Suárez, S.J., published by the Pontifical University of Comillas, Santander, Spain, in 1948;[2] and the third by Thomas U. Mullaney, O.P., "The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom," as published in the eleventh and twelfth volumes of The Thomist in 1948 and

1949.[3] Other significant comments or works will be included briefly, but certainly these three are among the most important.

Paul Dumont's book is one of the most widely quoted on the Suarezian position regarding freedom. Although its primary focus is theological, it still throws a great deal of light upon the philosophical basis of the doctrine. As would be expected from this type of perspective, the main source used by Dumont is Suárez' treatise, De Gratia, with its various prolegomena, although corroborating texts are frequently introduced from the nineteenth disputation. His chief concern is the controversy de auxiliis with its endless discussion over the manner in which God moves the will by the supernatural aid of grace without at the same time destroying its freedom. Focus is brought to bear first on the authentic position of Francisco Suárez, as well as his purpose in writing his several treatises connected with the problem of grace and/or free will. Each member of the opposition is summarized and answered in turn--Baius and his disciples, with their battle, not against the existence of liberum arbitrium as such, but against its most basic and fundamental property in the eyes of Suárez: its active indifference;[4] the leading Dominican thinker, Báñez, and Diego Alvarez, his follower,[5] together with (as Dumont views him) their modern-day interpreter, Father Garrigou-Lagrange.[6] St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas are also consulted on this point, since Suárez is convinced (regarding Báñez and Alvarez) that many of their statements represent a false reading of St. Thomas. Dumont holds the same position with regard to Garrigou-Lagrange, at least in the formulation of his doctrine of *liberum arbitrium*. Long sections follow in Dumont's text, summarizing the thought of St. Thomas himself on this whole question, but these points, although interesting, do not bear directly on the matter of this dissertation.

What is Dumont's view of Suárez? Perhaps to give his overall judgment first might be most helpful. In the summary of his column on Suárez in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*,[7] he quotes approvingly from Grabmann's eulogy of Suárez as exhibiting an "astonishing erudition," quoting a veritable constellation of authors professing the most varied opinions, while reporting their views "clearly, textually, and faithfully." Grabmann lauds Suárez' capacity for argumentation and penetration, his "tranquil objectivity," and concludes with the mention of the "profundity of his spiritual life."[8] Dumont himself does not use quite so many superlatives, but neither does he discount those of Grabmann. He summarizes his doctrine finally as "remarkably competent, judicious, and sure. Less brilliant than others, his work has certainly not been less fertile, and without doubt it will be no less durable."[9] Obviously, then, Dumont has the highest admiration for Francisco Suárez as a philosopher and a theologian. Coming back to his work on *liberum arbitrium* in Suárez, I find that throughout he presents Suárez as an authentic interpreter of St. Thomas Aquinas, if not *the* authentic interpreter. I have pondered the question of whether Dumont makes Suárez agree with St. Thomas, or whether he makes St. Thomas agree with Suárez, i.e., is he a Thomist or a Suarezian? He would probably say that these two terms are not opposed, as Suárez is a faithful student of his master, St. Thomas. Some students do surpass their masters, of course, as St. Thomas did St. Albert the Great. Dumont does not actually say this much of Suárez, but I believe he is more a Suarezian than a Thomist, although he surely sees the former as a metaphysical development of the latter.

Dumont's summary of the Suarezian doctrine agrees very strongly with the conclusions I had discovered from the textual analysis of De Anima V and DM XIX. Rather than summarize this doctrine once again, I will simply mention that Dumont considers two main points to be the foundation of the Suarezian position on liberum arbitrium, and ultimately also on grace. One, that the essential property of the will is its active indifference and domination; and the other, that a free faculty which is not able to be exercised freely is no such faculty at all. In the early philosophical treatises I studied, the particular opponents Suárez had in mind when proving some of these positions were not made specific, since his chief purpose there was not to refute theological errors or doctrines, but to demonstrate a point philosophically. But when Dumont points out that Baius and his followers denied the active indifference of the will,[10] or that Báñez and his group declared the will retained its formal quality of freedom even though its free use might be taken away from it by God's activity,[11] then the insistence of Suárez on the opposite positions becomes most understandable. Dumont calls it "une insistance presque solennelle," and I believe this phrasing is completely accurate. When a man is proving a point that is closely connected with his religious belief, particularly when the opposite position seems to him to border on heresy, italics proliferate. Suárez never shows emotion in his writing, but he does show conviction and courage holding to the right, if he believes himself in possession of it. At the same time he gives evidence of openness to the positions of others and submission in faith to the doctrines of the Church, especially to the Council of Trent. These attitudes are not at all incompatible, for they signify that a believing man seeks the truth every place he looks, but there are some truths which he has by faith that he will never diminish or let go. Not only Dumont's work demonstrates this spirit of Suárez; it is completely evident in the way Suárez treats each problem he brings up, even in his purely philosophical work.

The basic Suarezian positions, then, are in effect the same as those discovered in the analysis of the texts on liberum arbitrium undertaken in Chapters Two and Three. Dumont provides an interesting addition by discussing further the positions that Suárez was opposing, for to see his doctrine in its overall framework does much to underscore the points of emphasis.

Dumont brings out the different usage that Diego Alvarez and Suárez both make of St. Thomas in proving their respective points. His object is apparently to show the faithfulness of Suárez, rather than the Dominican Alvarez, to the true thought of Aquinas. Alvarez, endeavoring to show that the will must necessarily follow the practical judgment presented to it by the intellect, quotes St. Thomas as his authority. Dumont points out that in one passage Alvarez firmly asserts that his teaching is the "authentic expression of the thought of the great doctor,"[12] while a few lines later on, with somewhat less confidence, he asserts that his conclusion is according to the mind of St. Thomas.[13] Alvarez quotes two texts of St. Thomas in his own support, the first the very general statement that the will is able to choose among different objects precisely because the reason can have different ideas of the good;[14] while the other declares no less explicitly that since reason can bring forth diverse judgments and is not at all determined to one alone, man must be free precisely because he is reasonable.[15]

Dumont does not argue with these quotations from St. Thomas, but he does dispute Alvarez' interpretation of them out of context. He points out that in the first text St. Thomas is really speaking of the imperium, where the intellect can command only in virtue of a prior act of the will. He is not saying at all that the will must choose the particular good presented to it by the intellect. Dumont's conclusion is delightfully wry: "If the angelic doctor had ever formed the same opinion as Alvarez on the nature and role of objective indifference, it is certainly not in this passage, it seems, that he has shown it."[16] His comment on the second text mentions Suárez as its correct interpreter. Alvarez is implying here that St. Thomas holds freedom to be really the prerogative of the intellect and its indifferent judgment, so that because the intellect is free to know goods of many different kinds, so is the will free to love them. But Dumont asserts once again that Suárez has developed this doctrine accurately in the Metaphysical Disputations, where he shows that although the will and the intellect may be inseparable as powers, "like the river and its source," still this does not imply at all that "the appreciations of one are the unavoidable laws of the other."[17] These remarks of Dumont's seem entirely justified to me, for they are a faithful presentation of the Suarezian doctrine as it is evident in the Metaphysics. Dumont scores another point against Alvarez when he asks whether, if it were really true that St. Thomas taught the doctrine Alvarez claims for him, there would not have to be other texts, far more decisive ones, to confirm this interpretation.[18]

The same direction of thought appears in the summary Dumont makes of the thought of Father Garrigou-Lagrange, whom he names as a modern disciple of Báñez and Alvarez, attempting to justify his position through the texts of St. Thomas. The text under discussion here is taken from the De Veritate, question twenty-four, article two, where Dumont makes clear that St. Thomas is discussing the manner in which the rational appetite corresponds to the mode of knowing of the intellect. Not at all is he making the point that any will act is necessarily determined by the intellect's judgment. This would result in determinism pure and simple, Dumont is sure, and he cites Suárez once more as insisting that the two questions of the existence and the use of liberty are essentially different. Misunderstood or confused doctrine on these issues can lead to grave errors.[19]

The endeavor of Dumont remains generally the same. He hopes to show that the true doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas has been badly misinterpreted and misused by the followers of Báñez, down to the present day. At the same time, Dumont puts forth Suárez as the true and faithful disciple of Aquinas. One more example will be sufficient to show this trend, especially since it is one in which, it seems to me, Dumont has definitely made Aquinas more Suarezian than Thomistic. The issue is that of reciprocal causality, which Suárez spoke so strongly against in DM XIX as being not even intelligible. Dumont echoes much of the same language in describing the situation. He states that some thinkers prefer not to commit themselves to an actual choice of the more primary power in liberum arbitrium. Thus, these philosophers discover a "liberating compromise" in the simultaneous determination of the judgment by the will and of the will by the judgment. "La causalité réciproque n'a-t-elle pas été de tout temps le refuge suprême du thomisme en difficulté?"[20]

In Chapter Three I have already shown how Suárez sees the usual statement of this position as an outright contradiction. Dumont does the same thing here by showing that Garrigou-Lagrange must do one of two things--either give priority to the will as the efficient cause in free choice (which he seems verbally to do), or be guilty of contradicting himself. To say that the will really has supreme control over human actions, as Garrigou-Lagrange does in this passage, is certainly to make the intellect at least equal to the will, if not inferior to it in the act of choice. If the causality is truly reciprocal, however, is it possible for any philosopher in reality to attribute priority to one power rather than the other?

Dumont concludes his argument by citing many texts of St. Thomas clearly attributing to the will the complete power of self-determination, and thus making it truly prior in the actual order. Such texts abound, he points out, and if it is suggested that St. Thomas held the opposite position advanced by Báñez, Alvarez, and Garrigou-Lagrange, then where are the texts and passages which speak clearly of an "equally sovereign empire exercised within a distinct order of causality by the reason upon the will?"[21] Dumont undoubtedly follows the early position of Suárez in insisting that any extrinsic efficiency acting on the will would destroy its liberty, for he argues that unless the will really has the last word in acts of choice, it has nothing to say at all. The will, he writes, must be an absolute queen or a slave.

There is no other alternative possible.[22]

Thus the argument of Dumont's book on human liberty according to Suárez has become clear. Dumont is a loyal follower of Suárez, and seeks to interpret St. Thomas and all his other teachers, in a way that harmonizes with that of his true master, Francisco Suárez. Although I am no judge of the theological arguments involved in this complete work, still I can say unequivocally that Dumont understands the basic positions of Suárez, and summarizes them succinctly. He claims too much for Suárez, however, in making him the continuation of St. Thomas, and his only true interpreter in the area of freedom. The book as a whole, then, is solidly Suarezian. Using the principles of Suárez, which he obviously identifies with the truth, Dumont sets out to refute, answer, and explain all those--opponents or friends--who might be discussing the question of freedom and grace at that time. He views Suárez, then, not as an innovator nor an eclectic, but as an alert, wide-ranging philosopher and theologian who was unafraid to bring in references and citations from many different sources. His philosophic task may have been, according to this perspective, to elucidate and develop to an even higher degree the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Dumont may have seen Suárez in this role; I do not. Too many points of difference on doctrine still remain. Suárez was his own man. Hasn't the time come when to say this of a man is much higher praise than to say he belongs to this or that school of thought? Dumont seems simply to be uniting Suárez and St. Thomas, perhaps because of the great affection and admiration he had for them both. The facts themselves deserve a long and careful study.

One of the most important sources on Suárez in a modern language is our second book, by Jesús Muñoz, S.J., Esencia del Libre Albedrío y proceso del acto libre según F. Romeo, O.P., Santo Tomás y Francisco Suárez, published in 1948.[23] Muñoz has an interesting motive in mind for his joint study of these three thinkers. Francisco Romeo, O.P., was one of the outstanding Dominican theologians who helped to prepare for the sixth session of the Council of Trent. His book, De libertate operum et necessitate, published in 1538, was well known to all those engaged in the controversy de auxiliis.[24] How is it, then, that Suárez never cites Romeo in his own works? This fact has intrigued Muñoz, who wants to discover just how the doctrine of Suárez agrees or disagrees with Romeo, precisely because of his failure to mention him specifically.[25]

Father Muñoz is of course most interested in the doctrine of Suárez on free choice, and he declares his procedure to involve a double process: a rather rapid survey of the major points in Suárez over which there is little dispute, followed by a far more detailed study of many texts when the issue becomes more intricate or less well-known. The chief point of investigation falling in the second category will be the question of the relations between the intellect and liberum arbitrium, but the actual process of the free act is Muñoz' chief focus of interest.[26] Due to this emphasis, probably, he chooses as his primary source of Suarezian doctrine the De Voluntario, which is concerned most directly with this aspect of liberum arbitrium, as I pointed out earlier.

Why does Muñoz bring in a third consultant, as it were, St. Thomas Aquinas himself? As Muñoz clearly states: "to penetrate more to the root of this problem," it seemed only natural to consult the teaching of St. Thomas, the great doctor of the schools, and to compare his doctrine with that of Romeo and of Suárez. Finally, in the process of analyzing the Suarezian texts in such close conjunction with those of Aquinas, Muñoz hopes to give striking evidence of Suárez as a "devoted follower and a penetrating commentator--profound, original, and personal--of the Angelic Doctor."[27] From the outset, therefore, the personal attitude of Muñoz is plain. Not so laudatory as was Dumont, he nonetheless sees Francisco Suárez basically as a faithful and penetrating follower of St. Thomas Aquinas. The texts he chooses to analyze will portray his position on Suárez even more clearly.

The overall plan of the work is both simple and effective. Muñoz begins with a summary of the doctrine of Romeo on the essence of liberum arbitrium, and after drawing up a list of what he considers its essential characteristics, Muñoz sets forth the remarks St. Thomas and Suárez would make on the conclusions. I find this frequently used phrase, "St. Thomas and Suárez," significantly indicative of the attitude of Muñoz toward the two men. After this initial investigation, Muñoz goes on into the actual intellective-volitive process, giving the doctrine of Romeo in full, with a few comments on the limits of the liberty of the judgment "according to St. Thomas and Suárez." Romeo's position is labeled the first solution, and concludes with a solid affirmation of the primacy of the will in the free act, though Romeo seems to tend toward an intellectualist preference. Some early remarks of his confuse the issue, and are never really cleared up. He knows he must affirm the primacy of the will, however, so he embraces it completely, but the solution of some of his early problems remains unsatisfactory.

The second solution is that of Bartolomé de Medina, O.P., who attributed an efficacious imperium to the intellect. The opinion of Báñez is offered here also, as an attempt to salvage liberty in a situation which, we can easily surmise a priori, will completely obliterate the true meaning of freedom, at least as Suárez has envisioned it from the beginning.

The third solution is then presented, but in two parts: (1) the doctrine of St. Thomas on the process of the free act, completely explained and analyzed, followed by a short critique, and (2) the doctrine of Suárez on the same points. This having been completed, conclusions are presented according to the mind of Suárez, and finally a brief epilogue on the three main authors (Medina is omitted, apparently as unworthy) and their view of the psychological process of the act of free choice.[28]

For the purposes of this dissertation, no more needs to be said about the positions of Romeo and Medina, as Suárez himself has explained and/or refuted similar doctrines whenever he saw it necessary in De Anima V or DM XIX. More interesting now is the relationship Muñoz sees between St. Thomas and the Jesuit thinker. The chief stress falls, as it probably must, on the issue of reciprocal causality. Suárez was so open in his non-acceptance of this explanation of liberum arbitrium as he understood it, that anyone trying to bring St. Thomas and Suárez into conjunction will inevitably have to struggle with this text. Depending upon the position of the one arguing, St. Thomas will have to turn out to be saying exactly what Suárez means, or (from the other side) the words of Suárez will have to be reducible, after all, to the position of Aquinas. More than semantics are involved, however. Let us see what Muñoz has to say on this problem.

In order to explain the way in which Muñoz approaches this question, the fact must be stressed that he is a psychologist analyzing the complete process of the act of choice. In the discussions of mutual causality as they appeared in DM XIX, Suárez had a metaphysical point to emphasize not a psychological one. His analysis there of the intellect-will relation, in my understanding of it, turned upon the production of any act of liberum arbitrium, and he concluded that such mutual priority as some proposed was simply contradictory. A being's causality cannot precede its being.

Muñoz at first seems to be shifting this argument to an entirely different ground, for he spends little or no time on the individual act of choice as such, but goes almost immediately to an analysis of the first act of choice as supplying a foundation for every subsequent act. His question is rather: what ultimately initiates the process which culminates in choice and execution of a free act? Muñoz stresses instead the necessity of avoiding an infinite progression in mutual acts of intellect and will, which could--of its very nature, if one may so speak--never resolve the question at all. In a certain sense, such a series would simply multiply the contradiction to infinity; it would certainly not remove it. St. Thomas, Suárez, and Muñoz are in perfect agreement on this point; so am I. Somewhere, some act must be absolutely prior. Muñoz is not actually asking another question in shifting the approach to the first true volition, therefore, he is pushing the discussion to a level that is in fact more basic. On this level, Suárez and St. Thomas really do agree, for the issue here concerns not so much whether the intellect and will do influence each other in different orders of causality, as the impossibility of an infinite series in any order.

Establishing the analysis on this new level gives Muñoz himself a starting point. Is it a valid one? In one sense, yes, for the question of what precisely grounds the will's causality must itself be answered before any others can be truly solved. In another sense, no, for the shift leaves unresolved the disputed issue that originally disturbs Suárez in the causality of actual liberum arbitrium. Unfortunately, that still remains a question. Muñoz seems to imply that if the causality in the first act of volition is solved, the rest of the acts can proceed without contradiction since the whole series would be explained at once. I am not so convinced, for I believe the issues at stake are slightly different. Two distinct questions may spring actually from the same base, but in explaining the base one does not automatically provide the complete answer to both questions. If the explanation is correct the solutions should be there in embryo, but they must be brought to birth. Muñoz, I feel, does not quite achieve complete viability.

The one problem Muñoz does undertake to handle is approached carefully and thoroughly, however.[29] He begins his analysis by a basic summary of St. Thomas' views on the will before its production of a free choice, pointing out that in order to be a power having active dominion over its acts, the will must have everything it needs to produce its own acts. It has this dominion, Muñoz writes (explaining St. Thomas), in virtue of "its own perfection of being free, thanks to which it possesses virtually the production of its own will-acts. In other words, once the object is presented, the will has in itself everything necessary to produce its own willing."[30] The explanation sounds very Suarezian to me, not merely because of the doctrine itself, but also because of what is not said, namely, what "the perfection of being free" entails. The same lack of focus on what really grounded the efficiency of the will bothered me in the early texts of Suárez on this point. To say the will has this power because it is a characteristic of the will to have it does not sufficiently explain why the will has the characteristic in the first place. Muñoz is aware of the problem, however, for later on he investigates this precise point. In fact, it provides the ultimate solution for which he is looking.

As I have already mentioned, Muñoz rejects the mutual causality position because it would make the first volition of the will a contradiction. He declares that to think St. Thomas himself was not aware of this would be most disrespectful, to say the least, and proves his point by quoting Aquinas in the section of the Summa Theologiae on the will" "Hoc autem est inconveniens, quod procedatur in infinitum."[31] I am stressing here Muñoz' use of St. Thomas because it is indicative of the way in which he consistently unites the thought of Aquinas and Suárez. The union is not always explicitly done, and perhaps is due to no more than the way in which any scholar interprets the views of another according to his own thought categories. Whatever the reason, the fact is quite evident. Again, Muñoz anticipates this comment of mine, for after explaining the entire article from which the above quote was taken, as well as referring to some significant sections of the sixth question De Malo of St. Thomas,[32] he insists that his interpretation of Aquinas is not the result of "benevolent arbitrariness" toward the saint, but is solidly based on a penetrating textual analysis of the expressions used by St. Thomas himself. Muñoz concludes here that:

> Of the true thought of the Saint on the danger that the supposed mutual causality would involve of an infinite process, and of the elimination of that process, there remains no possible doubt.[33]

I agree that his procedure has been extremely careful, thorough, and textually based. If one is ever to discover the true thought of a philosopher, one must go about it in this way, I am sure. My quarrel with the conclusion of Muñoz here, however, is based upon something else altogether, and that is the assumption that, because St. Thomas and Suárez are shown to be in fairly close agreement on this precise point of the _first_ act of the will, the concomitant problems of reciprocal causality in the later acts of intellect and will are thereby solved. Perhaps Muñoz does not really assume this. His problem, after all, is that of the entire intellective-volitive process as set out chiefly in the _De Voluntario_, and this he solves. My problem, on the other hand, may arise from the persistency with which Suárez argued against mutual causality as he understood it in DM XIX, where a simple act of _liberum arbitrium_ was primarily the focus. To show, as Muñoz does, that St. Thomas does away with mutual causality on one level, thus putting him in agreement with Suárez, does not prove that they are equally in agreement on other possible manifestations of it.

The remainder of Muñoz' textual analysis and comparison of both St. Thomas and Suárez on these points seems to me very well done, but perhaps it need not be summarized and commented on here. The work itself is well worth a detailed study. One point should be made with respect to the final solution of the problem just under analysis, for Suárez and St. Thomas do differ on the answer, and Muñoz uses this difference to form the basis of his conclusions on Suárez. According to Muñoz, St. Thomas holds that the initial movement of the will into act comes not from any previous knowledge act on the part of the intellect which would determine it, but--quoad exercitium--from a special intervention on the part of God.[34] But Suárez, as is abundantly clear, insists that the will must in itself have everything it needs to move itself into act. Suárez rejects the position of those who hold that an irresistible command from the intellect precedes the primary volition, as well as the view that a complete or fully conscious awareness of the meaning of the ultimate good would somehow have to precede the first truly free act. He also holds that no special motion is necessary from God that the will go into action for the first time, other than the gift of the will itself, which by its nature is bent upon seeking after the good. This is the will, and this is given by God. Suárez thinks it foolish to hold that God, having given a power meant to go into act by its very being, would then have to start such a power working by another act of causality.

The view of the fundamental constitution of the will as dynamically inclined to act, then, which Muñoz has arrived at through his textual analysis of the De Voluntario of Suárez, is in basic agreement with my position in the summary of Chapter Three. The initial active causality of the will, for Suárez, comes from the very constitution in being which is the will itself, set upon the good and dynamically tending towards whatever leads to that good.

How does Muñoz then proceed to unite Suárez and St. Thomas on this point? He admits that the Thomistic texts quoted are "not the most reconcilable with the Suarezian opinion,"[35] but the desired result is actually achieved. Muñoz points out that St. Thomas did not speak only of an external superior cause moving the will, but also of its inclination "ex instinctu naturae."[36] He insists that St. Thomas means the words "mover" and "moved" in an analogous sense, and that they truly signify nothing else than God's creative action in giving to man a power innately bent upon the good. This view is certainly identical with the position of Suárez already set forth. Muñoz insists that the correct interpretation of St. Thomas leads to the same conclusion--that God is "the superior cause who, with His power, created the will 'insofar as He gave it form--its appetitive free nature ordained to the elicited appetition of the good--which is the principle of action.'"[37] The discrepancies are thereby resolved, quite efficiently, and Muñoz concludes with a note of triumph that "once again the Eminent Doctor [Suárez] is seen to be a penetrating investigator of reality and a masterful interpreter of the Angelic Doctor."[38]

In his final summation of Suárez as a philosopher Muñoz stresses this point repeatedly. He declares that the attitude of Suárez toward St. Thomas was similar to that of Aquinas to St. Augustine--full of respect, but unafraid to disagree or clarify a point when he felt it necessary. A careful reading of the Suarezian texts will prove this point beyond a doubt, he remarks. Suárez is by far the most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas, Muñoz holds, but he insists that the similarity between the two philosophers lies primarily in the fact that Suárez learned from St. Thomas how to look at reality according to the critical norms and fruitful principles which Aquinas himself had established. "He is not copying his Master," Muñoz writes, "for this would have been to keep himself in the role of an amanuensis or even of a mere disciple. He is imitating his Master. His genius is capable of this. He confronts himself with the same problems, and he solves them. He also is a Master."[39]

The position Muñoz holds on Suárez' relation to St. Thomas should be abundantly clear. Doctrinally, I find that his summaries of Suárez agree with the same points I discovered Suárez to be stressing. Perhaps the agreement is a fact because the procedure followed was similar, i.e., a careful textual analysis. Muñoz makes no mention of the later position of Suárez on the will, or of some of the doubts regarding the text of the De Voluntario, but I find his doctrinal conclusions solid and factual, as far as they go. No development of thought appears in his analysis of

Suárez, however. This characteristic would be accounted for by the fact that he limited himself to the one treatise, but neither does he situate the treatise chronologically in the total work of Suárez. Within these limits, his conclusions on the doctrine of Suárez are admirable.

The third work which I will now undertake to summarize is not so basically founded, for I do not feel that it is based on an objective textual study which attempts truly to understand Suárez on his own terms.

Perhaps the most important part for us of Thomas U. Mullaney's work on the basis of Suarezian teaching on human freedom,[40] is the section on potency and act in the order of operation.[41] After a very detailed study of the meaning of potency and act in the whole of being, Mullaney focuses his attention on efficient causality as exercised by creatures. Here, after all, is the crux of the matter with respect to human freedom. An efficient cause is seen to be the first principle from which some action or effect follows, and many different types are described briefly.[42] The important question, however, concerns the degree and manner of distinction between an efficient cause and its effect, i.e., that which receives its causality. Can an efficient cause reduce itself from potency to act?[43]

In any natural growth or physical alteration, the Aristotelian principle that a thing cannot be in potency and act at the same time and in the same respect certainly holds true. Some modifications, however, may occur in the case of vital or immanent actions in a being, or at least certain problems may arise. Immanent acts in a spiritual being, of course, are quite unique, for plainly these acts occur or are received in the very being which operates, and often in the eliciting power itself--a power which often lacks diverse or distinct parts.[44] Suárez does insist, however, that there is not an absolute identity here, a fact which Mullaney glosses over rather swiftly. He does state it, but only after putting the case so bluntly that one is initially convinced Suárez is completely contradicting himself. This impression is corrected, verbally, but not psychologically. The traces remain. This type of persuasion may be unconscious; perhaps it is only an accident that the Suarezian position is almost always stated by Father Mullaney in this fashion. The general effect of this procedure is to reduce a lengthy work which purports to be scholarly to the level of polemic. One hesitates to take polemic too seriously. The following text might be quoted as exemplifying this tendency:

> Suarez indicates this difference however, that of cognitive acts the proximate active principle is distinguished from the principal [sic] of receiving as the including is distinguished from the included; for the former principle is faculty plus species; the latter is the faculty alone. For appetative [sic] acts no species is needed, so the one faculty is the principle quo of both acting and receiving. Some argue that the principle of act is faculty plus appetition of the end (which is attributed to the author of nature) and the act of willing means to the end is received in the will alone, and so they find even here a distinction between active and receptive principle. But Suarez rejects this and states that the will through itself is the proximate principle both of act and

> reception. The inconvenient conclusion is of course that, one thing is, under the same aspect, agent and patient; therefore under one aspect, one thing is in act and potency. But this is no real difficulty for Suarez; he points out that there is no repugnance in this that one faculty be in first act, and in potency to second act for first act does not formally include second act but a power to elicit second act. Hence the faculty can at one time be in virtual act and in formal potency. As by one action a thing can be constituted actually acting and receiving so by one faculty a supposit can be constituted in the ratio of acting and receiving, in potency. There is no inconvenience in one thing's being, under one aspect, both agent and patient if it is taken with proportion, i.e., both in potency or both in act.[45]

This rather lengthy quotation gives ample evidence of the problem. Mullaney goes on to summarize quite boldly the conclusions that Suárez must draw from these positions and statements. He points out that in immanent action the passive and active principles are not even partially distinct, and applies this fittingly to the will, since it is both an appetite, and a free power. Such a power can "by its very self be sufficiently constituted in first act as a sufficient, proximate, effective principle of the same action which it receives."[46] Mullaney adds at this point in the text a proposition which he declares he would like to put "in large letters," for even though it is not taken from Suárez' section on efficient causality, he considers it absolutely fundamental to the Suarezian treatment of efficiency. The statement is a rather cautious one, directly quoted by Mullaney, from the twenty-ninth disputation, section one, paragraph seven. Suárez writes here that the principle "everything which moves is moved by another" is not yet sufficiently demonstrated in every type of motion or act. Who can really quarrel with this statement, I wonder, especially in the light of modern scientific discoveries? Suárez is not denying its truth; he is simply holding that it is not yet sufficiently proved, for he goes on to say that many things seem to move themselves from virtual act to formal act, such as water when it freezes, acts of the sense or rational appetites, "idem ergo accidere potest in motu locali." Is Suárez really holding this position here? Or is he simply declaring the need for further investigation of "what seems"? Is this what happens, or what seems to happen? Mullaney leaves no doubt; Suárez--at least in the quote as given--has not settled the question.[47] It seems to me that Father Mullaney, who is obviously convinced of the truth of the Thomistic synthesis and its explanation of the act-potency relationship (a conviction I believe I share), is here judging Suárez repeatedly on terms that are not his own. Stated in a Thomistic frame of reference, where act means always what it does to St. Thomas, and potency signifies always that which is not yet act but is capable of receiving it, these propositions cannot help but seem close to contradictory. True, the effort of discovering the true Suarezian meaning of these terms is a murderously slow and painful process, but it is an effort which seems to me to be owed to any serious philosopher, indeed to any man. Father Mullaney has gathered an impressive number of texts, but so gathered, do they state the Suarezian position truly, or instead the Mullaney-Thomistic version of that position? A more accurate way of proceeding, I believe, would be to establish the meaning of the terms first, not simply by a quotation from Aristotle, Suárez, or St. Thomas, but by a study of the progressive use of the terms and their meaning as it gradually unfolds in context. An a priori way of exposition can easily lead to prejudicial attitudes that can mislead, if they are not indeed actually faulty.

To go on with Mullaney's summary of the basic concepts of Suárez' position on the will and freedom, the article quotes Suárez as holding that the agent, or efficient cause, must be in some way unlike the patient at the beginning of an action, but not necessarily at its end. This doctrine is quite traditional, except perhaps for the statement that the only type of dissimilarity that is absolutely necessary is such as is found "between a habit and its privation, or between a thing constituted in act or existing in potency."[48] Certainly there is no need for any positive opposition between the two states. Suárez again makes his statement that in any immanent action a proportional thing is produced by the power--a second act which is in harmony with first act and is indeed the perfection of it, being already contained in it not formally but virtute et eminenter.[49] This does not contradict the principles of identity or non-contradiction because the difference or unlikeness between first and second act, although not formal, is virtual and true.

Following this section is a long and detailed account of potency and act, most of which is irrelevant for our purposes here. Suárez accepts the basic divisions of potency into active and passive, stating that while there are purely active powers (such as the agent intellect), which only initiate transitive action, never undergoing immanent acts, there are no purely passive powers. Some powers are both active and passive, for they are in potency to the reception of a form either from another power or one elicited by themselves. By the very fact that they exist as powers they are constituted in first act, and are actually powers in being--hence already in some act--but virtually or eminently containing a further second act.[50] Mullaney insists on Suárez' point that our understanding of such faculties as active-passive results from our faulty concepts; in reality no actual distinction between the power's two aspects exists. As a "vital and perfect power it comprehends the ratio of receiving and eliciting."[51]

The rest of this section is simply a recital concerning potency and act adding little for our purposes to the discussion. Father Mullaney, however, has formulated this in a confusing way. The references are brief and sketchy for statements ranging over a wide area from Aristotle to Suárez, including items such as passive potency (transcendental and predicamental), the real distinction ("The real distinction is clear, for the respect of potency to its act is real") vs. the modal ("The real distinction is sometimes a real distinction sometimes modal but it is always essential for potency and act are distinquished in reality [secundum rem] and have respects which are altogether diverse and opposite"),[52] and so forth. The fragmentary treatment of these pages together with their incomplete and unsatisfactory references prove both frustrating and basically incomprehensible. One cannot decide whether to lay the blame at the feet of Suárez or of Father Mullaney. One finishes this section on act and potency with a few clear ideas, not very startling, on the nature of potency in Suárez and the relative perfections of the various powers and their acts. Any more definite or ordered knowledge would be almost impossible to summarize.

The last lengthy section of Father Mullaney's article in The Thomist presents a critique of the teachings of Suárez that he had been endeavoring to explicate in the previous installments.[53] One of the first characteristics of this concluding installment is its greatly increased clarity and order. It seems that Mullaney is much more comprehensible when he is explaining Mullaney, or speaking as a Thomist, than when he attempts to summarize the Suarezian position. Perhaps this is the inevitable result whenever a thinker of one persuasion endeavors to criticize a thinker of another persuasion. They speak in apples and oranges. The first sections of this final installment reiterate the Suarezian positions on essence and existence: There is no real distinction, because essence is already in itself a limited act revealing the fundamental simplicity of things, and nothing can be formally constituted in the order of real actual being by something distinct from itself.[54]

Mullaney comes finally to the actual critique of the

Suarezian teaching on human freedom.[55] In this thirty-page section, which is based on the points which had been brought out and discussed previously, Father makes several concluding summations which seem to me misstated, over-simplified, and even--at times--grossly inaccurate. His whole purpose here is to show that the proposals he made in the very beginning of his work as characterizing the foundation of Suárez' view of human liberty are indeed true. The questions he raised there were excellent, and his stated manner of procedure promised to be both thorough and textual, but the outcome seems to me short of the truth. This result, I believe, has come about because Father Mullaney has failed to be truly objective in his study of the Suarezian texts, for his long pages of summary of their meaning frequently prove more confusing than helpful. It may be a matter of translation, of emphasis, of omissions in certain quotations, or of an inability to put on the mind of Suárez. Two points I would note particularly before giving my views of the final section. Father Mullaney shows no consciousness at all in his analysis of any shift in the position of Suárez on liberum arbitrium, and the texts he cites are taken from early and late works without, apparently, any notice of the fact that the treatises were taught or written at widely separated times. No chronological or historical setting is at all evident in Mullaney's treatment. Furthermore, the question of editorship, which proved to be a necessary point of reflection concerning the De Anima, has apparently not raised any problems for Mullaney. Yet of the four works he cites most frequently, even considering only the last concluding section of his work, two were edited posthumously by Baltasar Alvarez; while the others--the Metaphysics and the first Opuscula theologica--saw light under Suárez' own hand.[56] All are quoted by Mullaney with equal authority, it seems to me, and no study is given to the De Legibus. In spite of this, Mullaney's work purports to give the absolute basis of the Suarezian view of freedom in man.

Such passing over of the foundations of his remarks on Suárez reveals, I believe, a rather basic tendency in Father Mullaney to equate the real truth of something--be it a text or a doctrine--with the opinion commonly held about it. This kind of over-simplification will not do. I hesitate to spend so much time in comments on this book, as I do not consider it to be worthwhile in advancing the truth about Suárez, and yet I feel these remarks of mine to be necessary, since Mullaney's book is one of the few full-length works on Suárez available in English. One recent master's thesis on the sensitive appetites in Suárez was based almost completely on the De Anima and this critique of Mullaney's.[57]

Mullaney stated in the very beginning of his work that the whole of Suarezian thought on freedom could be summarized in two basic propositions, "each so basic that it can be resolved to no more ultimate proposition, and to the two propositions Thomists shall never agree."[58] This is quite true, but it is not the point at issue. The fundamental attitude of Mullaney towards the doctrine of Suárez revealed in this statement, however, has made itself felt throughout his work. All along, one feels him testing against the Thomist position. The question of whether or not the position of Suárez could be true is never asked in any other form than "Does it agree with St. Thomas?" The probing seems to go back no further than this. Mullaney's two propositions follow:

> 1) [R]eason does not enter in as a per se cause of a free human act; the Scotistic divorce of intellect from will was actually accepted by Suarez;
> 2) [P]otency and act are not really distinct principles of created being, for one reality which is actual can also be, in its very actuality, its own intrinsic limitation of actuality; conversely one reality can be of itself potential, yet virtually and eminently contain its own actuality.[59]

Mullaney holds that Suárez espoused the first principle unconsciously, and he declares he will prove this to be the case. He admits that it "can be instantly attacked by an appeal to Suárez' own words,"[60] and that ostensibly Suárez rejected the Scotistic view. Suárez never understood the Thomist teaching on interdependence of intellect and will --surely a deplorable situation which, in Mullaney's eyes, makes it impossible for him to arrive at the truth. I do not believe I state his view too strongly. The texts themselves bear it out, and only a few pages later he defends himself against just such an accusation: "Lest we seem through some intellectual chicanery to be twisting Suarez' position to conclusions unrelated to it, we must point out that traces of both these conclusions [two others regarding analogy and universality] . . . are to be found in Suarez himself."[61] Perhaps the aspect that I find most distasteful in all these remarks is the fact that they are made at the very beginning of the presentation in The Thomist of Mullaney's work. The reader who is not familiar with the works of Suárez himself can hardly avoid being predisposed to an unfavorable judgment.

In the concluding section of the work, which appears in the twelfth volume of The Thomist, Mullaney attempts to bear out his two original propositions with specific reference to the Suarezian doctrine on freedom. He repeats three points again and again: first, that the whole view of the will as a potency having complete and active indifference with regard to its acts is based on the fact that Suárez viewed the potential as itself somehow actual;[62] secondly, that the potency which is the will can determine itself to its second acts because it contains that act already "eminently virtually"[63]--a phrase which he constantly reiterates but never really explains--and thirdly, that Suárez holds that the will receives from the intellect no per se causality and hence no influence, thus establishing the "divorce" between the two powers.[64]

Many of Father Mullaney's points are true, but the treatment of them simply skips over the surface, in my opinion. He states their basis, but fails to prove his point except by citation of this or that text, which is really not analyzed thoroughly, but merely repeated. Frequently one text is used, or misused (as the one from De Anima V stating that the object is applied to the will through the judgment "per accidens"), and serves as a support for the whole conclusion. Later on, especially, Suárez definitely does hold a per se causality from intellect to will, but it is in the formal and moral order, not the efficient. The meaning of these terms to Suárez himself does not seem a matter of concern to Mullaney. I must ask myself whether Mullaney really wants to understand Suárez, or whether he merely wants to prove that the Suarezian and Thomist position are irrevocably opposed. They are two distinct issues.

I do not wish to write a complete dissertation on the work of Thomas Mullaney, but many points and remarks he has made seem to cry out for refutation or clarification. I will simply make two summary statements, and leave the rest to heaven. When Mullaney writes that Suárez' view of the will rests upon his doctrine that at least some potency can be eminently actual,[65] I feel that he has missed completely the Suarezian meaning of act. Suárez does not even think in terms of act and potency, but rather in terms of limited acts, made to be limited and actual at the same time by their efficient cause, ultimately God. Thus, I do not believe it is the potency as such which is eminently actual. It is the act which the will has already by its very constitution in being as a power adhering to the perfect good. This love of the absolute good is an act that eminently contains the love of all lesser goods that reflect it or may lead to it. It is not potency as such that contains act. It is the act already constituted which contains or includes lesser acts. Is it as valid to say that "every potency is somehow actual," as Mullaney does, and "every act in a creature is somehow limited"? The latter, I believe, Suárez means, for there is no division in the being for him. What is is a limited act --made to be, given actuality, by God.

The other statement I cannot avoid making has to do with Mullaney's view of the manner in which the will chooses to act. He reveals no awareness at all of the many texts in which Suárez specifically points to the intellect as guide and rule of the will's choices. He in fact denies this position outright, declaring that indifference for Suárez means complete and total active indetermination toward every good (he even seems to include God in this), without any influence at all from the judgment of the intellect. Suárez does not say this. His position must be explained, I agree, for I also am convinced that the seeds of voluntarism are present in his view, but at least in this early position (and Mullaney shows no awareness of any other), I believe that Suárez' own statement must stand as meaning then no more than he meant it to mean. In the nineteenth disputation, as late a text as any Mullaney deals with, Suárez writes that "the judgment as such never determines the will in an absolute manner, unless the object might have this power by reason of the excellence of its good."[66] In spite of this statement and all it implies, however, Mullaney can write that

> Had Suarez admitted the Thomistic position that the will is indifferent precisely because reason proposes to it objects which are presented as partial goods and which are therefore incapable of causing a necessary act of the will, had he seen that as a consequence even the act of selecting such a good must be itself an object elected as a merely partial good, he would have seen that the dominative power of the will as that faculty is proximately disposed to act does not require indifference in the sense of indetermination.[67]

The fact is that Suárez did see these points, and he explained them often. Where are those texts for Mullaney? It is not sufficient to say merely that because Suárez said these things, that does not automatically prove them. Of course not, but why? The exact explanations must be given.

Regretfully, I must conclude my comments on Mullaney's work. Many other points should be disputed, but this is not the place. I agree with Father Mullaney in his choice of the central issues, but I could not disagree more with his manner of presenting them. The conclusions of Suárez are neither so extreme nor so contradictory as Mullaney would hold. They are completely consistent with his first principles. Mullaney admits this, but does not deeply examine these first principles of Suárez. The meaning of actuality is the foundation, I agree. Simply to say, however, that the Suarezian position differs from that of St. Thomas is not sufficient to disprove it. All it really proves is that this theory is not Thomistic, and even this thesis some of the current Suarezian thinkers would be prepared to dispute.

NOTES--CHAPTER IV

[1] Paul Dumont, Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez (Paris: Beauchesne, 1936).

[2] Jesús Muñoz, Esencia del libre albedrío y proceso del acto libre según F. Romeo, O.P., Santo Tomás y Francisco Suárez, S.J. (Separate edition of article in Miscelánea Comillas, IX, 347-504.) (Comillas [Santander]: Universidad Pontificia, 1948). In this study I have used the article from Miscelánea Comillas.

[3] Thomas U. Mullaney, O.P., "The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom," The Thomist, XI (1948), 1-17, 330-69, 448-502; XII (1949), 48-94, 155-206. Published separately as Suárez on Human Freedom (Baltimore, Md.: The Carroll Press, 1950). There is some slight rearrangement of the article in its book form, but the doctrine remains the same.

[4] Dumont, pp. 3-22.

[5] Ibid., pp. 22-29, 34-60.

[6] Ibid., especially pp. 29-34, although thereafter mention of Garrigou-Lagrange follows periodically until the end of the entire section on Báñez, p. 60. The book on which Dumont bases his criticism is Dieu, son existence et sa nature, published in English in 1939. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., God, His Existence and His Nature, trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1939).

[7] Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1941). The section on Suárez, t. XIV, part 2, cols. 2638-728. Dumont has contributed the summary of dogmatic theology. On efficacious grace, etc., see cols. 2687-690.

[8] Ibid., cols. 2690-691. Dumont is quoting from M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, t. 1, c. xvii, Die Disputationes metaphysicae des Franz Suarez, pp. 534ff.

[9] Ibid., col. 2691.

[10] Dumont, Liberté humaine ... , p. 3ff.

[11] Ibid., pp. 21-22ff.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 26. Dumont lists his source for Alvarez as his work *De auxiliis*, XII, disp. cxvi, No. 4. Dumont equates, for all practical purposes, the thought of Alvarez and Báñez. I have not studied either man first hand, so I cannot really give a judgment on his evaluation of the two Dominicans.

[13] Dumont, *ibid.*, quoting Alvarez, *ibid.*, No. 9.

[14] Dumont, *ibid*. St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* is cited by Alvarez as *Summa Theo*. I-II, q. xvii, a. 1 ad 2.

[15] Dumont, *ibid*. Alvarez here quotes *Summa Theo*. I, q. lxxxiii, a. 1.

[16] Dumont, p. 28.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[18] *Ibid*.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 42. This particular question certainly identifies Dumont as a Suarezian, if any doubt still remained.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[23] Please see complete reference data above, note 2.

[24] Muñoz, p. 349.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 353.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 353-54.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 354.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 505-06.

[29] For the discussion of this entire issue, *ibid.*, pp. 392-97.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 393.

[31] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 17, 5, obj. 1. Marietti edition, p. 83.

[32] "In all these passages[St. Thomas] looks for an efficacious solution for mutual causality and to the resultant absurd process which would follow from it." Muñoz, p. 396.

[33] Ibid., p. 397.

[34] Ibid., p. 462.

[35] Ibid., p. 464.

[36] Ibid. Muñoz cites the basic Thomistic texts he is using as S.T. I-II, 17, 5, 3, and 9, 4, c. He then refers to 9, 6, c. and also De Veritate, 22, 5, c.

[37] Muñoz, p. 466. The quote from St. Thomas is from the Summa Theologiae, I, 105, 5, c.

[38] Muñoz, p. 466.

[39] Ibid., p. 447.

[40] Thomas U. Mullaney, O.P., "The Basis of the Suarezian Teaching on Human Freedom," The Thomist, XI (1948), 1-17; 330-69; 448-502; XII (1949), 48-94; 155-206.

[41] Ibid., XII, 76-94. Mullaney's source is chiefly DM XVII and XVIII.

[42] Mullaney, XII, 76-77. Cf. DM XVII, sec. 2, Nos. 2-21. One type of particular interest to us would be the two-fold description of a moral efficient cause. It may mean one which acts freely, and in this sense it is hardly distinct from the physical cause (one which truly brings about an effect). Or moral may mean a cause which does not truly and really effect, but acts in such a way that the effect may be attributed to it morally. Such a moral causality is always per accidens.

[43] Mullaney, XII, 77. DM XVIII, sec. 7.

[44] Mullaney, XII, 79-81. On the latter point, p. 81. Cf. DM XVIII, sec. 7, No. 45.

[45] Mullaney, XII, 81-82. For all this he gives a short abbreviated quote from DM XVIII, sec. 7, No. 51, as follows: "Fatendum est eamdem omnino potentiam per seipsam esse principium proximum agendi et recipiendi talem actum . . . eamdem facultatem esse in actu primo et in potentia ad actum secundum immanentem nulla est repugnantia quia actus primus non includit formaliter secundum, sed virtutem ad eliciendum illum . . . in hoc sensu non est inconveniens quod idem secundum idem constituatur agens et patiens si cum proportione sumatur."

[46] Mullaney, XII, 83. DM XVIII, sec. 7, No. 54.

[47] Mullaney, XII, 83-84. He quotes DM XXIX, sec. 1, No. 7.

[48] Mullaney, XII, 84.

[49] Ibid., p. 85. DM XVIII, sec. 9, No. 9.

[50] Mullaney, XII, 85-87. DM XLIII, secs. 1 and 2.

[51] Mullaney, XII, 88. Reference is to DM XLIII, sec. 2, No. 15, and also No. 16, but there is no direct quote.

[52] The reference for the first quote on the real distinction is Mullaney, XII, 90. The second is on page 91, and is footnoted in full as follows: "Distinctionem hanc . . . interdum est proprie et in rigore realis, interdum sufficit modalis." (Note 407, DM XLIII, sec. 5, No. 12.)

[53] Mullaney, XII, 155-206.

[54] Ibid., p. 156.

[55] Ibid., pp. 178-206.

[56] In addition to the Metaphysical Disputations (1597), Mullaney cites most often the Prolegomena to the De Gratia (1619), the De Anima (1621), and the Opuscula Theologica (1599). The first and the last would be roughly contemporary, though the former is primarily philosophical, the latter plainly theological. Mullaney leaves the question of the authenticity of the two posthumously edited works completely untouched.

[57] John L. Treloar, S.J., "Sense Appetite and Will in Suarez: The Doctrine of the De Anima" (unpublished Master's thesis, St. Louis University, 1964).

[58] Mullaney, XI, 11.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., p. 11.

[61] Ibid., p. 14.

[62] Mullaney, XII, 186 and throughout.

[63] Ibid., p. 184 and throughout.

[64] Ibid., p. 196 especially.

[65] Ibid., p. 193. "At least" and "can be" are welcome qualifiers Mullaney usually omits.

[66] Suárez, DM XIX, sec. 6, No. 14, p. 399.

[67] Mullaney, XII, 201.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

After many words and many thoughts, I will now try to summarize and review the position of Francisco Suárez on liberum arbitrium as it reveals itself in his early thought, especially in De Anima V and Metaphysical Disputations XIX. A rather gradual development has been evident from his earliest work in the De Anima, which was taught in the early 1570's when Suárez was just beginning his teaching career. Since Alvarez filled in the missing pages of his posthumous edition with this early manuscript, I think it is safe to say that the De Anima--especially in the manuscript but even in edited form--represents the earliest philosophical thought of Suárez available to us. At that time, Suárez was quite positive of one thing. In order for the will to be really free, absolutely no efficiency whatever could be allowed to act upon it. Suárez went to great pains to eliminate every trace of efficiency from every other power except the will itself. He denied any per se influence that could be a necessary determinant from the intellect or the object presented to the will by the intellect. His views seemed to be structured in a sort of spiral closing in on the will. Each new circle proceeding inward marked off another area in which he allowed no efficiency operating on the will, until at last only the will remained, alone in its glory of actuality and efficiency. But what was this? Suárez did not seem, at that time, to be able to say any more. His understanding of the meaning of efficiency and the way in which it necessitates its effect was to undergo much development. In the De Anima it still remained quite vague and nebulous.

From the very beginning of his work, however, Suárez consistently placed strong stress on the formal determinants of liberum arbitrium. He is unequivocal in his judgment that the intellect is a superior power to the will, and his use of the term radix, as we have shown, maintains a constant reference of will to intellect. He meant this connection and influence to be a formal one, not an efficient one, although later on in DM XIX it became evident that he would even permit the possibility of some degree of efficiency from the side of the intellect or any other determining cause. So long as the power of the cause did not measure up to the capacity of the will, which is set on the supreme and necessary good alone, the will would still remain in active dominion over its choices.

In the conclusion of Chapter Three I showed how even though Suárez held firmly to the influence and importance of the formal determinations of a thing, he still refused to make liberum arbitrium a joint act of both intellect and will. Formally, freedom belongs only to the will for Suárez. Any determination, cause, condition, or influence coming from outside only becomes an actual part of the free choice if the will chooses to make it actual. Thus, it is true that a split takes place here, so that the act taken as a whole contains only those elements which the will decides. This is indeed the beginning of voluntarism, although at this point in his development Suárez would never say this. I feel convinced, nonetheless, that it is from these basic tendencies to primacy of the will in the actual operation that those who call Suárez a voluntarist take their starting point. It is from his stress on the formal and the intellectual as the ground, rule, and norm of perfection for the will that the intellectualists take their stand. Suárez himself appears at this moment in transition, but I believe him to be at heart a voluntarist as his thought develops philosophically.

The stress on actuality as the precise gift donated by the efficient cause, thus including the will in its proper area of operation, marks the primary value in the philosophy of Suárez. To pose his problems in essence-existence terms or in act-potency categories is not quite fair to him, for instead of seeing a created being as essentially composite and for this reason dependent upon God, Suárez views the creature as a limited act, and for this reason dependent upon God, the First Efficient Cause, for its total actuality. Suárez views being as simple, not in the sense that it has no parts, but in a deeper unity that sees it fully and finally constituted only by the efficient cause. He asks more than once why a being would need some existence from any extrinsic source once it is actual. By being actual, it has existence.

God, as efficient cause of actuality in which all actual things participate, is the absolute center of the Suarezian philosophy. It is in Him, as I pointed out at the close of Chapter Three, that formal and efficient causality unite in Pure Actuality. Suárez has no doubt in his mind that creatures are in no way necessary. When he says that an actual essence includes existence he is not saying at all that it is necessary; quite the contrary. An actual essence has actuality (of whatever type) only from God. Participation is at the root of the actuality of everything. Just as we saw in liberum arbitrium that a human act of free choice becomes actual only when the will, exercising its own participated efficiency, so decides, thus everything in the universe outside God depends for its being upon a free choice of God, an act of love. The universe of Suárez has been named non-Christian, but to one who understands the complete dependence of any created actuality at all upon the supreme and perfect Act, loving His creatures into actuality, and allowing men to imitate Him in their same free exercise of efficiency in giving actuality, the Suarezian world is deeply Christian, profoundly conscious of God. Man is like God particularly in his powers of knowing and loving, i.e., intellect and will. For Suárez, I believe that man's supreme likeness to the creativity of God is found in the free and unhindered exercise of his power to love--the will in the act of liberum arbitrium.

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APPENDIX

COMMENTARIA UNA CUM QUAESTIONIBUS
IN LIBROS ARISTOTELIS DE ANIMA

by

Francisco Suárez

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Disputation 12, Question 2
Folios 260r-264v

imperio agit, quae q[uae]d[am] sit ac e[st] alia quam quae tractauimus dis. 12
ubi n. tn̄ conformiter quoad eliciendum aliquem uolitionis n[on] concurrit
intellig. nec ostenditur. an 2° concurrat imperatiue aliq[uo] quodcumque. De
breuiter Iudico intellectum n[on] posse efficaciter imperare actus
uoluntatis sed si aliq[uo] m[odo] pot[est] erit ex praesupp[osi]to aliquo actu uoluntatis
et postq[uam] uoluntas dirigit per intellig. efficaciter imperare uoluntati
quare. ita tota illa efficacia intellig. prouenit ex electione uoluntatis
quae si auferretur imperium esset inefficax. et ideo simpliciter dicebam
intellig. tn̄ pot[est] mouere finaliter uoluntatem: uoluntatis 2° intelligere efficaciter.
Ex quo colliges quod inter actus etiam 2° potentiarum, i. dabitur esse actus intellig.
qui appellatur semper suis cognitionibus. et ideo respiciunt, i. actus intellig. non mouent
uoluntatem. sed l. ab inclinatione naturali, l. ab extrinseco aliquo ipsos aliquod
de in intellectu specialiter tribuitur Deo ut et prius actus. ad 5. 1 p. q. 63. forte
qui Deus specialis prouidentia gubernat creaturam rationalem: Et hinc
ad illum pertinet inclinare illam ad bonum. et ad illud etiam maxime
in principio sui esse, q[uo]d desumpsit ex Ar. et Bu. de bona fortuna e[st] p[ro]pria l.
ubi ait quod dari consilium quoddam naturale. ab interiori mouente praecedens
deus. ut in rebus agendis ipse experimur quosdam actus in in-
tellectu n[ost]ro. q[ui] n[on] procedunt a uoluntate. sed l. ex peculiari instinctu
superiorum. l. certe ex suggestione malorum. quae opus discernere et secernere
ut monet Ioa. 1. cano. et Bernar. i sermone 1° pentecost. Ex quo
colliges quod haec motio uoluntatis. n[on] e[st] adeo necessaria in suis potentiis
ad operandum, ut sine illa operari n[on] possit, et per n[on] aliae potentiae
motionibus suis praeueniunt hanc motionem uoluntatis.
Ultimo N. quod motio uoluntatis. a qua effectiue dicitur mouere alias
potentias n[on] e[st] sic intelligenda. ac si illam aliquid uoluntas formaret
in aliis potentiis. l. aliquod immediate concurrat ad eliciendos
actus aliarum potentiarum. sed tn̄ e[st] quaedam moralis motio. quae in suo genere
e[st] efficientia per accidens. impropria aut morali consor[tio] ipsis et quae
sint tn̄ ex consensu istarum potentiarum, quae in eadem a[n]i[m]a radicantur
et sunt inter se in subalternatione nalem

Q. 2. An Voluntas sit libera in actibus suis.

D. Th. 1. p. q. 81. 1. 2. q. 82

Postq[uam] dictum e[st], de potentia. et actibus eius. dicendum de ipsa libertate
eius in principio disputationis adnotaui, cum potentia ca[pax] p[ro]prium spiritualem absque or-
gano corporeo. quaeri tn̄ posset an sit distincta realiter ab intellectu
necne nam multi putant tn̄ distingui formaliter. ut Durand.
Scot. et alii in 1. d. 3. q. 3. et August. de trinitate n[on] uidetur ma[gis]
distinctionem ponere inter intellectum. et uoluntatem q[uam] inter memoriam

et intellectum

260v

Ro intellectum, et nos cum DDS opinamur distingui realr ab
eo ut videre est Ar. 3 de aia tex. 29. Ro sane susp.a distingui
realr ab essent.a probabilius multo est distingui ex nris. ita qua
sententia posita nullum sequitur inconveniens. Ro oia que ad hoc
spectant ex dictis multo facilius intelliguntur. Hoc ipsum tn monet
q° de libertate voluntatis. q̄ue tractari posset. De pōa quia
Ro hec de libertate ex ptis pendet nam ad illius perfectam divi[illegible]
neare, i. scire quō Deus possit certo cognoscere operationes
liberas n' auferendo libertatem. Item quō Dei providentia
[illegible], Ro [illegible] quō illius praeveniens gra. stet cum libertate
arbitrij. Item quō praedestinatio. Ro confirmatio in gra n' tollat
libertatem. in ab his orbs. supersedendo. Que hic breviter a
nobis tractanda est ex propriis tn principijs. nec n. omnino
omitti potuit cum sit huius mae propria quam h' tractat
Ar. [illegible] pōa ne[illegible] 1° quia pōa que deliberat
ad unum n' e. libera. sed voluntas terminatur ad unum s. 1
bonum [illegible]. 2 repugnat eadem pōa libere. Ro necessario operari
sed voluntas nra in multis necessario operatur. nempe diligit 2
beatitudinem. Ro Deum clare visum [illegible] 3 pōa libera ad agendum 3
e. illa que positis requisitis ad agendum pōt agere. Ro n'
agere. sed voluntas n' e. huius [illegible] nam voluntas re
quirit concursum voluntatis divine. ut possit exire
in actum posita aut dei voluntate n' pōt voluntas nra
n' operari. Ro [illegible] 4. nam si Deus scit me operaturum 4
hoc [illegible]. si infallibiliter operabor illud, si n' infallibiliter
n' operabor ergo nunquam e. libertas ad operandum, Ro n' operandum
5. [illegible] pōa nra e. libera [illegible] dum operatur [illegible] operatur 5
n' antea, nam tunc n' operatur, atque adeo n' operatur libere.
nec [illegible] operatur [illegible] tunc necessario operatur, nam res [illegible] necesse
e. ea, Ro [illegible] operatur necesse e. operari. 6 quia aia nra 6
e forma corporis, ergo sequitur conditiones corporis in operibus suis
ergo quemadmodum aliae formae pendent a caelo in suis operationibus, Ro sequuntur
illius influxum. ita aia. Ro voluntas nra. sed influentia
caeli naliter operatur. ergo Ro voluntas nra que illam sequitur. 7 7
voluntas. Ro appetitus sensitivus sunt pōe in eadem aia
radicatae. ergo quidquid una istarum pōarum appetit. appetit alia
nam, in eadem aia appetens pro utraque n' pōt aut eadem
aia simul contraria appetere. sed appetitus sensitivus naliter
operatur ergo Ro. 8 si voluntas nra esset libera ex na sua, n' posset necessitari
adeo [illegible] falsum ergo [illegible] Deus n' pōt
mutare [illegible] Deus n' pōt facere ut pōa

que n'e

que n. e. libera ex na. sua operari libere. Gra. pot. facere ut
sit libera operari nunc —
Secundum e. fidei catholice; in hac q. errarunt imprimis pagan
et qui gentiles q. posuerunt unum prim. bonum et malum, ut Marcio-
nitae. Et etiam erat Stoicorum error, qui dicebant nos operari
omnia ex absoluta fati necessitate, ut videre est in Cicer. l. de
fato. Plutar. de placitis philosop. c. 28 et 29. Aug. 5 de
civitate c. 9 et 10. et de haeresibus c. 33. et eundem errorem
secuti sunt Priscillianistae q. dixerunt nos necess. operari propter
influxum stellarum ut colligitur ex Leone epistola 91. Hier. epis. ad
Ctesiphont. concil. Bracar. etc. Huic fuit similis error Mani-
chaeorum, qui statuebant 2 Deos, alterum principium bonorum,
alterum malorum, et ita ponebant in nobis 2 animas alteram
quae necessitaret ad bonum, aliam ad malum. Et hi 3
errores tollunt etiam libertatem quantum est ex ista in
na. sua. Alii haeretici tollunt libertatem aliquibus. Et
alii dicunt praescientiam et providentiam Dei tollere libertatem,
quod tenuit Abailardus quem secutus Wiclefus, damnatus
concilio Constantiensi sess. 8. Videndus est Bellar.
idem est ... liber. Alii tollunt libertatem arbitrii
specialiter in baptizatis per gratiam Dei illos necessitantem
quem errorem tenuit Iovinianus, contra quem Hieron. et
Aug. saepe disputant. Alii aiunt libertatem arbitrii per
peccatum originale esse ablatum, postque necessitari homines ad
peccandum. Ita erravit Lutherus, q. a 36 ad Leonem 10
ait liberum arbitrium post lapsum esse de solo titulo, et figmentum
cum multis aliis haereticis, multi iis iam dicti, et Aug.
de liber., S. Bern., Anselmus, Orig., Tertullianus sub eodem
titulo et contra servum arbitrium Lutheri Roffensis a 36 ad Leonem. Drie-
donius de gra. et liber. Alber. Pighius, Lessius in ... c. 32. Soto de na. et gra. c. 15. Castro de haeresibus verbo libera
arbitrium. Secundum e. contra libertatem uno opponi ser-
vituti, et illud Ioan 8. si vos filius liberavit vere. ad
Rom. 6 cum servi essetis peccato liberi facti estis. alio opp-
poni necessitati, 1 ad Corinth 7. qui statuit apud semet-
ipsum non habens necessitatem, facultatem aut habens suae volun-
tatis; et 3 coactioni opponitur, nam qui cogitur necessitatur. Et
de hac libertate loquimur, nam liberum arbitrium
ut Sot. 5 c. 15 ... nec tamen ... libet ... est
quasi illud dicatur liber qui sua sponte quod libet operatur. Sed
aut libertas consistit in hoc quod homo possit eligere malum

Et non existere possibilibus omnibus requisitis ad agendum. ut si habet potentiam
obiecto visibili. et potentiis ceteris positis potest oculus
videre, et non videre. est liber. Dicitur autem omnibus requisitis ne-
nam ex parte [illegible] deficiente obiecto, vel alio impedimento
indigentia et non libertas. 2a N. quod sane [illegible] hoc [illegible]
sensum. Est voluntas nostra sit libera e contra. Et con-
hoc dato exercet hanc libertatem in omnibus actibus suis in
[illegible] tamen et qui sunt ultra circa finem et principia [illegible]
et libertatem, et dominium suarum operationum, sua ac-
tionum. Hoc constat quoniam est ex fundamentis fidei nostrae. dicitur
n. ad Hebr. 11 quod accedentem ad Deum oportet credere, quia est,
et accedentium ad se remunerator sit. remuneratio autem
non esset, nisi esset libertas, necessariis aut aliquo [illegible]. Atque nec me-
rentur, nec demerentur [illegible] subeunt egeris [illegible]. sint
aut mala in [illegible] peccatum suum adderit. Et Ecclesiastici
15. cap. 30 Deuter. Et Ecclesiastici 15 dicitur reliquit illum in manu
consilii sui. Et 31 qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus
facere mala, et non fecit, et 1 ad Corinth. 10 potestatem habens
suae voluntatis &c. Probatur sacra scriptura est plena praeceptis, suasio-
nibus, minis, promissionibus. quae omnia nec intelligi possunt sine li-
bertate utrosque [illegible] D. Aug. epist. 46. Item Deus
punit malos Matth. 25 si autem non essent liberi sine causa
puniret. quae certissima res est in fide. tam ante peccatum
quam post peccatum originale, nam testimonia adducta universaliter
loquuntur, et hec veritas definita est contra lutheranos concil-
lio Trid. sess. 6. c. 5, et 6. et [illegible] hoc constat in ratione naturali evidenter
quam assequuntur et [illegible] qui refert [illegible] c. 16 dicunt
non tamen dedit nobis Deus facultatem, quibus ad [illegible] foramus
neque erat bonum. Et veri fratres, dedit hoc liberum, et
expeditum non coactum ipsum quam. de inseruit et [illegible]
in nobis, nec ullam vim et [illegible] vincit. quae
positio impedimento est. Probatur facultas per se. nos non
ipsi videmus quod volumus operamur. et ab operatione
cessamus. Et hoc differt homo a bruto. Et consultatio a
insano. Probatur sed omnium hominum sensum operationes hu-
manae sunt dignae laudis. et vituperio omnis et poena
Et hoc est quasi primum principium naturale. quod liberi. Item homo
ex natura sua est capax consilii. ad monitionis et praecepti
alias varia erant consilia. et leges sunt frustra quae est contra in-
clinationem naturae. si autem homo non esset liber ista non sunt utilia
nam semper homo operaretur necessario. ut si brutum daret consilium.

Campanella d. qui vellet tollere libertatem arbitrij est destruere ordinem naturae, pub. religionis, societatis. evidens est, nam homini nec propter hoc honorarent, nec malum operanti. Quia necessario operaretur necessitate absoluta, bonum sequeretur ab auctore ipso deo adoperandum malum, quod est absurdum. Probatur 2o ex nostra sententia est dominus suarum actionum, quod dominium in hoc consistit quod possit pro libertate sua illas exercere vel non exercere. Quia est liber, qui habet sui dominium, nam homo est dominus aliarum rerum, nam in vobis nullus [illegible] debet, quod homo est capax dominii, quia quod est malum auferre ab aliquo quod suum est. Illud autem dominium in hoc consistit quod habet libere uti rebus suis. Et in hoc dominio actionum suarum consistit quod homo sit factus ad imaginem Dei ut Damascenus l. 2 fidei c. 12 et Aug. psal. 17; ideo postquam Deus dixit faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, eis dedit ut esset, quae omnia a posteriori demonstrant rem.

Sed ut eam a priori demonstremus oportet explicare in quo consistat formalis et radicalis libertas, in quo supponamus 1o quod haec libertas convenit homini sive quatenus rationalis est, quod probatur nulli alio animali conveniat. Quia signum est convenire homini rationalis, per quod ingenio superat alia animalia. id quod constat experientia, nam homo non experitur in se libertatem nisi ingenio rationis utitur. Item quod ista potentia est spiritualis, libertas ad spiritualem compertinet Scotus in 2. d. 12. [illegible] Magister 2 d. 24. ubi dicit liberum arbitrium esse facultatem voluntatis et rationis. Igitur liberum arbitrium imperium significatio [illegible] aliquem [illegible] translatum ad significandum propter [illegible] iam potentiam significat ut D. Th. 1. p. q. 83. a. 2. et ideo dicitur facultas, scilicet rationis facultas non [illegible] sunt addit[illegible] voluntatis et rationis, quia libertas partim in ratione partim in voluntate consistit, in illa tamquam in radice, in hac tamquam in subiecto formaliter libero. Utrumque probatur nam quod libertas consistat formaliter in voluntate nam consistit formaliter in indifferentia electionis. Dico homo est liber quia potest elligere hoc vel illud. consistit et in libero [illegible] contrariorum operationum, elligere autem et aliis [illegible] propriis voluntatis quod ut patet. Quia formaliter libertas ad voluntatem pertinet. Et omnis operatio [illegible] libera [illegible] subiicitur voluntati quod hoc libertas ex ratione oriatur probatur 1o quod appetitus ex cognitione oritur ut [illegible] consensum, quod modus appetitus est voluntatis illius [illegible] oriatur ex modo et [illegible] perfectionibus cognitionis

Sed ostē in particulari et in generali quod ex rāe oriat
libertas in volunt. et thom. coīr collocant quod libertas
voluntatis orit ex intellu intellus odio in ipsis sunt pot.
voluntas amare hoc vel non amare quia intellus non necessitat
hoc esse melius sed pot in ~~[illegible]~~ obiecto invenire aliquam rationem
boni, vel aliquam rationem mali, vel ita voluntas pot illud
amare, vel alio hoc quam secum et dicere D. Thom. p. q.
83. a. 1. ad 2. probat bruta non sunt libera quia non agunt indifferenter hoc
2o habet liberum arbitrium quia agit iudicio rationis quia
habet vim ad opposita. vel ex his [illegible]; nam libertas voluntatis con
sistit, i. in hoc quod proposito obiecto bono, pot illud
amare, vel non amare, sed hoc non pot habere. sed in hoc
pot amare inquantum reperit rationem boni, vel non amare inquantum
habet rationem mali. ergo libertas consistit in hoc quod ~~[illegible]~~
in eodem obiecto pot comprehendere. nam si intellus cognosceret
aliquod bonum in quo [illegible] amare nullam rationem mali
inveniret non posset voluntas illud non amare. ergo hoc sane se sum
tenit forma. 3o est ut sciri [illegible] quae doctores inferunt
quod voluntas semper debet eligere quod intellus iudicat
esse melius, vel convenientius quia non pot aliquid refutare
nisi quia videt aliquam rationem mali [illegible] minus bonum invenit
[illegible] ex hoc quod libertas voluntatis [illegible] esse in tra
[illegible] [illegible] quod bonum, sed iste modus habet difficultatem
nam si hoc est verum voluntas non est magis libera quam intellus
nam sicut intellus necessario assentit vero, ita voluntas amat
bonum, cui nullum malum est coniunctum, vel sicut voluntas
pot non amare bonum quia invenit rationem mali ita intellus
pot non assentiri si verum non appareat certum sed quod
sit admixtum falsitati. ergo hoc quod ab [illegible] intelligendo vo
luntas non est libera nam semper sequitur iudicium intellus
vel semper debet ~~intelligere~~ eligere quod intellus iudicat melius
sed intellus non est liber ergo nec voluntas. Propter hoc ergo considerandus
est modus Dur. quam forte deus theologi imponunt. libertatis — Contra Dur.
libertatis causam formalem in intellu, nam sicut ex intellu [illegible] li
bertas [illegible] intellus oritur libertas in voluntate proinde
vel perfectius erit in intellu. Alius modus dicentium quod
voluntas libertas oritur ex intellu non est ex intellu
illius, sed ex perfectione vel unitate in hoc non superat
intellus alias potentias cognitivas. quod cog
nosci [illegible] confirmare hoc esse convenientius [illegible]
distinctum principium rationem convenientis separando illam ab aliis rationibus

Q. 4ª An voluntas sit libera in omnibus actibus suis.

3º. sic contingit et considerando quantum sit appetibile et sic hac perfect. cognitionis oritur perfectio in appetitione voluntatis nam sicut intellectus percipit in unaquaque re quanta sit illius bonitas vel malitia ita voluntas illam amare perfectius quo eius bonitas exegerit, et ideo res illæ quæ apparent bonæ, non tamen adeo ut necessario conferant ad beatitudinem hoc non amant, necessario sed libere, et huius sunt omnes particulares res quæ in hac vita occurrant, numquam enim in particulari aprehenduntur necessariæ, vel quia beatitudo non penitus in eo in quo debet poni vel quia non consideret aliter vel certe quia aliud et hoc ergo non conferant necessario hinc ergo oritur libertas voluntatis et ideo quocumque bono sibi proposito potest illud amare propter bonitatem quam habet et non amare quia non desiderat illud, necessario saltim, et ratio sed est quod aliud est non amare, aliud odio persequi, non amare dicitur libertatem quo ad exercitium et ad hanc non est necessarium invenire in obiecto rationem mali sed satis est non invenire necessariam rationem boni, ad odium vero necessarium est invenire aliquam rationem mali et ad hoc tendit et forma quæ non omnino repudianda est sed explicanda. ~

Ex quibus omnibus sumitur ratio a priori conclusionis nam voluntas sequitur formam rationalem et discursivam ergo est libera, tenet consequentia quia libertas arbitrii sequitur rationem ex intellectu et ratione nam ut ex dictis quod intellectus aprehendit rationem boni et mali et de una quaque re iudicat qua ratione et modo eligibilis et bona sit, ergo appetitus qui talem cognitionem sequitur, poterit amare unumquodque bonum cognitum, ea ratione et modo quo diligibile sit atque adeo libere confirmatur nam appetitus sequitur cognitionem ergo formam cognoscitivam existentem in supremo gradu formam appetitivam, atque adeo libere sed intellectus est talis forma, inter cognoscitivas ergo voluntas inter appetitivas e.

Ex quibus etiam probatur quod voluntas et liberum arbitrium sunt idem re et ratione, distinguuntur sicut intellectus et ratio nam sicut intellectus dicitur intellectus vel absolute quatenus intelligit aut quatenus simpliciter res intuetur ratio vero dicitur quatenus discurrit ita voluntas dicitur talis vel inquantum vult vel ingestum simplici modo tendit in finem liberum autem arbitrium dicitur ingestum libera electione circa media versatur. e.

An Voluntas et liberum arbitrium distinguantur realiter

Sed super circa hanc conclusionem explica[illegible] in quibus actibus et circa quæ obiecta sit libera voluntas sed hoc non potest explicari nisi simul plures quæstiones theologicæ tractentur et ideo breviter dicitur quod libertas alia est quo ad exercitium quæ in hoc consistit quod possit habere actum et cessare ab illo, alia est quo ad specificationem quæ consistit in hoc quod possit habere hunc actum vel contrarium vel amorem, vel odium vel in hoc quod possit amare hoc vel eius oppositum dico ergo quod

in quibus actibus aut circa quæ obiecta sit libera voluntas

voluntas.

diversis gradibus [illegible]

Voluntas e. determinata quo ad specificationem ad bonum et beatitudinem in communi non tn. quo ad exercitium t. q. qd in beatitudine l. bono in commu nulla apparet ro mali ut posset illud odie persequi .2. u. q. qd numquam mo huius boni l. beatitudinis aperte in hac vita tanquam simpliciter necessarij et ideo non necessitat voluntas ad exercitandum illud. at v. ad nullum bonum in particulari necessitat voluntas in hac vita neque quo ad exercitium qd non videt aperte et clare in eo complexitas et necessitas rationem boni, neque quo ad specificationem qd nullum e. bonum in hac vita qd non sit malis et difficultatibus admixtum, u. in hoc differt voluntas ab intellectu, qd intellectus quo ad exercitium non e. in se liber sed pendet ex motione libertatis ut s. ostensum e.. quo ad specificationem v. si alm. appareat evidenter verum, necessitat intellectus ad asentiendum voluntas v. non necessitat ad amandum etiam si appareat evidenter bonum ro e. qd ro veritatis e. unica tn. u. si res habet veritatem excludit omnem falsitatem at v. bonitatis ro non e. tn. una et ideo una bonitas potest esse admixta alijs rationibus mali ad v. post hanc vitam si hoc consequitur Dei visionem necessitatur quo ad exercitium et quo ad specificationem ad Dei amorem qd ibi nulla potest inveniri ro mali sed semper summi et nec. ro boni in alijs aut. actibus omnibus voluntas e. libera tam in electione quam in intentione finis quamvis alio et alio m. nam circa media operatur non solum libere sed cum deliberatione et consilio, circa finem v. operatur absque deliberatione sed de his omnibus i. 2a dicendum e. partim q. 1 partim q. 8. et 10, et 13. .

tta forsan met ci. q. 1. sic sumd. multis in locis.

Ad 1um et 2um

Ex his pt solutio ad 1m argum. et ad 2m. R. qd eadem pa. quae libere operatur, circa aliqua obiecta pot. operari naliter et nec. circa alia qd e. pa. superior et operatur iuxta exigentias obiectorum ut voluntas Dei amat nec. suam esentiam qd illud obm. sic e. dilligibile creaturas v. libere amat qd etiam illae sic dilligibiles sunt sic etiam voluntas nostra proportionali —.

Ad 3um quo Deus concurrit et cum voluntate nra

3m argm. petebat longam tractationem de modo quo Deus concurrit cum voluntate nostra ad exercendos actus tam naturales quam supernaturales salva illius libertate de qua et theologi multa dicunt quae videri possunt. 1. p. q. 19. 22, et 23. et 12. q. 109 breviter tn. d. cum Stho suis locis et 129. a. 4 qd cum voluntas ex natura sua sit libera Deus cum illa concurrens non aufert libertatem illius sed cum infinitae sapientiae sit et potentiae acomodatse, causis 2is et cum una unaquaque concurrit eo m. quo illius natura exigit.

vide huiusmo dicam de actu

Exipit, et ita cooperat. voluntati non illam necessitando sed relinquens
illam ut se determinet ad quam partem voluerit et ad illam pre
at, auxiliis et concursibus, ad arg. 3. ~~inform~~ forma. Resp. quod positis omnibus re
quisitis in actu 1° pot. voluntas exire, et non exire in actum 2m, Deus
n. quantum ex parte sua e. paratus ad concurrendum cum voluntate
ad actum quem ipsa voluerit elicere et in potestate mea e. quod Deus
concurrat mecum s. non concurrat. et ideo e. libertas in electione. ut supra
do. quod posita voluntate divina non pot. non operari hanc et nihilominus
tn. libere operatur quia illa propositio facit sensum compositum et tm. ponit ne
cessitatem conditionalem ad 4m. Resp. quod voluntas quando operatur libere operatur Ad 4
simpliciter loquendo. at quando non operatur etiam libere non operatur quia in eo
dem instanti in quo operatur posset quantum e. de se non operari ad quod in
telligendum e. consideranda voluntas in hoc instanti in quo elicit actum
ut e. prior na ipso actu, et hoc prioritate sic libere se determinat ad hunc
actum eliciendum et postquam iam intelligitur sub actu nec. sub illo.
quod tunc quia facta e. compositio et illa e. tm. necessitas consequentis non
consequentiae cum qua stat libertas simpliciter. de quo arg. plura supra q. 14 a.
13. q. 19. a7 et hoc etiam m. manet solutum — 5m arg. Deus n. non scit actus Ad 5
meos liberos nisi inquantum sunt aliquo modo presentes sue eterni
tati et illo m. scit illos esse futuros quo illi sunt nec scia illius ponit ne
cessitatem, nisi conditionalem. 6m arg. petit aliam difficultatem de m. quo Ad 6
celum habeat dominium circa operationes voluntatis nostre de qua re. 1. 2. q. 9
a5. sed non e. h. locus ad tractandum omnia. dico tm. breviter quod celum
habet influentiam circa corpus hic et circa oes potentias corporales que intrin
sece, in dispositionibus suis pendent a dispositionibus corporis at v. circa
opera intellectus et voluntatis non habet celum directe influentiam nec
dominium quia iste potentie sunt spirituales et altioris ordinis nam licet aia nos
tra sit forma corporis non tm. e. corpori immersa omnino sed a corpore elevat.
in aliquibus operibus suis verum e. tm. quod indirecte quasi ex consequenti in
quantum ratio sequitur sensum, et voluntas sensitivum appetitum
celum influens in has potentias materiales indirecte et quasi ex consequenti trahit
voluntatem non nec. sed inclinando tm. potest, voluntas libertate sua
resistere et dominari influentiae celi iuxta illud sapiens dominabitur
astris, 7m arg. ut impugnaremus impietatem Lutheri asserentis concupiscen
tiam appetitus sensitivi semper esse peccatum mortale et voluntatem semp.
necessitari.

Necessitari ab inordinatione appetitus quae post peccatum mansit sed
hoc tractent theologi, et ideo breviter qd. appetitus et voluntas sunt
diversae potentiae distinctae sequentes diversas cognitiones et ideo ad diversa in-
clinantur, et una trahit aliam post se non necessitando sed inclinando
aliquo modo, nec repugnat eandem animam per diversas potentias contraria ap-
petere, maxime si per unam potentiam coerceat inclinationem alterius
vide de hoc 12 qq. a. 2. 5. argumento petit aliam difficultatem s. an deus pos-
sit necessitare s. cogere voluntatem de qua D. Thomas 1a. q. 82. a. 1. 12.
q. 6. a. 4. breviter dicitur quod res theologica est quod licet voluntas de se sit li-
bera; tamen potest necessitari a Deo nam cor Regis in manu Dei est et quo-
cunque voluerit vertet illud est n. omnipotens et dominus voluntatis
neque est simile quod in argumento adducit, nam res quae necessario operatur est mixta
et inferioris ordinis et ideo omnino est incapax libertatis ex natura sua et
ideo neque a deo potest illi conferri nam libertas debet esse ab in-
trinseco, dicit n. intrinsecum quoddam dominium supra actus proprios et ideo
non potest intelligi quod ab extrinseco libertas alicui tribuatur. at vero neces-
sitas est ab extrinseco et ideo rei quae ex natura sua libera est Deus potest
necessitatem inferre non tamen potest Deus violentiam inferre voluntati
nam violentum dicitur quod est contra voluntatem et inclinationem, voluntas
autem non potest velle aliquid sine sua voluntate. nam eo ipso quod
vult habet voluntatem et inclinationem et illud. et ideo coactio in
voluntate contradictionem implicans sed de hijs omnibus latius in suis locis

Quaestio 3a. quaenam sit perfectior
potentia intellectus an voluntas est.

Hec quaestio ultima est de potentiis animae rationalis nam postquam de illis sigilla-
tim d. e. complementum doctrinae postulat ut eas inter se comparemus
quae quaestio etiam de potentiis sensitivis haberi posset tamen relicta in hunc lo-
cum est quoniam in his potentiis spiritualibus melius intelligetur difficultas et fa-
cile poterit adaptari reliquis, videlicet quod voluntas praemineat intellectui
1. quia habet nobilissimum obiectum, respicit n. ipsam rationem boni prima autem
et potissima perfectio rei videlicet eius bonitas consistit nam bonum dicit ordinem
ad existentiam.. verum autem quod est obiectum intellectus ab existentia, abstrahit
illud autem videlicet ea perfectio quod ordinem habet ad existentiam, nam exis-
tentia est prima et potissima perfectio rei, 2. argumento ex actibus nam perfectior
est actus.

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